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The industrial success of Hong Kong has been examined by a number 
of theoretical perspectives. While each of them has its own merits, it is 
argued that they all neglect the social organization of production, as 
well as the mode of linkage with the world-economy. With the help of 
the Global Commodity Chain Framework, this thesis is aimed at a 
description and explanation of the input-output system and the mode of 
governance of the domestic production system in Hong Kong. The role 
of local trading firms in mediating the domestic node and the world-
economy would be highlighted first. They are important matching 
agents between foreign buyers' demands and domestic production 
capability. This mode of insertion into the world-economy would 
affect both the input-output system and the mode of governance. 
Specifically, the domestic production system has to be organized in a 
responsive fashion, so that foreign buyers' orders can be sucessfully 
satisfied. The issue of governance is interesting, particularly when the 
input-output system is populated by a large number of small-sized 
establishments. Trust is shown to be an important mechanism in 
regulating and organizing the production process. It serves to tackle the 
problems of externalized economic transactions among domestic 
producers; but its construction and operation cannot be separated from 
the personal or social relationships in which the actors are embedded. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Hong Kong has achieved a good development record in the past decades. 
How can we explain this phenomenon? In conjunction with the rapid growth in other 
？ East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries Q^lCs), namely, South Korea, Taiwan and 
^ 
^ Singapore, these "economic miracles" have captured the attention of theorists of 
i . 
economic development. In this project, I would like to engage in this discussion, 
focusing on the social organization of production in Hong Kong. My research aims 
are to describe how production in Hong Kong is organized and to relate this with her 
industrial dynamism or development. 
1.1 Research Objectives and Basic Arguments 
I would adopt a social organizational perspective in this thesis. This attempt is 
i 
j based on an examination of the inadequacies of three prevalent explanations of this 
phenomenon. I would show that they have neglected how the whole chain of 
1 
production process is organized and also the mode of insertion (or developmental 
context) of the industrial system into the world-economy. An understanding of these 
two problems is a prerequsite to our understanding of the developmental outcome. 
My research objectives are thus threefold: firstly, to show how Hong Kong is 
inserted into the world-economy; secondly, to describe the organization of "input-
output system" and the "mode of governance" (the two major components of the 
organizational setup); and finally, to demonstrate how this mode of insertion would 
affect these two organizational aspects. The base point from which my analysis starts 
is that most domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in "buyer-driven 
commodity production". Such a mode of insertion would affect how domestic 
production system is organized. Specifically, domestic producers would organize a 
responsive production system, because to do so is the principal way to attract foot-
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loose buyers' capital. I would show that to enhance responsiveness to these foreign 
i buyers' demands, the input-output system would take a form of decentralization, and 
•： 
that economic transactions across organizational boundaries would be governed by 
power and trust. These are the major arguments which would be examined in the 
I 
chapters to come. 
1.2. Chapter Organization and Subsidiary Arguments 
I Why should we pay the emphasis on the social organization of production? 
f . 
This is indeed an outcry from the prevalent explanations on Hong Kong's industrial 
success. In Chapter Two, I would begin from a critical examination of three existing 
？ perspectives. Specifically, free-market explanations, dependency theory and statist 
i 
perspective are put under closer scrutiny. My conclusion is that these prevalent 
explanations have neglected the mode of linkage between the domestic production 
system and the world-economy as well as their interaction. They also lack an analysis 
ofthe social organization ofproduction, that institutional medium in which “factors of 
production" are combined and generating macro economic outcome. I believe only 
when these two inadequacies are redressed can one have a better understanding of 
j 
Hong Kong's industrial development. 
I would introduce the Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) framework in 
Chapter Three. Under this framework, we have to answer four questions when we 
want to explain why a particular nation-state or economy would experience (under)-
. development in the world-economy: firstly, what is the nature of global commodity 
' ' c h a i n s in which the nation-state is involved!?; secondly, what is the position of the 
nation-state in those chains?; thirdly, why and how can the nation-state or economy 
occupy that position?; and finally, how is surplus distributed within those chains or in 
1 GCC theorists argue that the zonal regions in the capitalist world-economy are connected by global 
commodity chains. 
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\ the global division of labor〗？ My attempt to describe the configuration of the input-
j 
； output system and the mode of governance of the production system in Hong Kong is 
、 
to answer the third question. In this sense, the aim of this thesis is a rather modest one. 
‘ The GCC framework is particularly useful to my purpose here. Firstly, this 
framework puts the social organization of production in the forefront. It talks about 
how commodity production is accomplished across organizational (and national) 
boundaries. How production is organized socially is related with the developmental 
( potential of the nation-state in question, a point that is echoed in a social 
( 
j organizational perspective. Secondly, it has aptly recognized the impact of the mode 
ofinsertion on the configuration of domestic production system. The configuration of 
the domestic production system is affected by the nature of commodity production in 
which producers are engaged. This recognition is important, since domestic producers 
； 
in Hong Kong are export-oriented or subordinated by foreign buyers. I would show in 
this chapter that domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in "buyer-driven 
commodity production", and that to succeed in such a developmental context, 
production has to be organized in such a way that responsiveness of the whole 
production system to foreign buyers' demands can be enhanced. In other words, this 
mode of insertion into the world-economy has placed specific "functional 
imperatives" on the domestic production system. 
In Chapter Four, I would describe how the domestic production system is 
connected with the world-economy. Connection is important, since production is 
possible only when domestic producers have received foreign buyers' orders. This is 
indeed a defining feature of buyer-driven commodity production. I argue that local 
trading firms have played an important function here. Local trading firms are in a 
structural position to facilitate the matching between domestic production capability 
2 Development or underdevelopment is related with, or reflected by, the relative accumulation of 
surplus. 
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and foreign buyers' demands. Local trading firms are indispensable, because they can 
I . 
I monitor foreign buyers on behalf of domestic producers, and vice versa. As the grid or 
‘ center in the whole commodity chain, they can guard against opportunism of the two 
actors, the possibility of which is extremely high in such a developmental-
^ organizational context. By focusing on how the domestic production system is 
connected with the world-economy, we can understand better why Hong Kong is able 
、 
*’ to occupy her specific position in the global division of labor. 
：1 ‘ 
\ However, that local trading firms play an important mediating role does not 
guarantee that foreign buyers' demands can be successfully satisfied or the position 
necessarily occupied. The reason is that it is the domestic producers themselves 
！ (narrowly defined) which organize the whole production process. Only when domestic 
producers can deliver the required products according to the specifications of foreign 
I buyers are local trading firms able to facilitate the matching process. In other words, 
[ 
we should focus on the local organization of production, which is, when seen in a 
global scale, just a node in the global commodity chain. In Chapter Five, I would 
3 
！ sketch the configuration of such a node. Based on a secondary analysis of a number of 
existing studies and government surveys, I would show that there are extensive inter-
organizational linkages in the input-output system; and that such a system is stratified 
by different-sized producers. That the domestic node is structured in this way is 
related with the mode of its insertion into the world-economy (as well as the social 
and political contexts in which commodity production is accomplished). In other 
words, the local organization of production is affected by the global organization of 
production. I would also introduce the local organization of a buyer-driven metal ware 
commodity chain in this chapter. It serves as a preliminary for our discussion of the 
governance of the production system. The data are gathered by intensive interviews 
(the length being over six hours) with one of the owners (acting as the sales person) of 
the first-tier local producer in this chain. The interview is centered around the 
management of inter-organizational ties this producer has. The account is further 
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Strengthened and cross-checked by the materials gathered in interviews with six local 
trading firms and/or agents (see Appendix 2). These trading firms are mainly 
contacted via the interviewee. In this sense, the "sample" is drawn with a certain 
degree ofbias, since they are the active trading partners of this first-tier producer. But 
my purpose in this project is to study the social processes involved in the management 
of inter-organizational relations. I believe that such a loss of “statistical 
representativeness" can be complemented by the richness of information gathered. 
Granted that commodity production is accomplished jointly by various 
producers, the problem of integration or coordination should figure in the forefront. 
How can foreign buyers ensure that local trading fmns are able to coordinate 
j 
I production? How can local trading firms ensure that the first-tier producers they have 
. 
appointed can deliver the goods? How can first-tier producers ensure that their lower-
tier production partners are able to accomplish production subcontracts? These are 
very important and interesting research questions when we are to understand how 
I commodity production is organized or governed. In Chapter Six, I would show that 
) I ！ trust is an important means in the governance of the domestic production system. 
Trust can promote quick delivery, lower price, as well as responsiveness, those crucial 
J - - .— 
I factors in satisfying foreign buyers' demands. Only when domestic producers have 
j . 
I placed enough trust on each other can the responsiveness ofthe production system be 
i j 




\ . . 
I At first glance, the presence of trust would imply a egalitarian relationship. 
， However, as I would also show in Chapter Six, power is unevenly distributed in the 
I _ 
domestic production system. The power-holders would utilize such power to 
substitute as well as to create trust. Trust, then, cannot be separated from power 
relations in which domestic producers are situated. In tum, how power is distributed is 
related with the configuration of the input-output system. Upper-tier producers are 
generally more powerful than their lower-tier counterparts, mainly because of their 
~" Page 5 
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I "proximity" to market outlets. In the second section of this chapter, I would talk about 
;i the process of construction of trust. While some economists may argue that exactly 
(: 
because the mode of governance is an efficient one, it would automatically be erected. 
I argue that this kind of explanation is erroneous; what we need is the causal 
•\ 
I • 
j processes of social construction. I would show that personal and social relationships 
j are important means to gather the necessary information when actors are to place trust 
I on others. That domestic producers would embed economic transactions on social 
relationships is related with the special properties of trust. To collect reliable 
'i -
I information through personal networks is a crucial means to minimize the inherent 
I • 
j risks in trust placing. Moreover, domestic producers would utilize community i 
1 . . 
I sanctions or social ostracism to ensure cooperation across organizational boundaries. 
i 
' i 
1 Put it slightly differently, while trust is efficient in smoothing economic transactions, 
the construction oftnist is intimately related with the social relationships in which the 
I . 
I actors are embedded. This is the social aspect ofthe organization ofproduction. 
In Chapter Seven, we would come to some concluding remarks. I would first 
recapitulate my discussion on the domestic production system and the mode of 
insertion into the world-economy. While I have adopted the GCC framework in this 
thesis, I think there is room for improvement. The first thing is to “domesticate，，the 
framework: only when the organization of production of the domestic node is folly 
theorised can we have a clearer understanding on the operations and constitution of 
global commodity production. I would then say a number of words about the 
developmental outcome ofthe production system. After that, I would talk about what 
I mean by a precarious symbiosis among domestic producers. As a fmal remark, I 
would base on the precepts of the social organizational perspective to say something 
about the destiny ofthe production system and its ftiture developmental possibilities. I 
hope the utility ofasocial organizational perspective can be figured out thus. 
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i Chapter 2 The Social Organization of Domestic Production and the Linkage 
with the World-Economy 
I 
In this chapter, I would first discuss the major existing perspectives on the 
economic growth in Hong Kong, and argue that we should focus on the social 
, organization ofproduction in the Hong Kong's industrial economy as well as that of 
I its linkage with the world-economy. In Section 2.1,1 would examine the free-market 
explanations, dependency theories and similar ones emphasizing the impact of the 
international economy on domestic economic development. Some brief reference to 
the statist arguments would also be made. My conclusion is that while the free-market 
i ‘-
explanations are incomplete in their conception of economic action and fail to take the 
； production process into account, dependency theories are attributing too much 
i 
I attention to the determining role of international factors. How the domestic economy 
is organized, how and why it is inserted into the world-economy are two important 
questions that are neglected by these two kinds of explanations. The statist arguments 
fare better in certain aspects, for example, in their notion of the role of the colonial 
state in generating "collective consumption" and hence internalizing some ofthe costs 
of reproduction of labor power for capital. However, the transformation of labor 
power into labor is just one of the aspects in organizing industrial production. The 
management of inter-organizational ties is another important job for all small-sized 
industrial establishments in Hong Kong, since external linkages of goods, services 
and the like must be resorted to. My contention is that a ftill cognizance ofthe social 
organization ofthe whole local production chain is a prerequisite to our understanding 
of industrial development. This point prepares a good ground for my coming 
discussion on the input-output system and the mode of governance of the domestic 
production system. 
In Section 2.2, I would review a numher of studies utilizing such an 





j While these studies have successfully problematized the exact social organization of 
^ 
j_ economic activities, they have paid insufficient attention on the linkage between the 
气 
domestic productive capacity and the world-economy as well as the impact ofsuch a 
mode ofinsertion on the organizational setup of the domestic production system. My 
research findings suggest that the way by which the two are connected will affect the 
organization ofthe former. This point underpins my coming discussion on the role of 
1 
• local trading firms in organizing industrial production, and how they would affect the 
organization of production among domestic producers (narrowly defined). 
2.1. The Existing Perspectives and Their Weaknesses 
！ 
2.1.1. Production as a Black Box and the Social Bases of Economic Action 
丨 
The most common explanation of the post-War growth in Hong Kong is from 
the free market theorists. To them, the fact that the government in Hong Kong 
maintains a "positive non-interventionist" stance with respect to the workings of the 
economy testifies to the strength of a "pure" market regime. In a comparative 
perspective, the low intensity and scope of interventions into the economy by the 
colonial state in Hong Kong is beyond doubt. By this token, these theorists argue that 
； Hong Kong experiences rapid economic growth because she has a laissez faire 
economy, in which only minute, if not nonexistent, administrative controls on the 
i 
1 • 
flow of resources and information are imposed. This kind of explanation, amplified 
j 
for example by Chou (1966), Friedman and Friedman (1980), Mok (1993), Riedel 
(1974) and Szczepa^ik (1953), emphasizes the importance of free market in the 
optimal allocation of resources in creating a sound economic base and industrial 
structure. That Hong Kong experiences a rapid economic growth is a firm testimony 
to the correctness of their approach and prescription. 





^ But under a closer scrutiny, this explanation is not without its faults and blind 
；； 、 
！ spots. The criticisms leveled against this kind of explanations are numerous (see，for 
t . 
example, Haggard 1990; Henderson 1993 and Wade 1990 in the context ofEast Asia 
and Latin America) and would not be repeated here. There are, however, two points 
'•t H, 
worthy of further attention. One can first query whether a "true" market is really 
existent. Though the state may abstain from heavily "intervening" into the economy, 
it has laid down the institutional rules (for example, laws and regulations) in which 
I -
market forces operate. It follows that the market in itself is politically embedded. Chiu 
1 (1993) has demonstrated the historical and institutional bases of the laissez faire 
I 
economy in Hong Kong. His central argument is that, because of her colonial nature I •• ;i -
and entrepot legacy, the colonial state is subject to pressures from both the JBritish 
government and big British capitals, represented by the big trading companies. The 
！ institutional base of "unorganized capitalism" (Chiu and Lui Forthcoming) was 
conditioned by the nature of state-capital alliance. Industrial capital as a whole, 
suffering from "the law of large number", was weak in organizational terms. The 
fiscal and political constraints thus imposed determined the developmental pattem of 
Hong Kong, for example, the relative neglect of small-sized factories, especially those 
owned and operated by the Chinese "subjects", and the hands-off attitude and policy 
towards industrial development. The government had refused steadfastly to the 
demands for preferential provision of industrial land and the establishment of an 
industrial bank, which were thought to be beneficial to the establishment and 
operation of small-sized factories in overcoming fiscal constraints and acquiring 
industrial accommodation. In other words, markets (or indeed any other economic 
institutions) are politically embedded. We should focus on the institutional source of 
"self-regulating" market (Polanyi 1944), or more generally, the social construction of 
economic institutions. 
On step further, the market is a social entity. Actors in markets are not as 
anonymous nor as atomistic as these theorists would like to see. Economic actors 
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i would resort to social ties in organizing their transactions, since transactions involve 
administrative costs as well as risks (see especially Granovetter 1985, 1992). 
Economic action is superimposed into the social sphere, in other words. The market in 
Hong Kong can thus be seen as a test case here: we can cast the validity ofthe free-
market explanations into doubt if we can show that even in a laissez faire economy 
like the one in Hong Kong, market transactions are very organized (see Silin 1972 for 
i . 
the stable trading patterns in vegetable wholesaling and retailing). I would show in 
later chapters that in order to enhance responsiveness to the changing demands of 
*: foreign buyers, local trading firms and domestic producers would try to build long-
V 
i term and stable (that is, organized) relationships among themselves, which is 
f| . ‘ “ 
buttressed by the presence of trust. 
i 
1 ‘ ‘ 
1 The incompleteness of this kind of explanations also surfaces when we take a 
closer look at the industrial structure in Hong Kong. From Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 \ we 
can see the trend of decreasing average size of the industrial establishment over the 
years (see also Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The average size of industrial establishments (in 
the manufacturing sector as a whole as well as in the manufacturing industry of 
"fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment，, is extremely smalL In 
the very first instance, why the industrial establishments in Hong Kong are so small is 
an important question which is neglected in these free-market accounts. That 
industrial establishments are very small in size would bring serious implications on 
the developmental outcome of the production system. 
It is often a received wisdom in neoclassical economics that increasing 
establishment size is advantageous in realizing the internal economies of scale and 
scope. To enjoy these advantages would make all national economies converge into a 
common model. In other words, a growing and rationalizing industrial economy 
^Tables and figures are placed at the end of their respective chapter. 
2 ISIC7HIC 380-381. Hereafter as "fabricated metal products". It is the broad industry group to which 
my cases belong. 
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I would gradually eliminate the small (hence inefficient because ofthe remnants ofthe 
i_ traditional constraints) factories or workshops. To these theorists, a small factory is 
i characterized by traditional authority, inefficient management and "irrational" 
:4¾ 
working practices. That Hong Kong maintains a very large pool of very small 
\ factories is an anomaly to these theorists (see also Granovetter 1984). We should 
-•1 
； recognize the systemic viability of small-firm economies. 
I 
1 I 
-.i I . 
Furthermore, when the scale and scope of a particular industrial establishment 
• are so small, commodity production can only be accomplished by resorting to external 
linkages. Proceeding from the view of transaction cost approach, exemplified for 
example by Williamson (1981，1983)，vertical integration is predicted because of the 
j economizing of transaction costs. I would agree with the economists that these costs 
( are extremely high in the production system in Hong Kong, because, firstly, export-
oriented production (or more specifically, "buyer-driven commodity production") is 
characterized by a high level of uncertainties as well as risks; and secondly, an ex ante 
complete contract is made impossible (or impractical) when production activities are 
accomplished by a combination of a large number of small-sized industrial 
establishments and constant readjustments are the rule (see also Liu and Wong 1989). 
However, the consequence I observe is different from that predicted by these 
}•. • 
economists, viz., granted that integration is not a favorable nor a feasible option, 
> 
I market actors would try to build trust (or organized transactions) in order to minimize 
丨丨 
) _ 
the costs and uncertainties in governing these external transactions. The pattem we 
i 
3 
I can observe is that market transactions (as inter-organizational ties) are more 
organized than the ftee market explanations could have recognized. A more 
sociological approach can help unravel the social processes involved in organizing the 
networks of interdependence among these small-sized industrial establishments. In 
Chapter Six, I would retum to the social construction of trust among domestic 
producers, which can fully explicate what is meant by a social organization of 
production. 
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Additionally, an adoption ofthe neoclassical perspective would lead us to ask 
the wrong questions. For example, in several early studies of the small-sized factories 
in Hong Kong, questions are asked about the erosion of traditional (that is, Chinese) 
"touch" in these factories in Hong Kong (King and Leung 1975; King and Man 1974). 
i 
句 
^ It is no denying that the small-sized factories in Hong Kong are really Chinese in their 
\ various practices, for example, in terms of recruitment, management and the general 
conduct of business. But one would be misled when "Chinese-ness" is equated with 
tradition and backwardness, which should be swept away in the course of 
industrialization. The incomplete separation of economics from social influence 
1 should be seen as a creative tactic in governing external transactions. On this 1 
,i . 
I "Chinese-ness" issue, Djao (1981) proceeds from another angle and argues that the 
"use" of"patrimonial authority" inside the Chinese small-sized factories is exactly the 
solution devised by the entrepreneurial (Chinese) capitalists to "engineer" the consent 
I 
of workers. These capitalists can ensure the production and appropriation of surplus 
！ value and adapt to the imperatives of the capitalist world economy by installing 
I patrimonial relations in production (see also Lee 1993 and Siu n.d.). The validity of 
I this argument is not at issue here, but two important points are highlighted 
I 
I nonetheless: firstly, economic action cannot be separated neatly from social action, 
i 
and secondly, the exact social organization of production in a domestic economy 
cannot be detached from its developmental context. 
However, the first point cannot be pushed too far. While social or personal 
relationships are utilized to smooth economic transactions, the instrumentalism 
involved in such governance cannot be neglected. Redding (1991), Whitley (1992a) 
and Wong (1991) have argued that the networks of interdependence among Chinese 
small-sized industrial establishments are made possible because of, firstly, the 
existence of "systemic trust" prevalent in a Chinese culture and, secondly, the easy 
availability of trust between one's kin or close friends. However, as I would 
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demonstrate in Chapter Six, a common "characteristics-base" is not a sufficient factor 
L 
in the building oftrust (Cf. Zucker 1986). A would-be trustor would gather as much 
information on past performance of the would-be trustee as possible when it is to 
place trust. By this way, the would-be trustor can determine the probable 
trustworthiness of the would-be trustee, and consequently would discriminate among 
one's fellows. The reason is this: since trust-placing would create risks for the trustor, 
1 1 it would be extremely careful in the process. Only when the "right" information has 
,i . 
been gathered (which is undoubtedly facilitated when both parties belong to a 
i common characteristics-base) would a trusting relationship be constructed. It follows 
that trust may not be granted to one's kins or fellows. Economic rationality is an 
important principle to be observed, a fact that is neglected by these "culturalist" 
theorists. Nonetheless, their renewed focus on the social organization ofproduction is 
I suggestive, because they have highlighted the fact that the production process matters, 
and that economic actions are always juxtapositioned into personal or social 
relationships. 
2.12. The Linkage with the World-Economy 
Dependency theories, as well as other explanations similarly emphasizing the 
impact of the international economy on domestic economic growth, have been a 
minority explanation on Hong Kong's economic growth. To these theorists, a heavy 
dependency on the international economy is detrimental to a healthy and normal 
' i 
growth in a dependent country. That Hong Kong experiences a genuine growth is a 
！ deviant case indeed. Of course, one could deny the existence of growth in the East 
Asian region as transitory and highly vulnerable, as Frank (1982) does. But this 
^ 
‘ dismissal is far from satisfactory, when the growth has continued for over 40 years, 
and the social dislocations, for example, increasing income inequalities, authoritarian 
politics, which are thought to be related with dependency, are decreasing in their 
significance (but not eliminated though). 
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1 . • . 
One could then revise the main argument and recognize the possibility of 
？ development in a dependent economy. In this revised version, an economy heavily 
i 
, reliant on foreign trade, import and export is said to be conditioned by the capitalist 
world-economy. Economic growth in dependent NICs is tightly related to the ups and 
downs of the economy in the core. They can experience economic growth if and only 
if the conditions "permit", or that the capitalist world-economy "invites" them to the 
promised land. For example, a dependent economy can seize the opportunities offered 
I 
when a "new international division of labor" is said to be established after the Second 
World War (Frobei, Heinrichs and Kreye 1980). Rising wage rates and the 
I ascendance of the working class in developed capitalist societies (because of the 
I 
ascendance of class struggle) drive many capital, together with the labor intensive 
productive processes, out from the core. Combined with the advances in 
transportation and communications technologies, production is hereby 
internationalized, that is，spread to peripheral areas. Thus we witness the proliferation 
of giant multinational corporations around the globe and the establishment of 
extensive subcontracting links between these core societies and the dependent 
countries (Sharpston 1975). The main attraction in these dependent NICs is that they 
are rich in the provision of cheap labor power (Landsberg 1979). Because of its short 
industrialization experience and the repressive state in curtailing labor "unrest", the 
working class is docile and can be subject to tighter control and higher exploitation. 
Thus one can explain the existence of growth in Hong Kong by reference to, first, the 
economic boom and the rising wage rates in the West, especially in the 1960s, and, 
second, to the provision of cheap labor (made possible^ by continuous influx of 
Chinese refugees) engaging in labor-intensive production (So 1986). 
That Hong Kong is intimately related with the developed countries is a truism. 
But if one attributes the key of success solely to the dynamics of the world economy, 
one would miss very important features in the domestic society. How and why is the 
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domestic industrial economy linked to the capitalist world-economy? These theorists 
would regard this question as a false one, because “capital’’ would actively search for 
profitable production sites, and that the existence of a cheap labor supply in a 
dependent country is a sufficient condition to attract it. Economic development or 
underdevelopment is an automatic outcome. 
I One could refute these claims from two fronts. Firstly, one can query the 
: importance attributed to the determining role of mere cheap labor supply as the 
sufficient condition of growth and the magnet attracting foreign capital. The existence 
of cheap labor, a sellers' labor market and a weak labor movement does not 
necessarily imply the exact possibility of “easy” extraction of surplus value. Consent 
must be "manufactured" (Burawoy 1979) and the labor force must be concretely 
organized so that capitalist production can be carried out. Cohen (1989) fmds that 
1 capitalist production implanted in “traditional” agricultural societies has to face many 
difficulties in socializing the peasant workers to factory discipline or a "modem" 
lifestyle. A large reserve army of laborers is not a sufficient factor in explaining 
f' fc 
dependent development. Furthermore, global out-sourcing and industrial relocation 
may be a result of, for example, the search for market access, linkage effects as well 
as local expertise and initiatives (Schoenberger 1988a). Cheap labor, and by the same 
j token, labor control, should seen as just some (but not all) of the concerns of capital. 
I 
I Secondly, the size of foreign investments in Hong Kong (either as direct investments 
or in joint ventures) is surprisingly small (Mok 1993: 138). While the industrial 
economy in Hong Kong is export-led, it does not imply that it is organized or 
coordinated directly by foreign capital or their subsidiaries. These two points would 
i 
direct us to the domestic organization ofproduction. 
Secondly, one would question the attempt to equate the existence of foreign 
linkages with the determining role these linkages bring. Hong Kong is indeed heavily 
reliant on trade, and her industrial economy is basically export-oriented (See Table 
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2.4). But one would commit an error when a determining role is hereby attributed to 
the foreign factors. Similar with the neoclassical account but from the opposite angle, 
this kind of explanation is static and thus neglecting the questions of mode and timing 
ofits insertion into the world-economy, I argue that most domestic producers in Hong 
Kong are engaged in "buyer-driven commodity chains" (Cf. Rabach and Kim 1994). 
I 
I Such a mode of insertion into the world-economy, which is facilitated by the local 
� tradingfirms, would affect the configuration of the domestic node. I would also argue 
I that whether the domestic node can withstand competitive pressures from other NICs 
I (or whether it can reproduce its occupancy into a particular kind of global commodity 
chains) is highly conditional on the overall responsiveness ofthe production system in 
the domestic node. In other words, how the domestic economy is connected with the 
f , 
^ f- • 
world-economy and how the production system is organized are two important 
I . 
research questions. I would return to these in more detail in the next chapter. 
‘ 
1 
2.1.3. The Search for a Center and the Provision of Collective Consumption 
i f 
The statist perspective is seldom applied in the analysis of the process and 
success of industrialization in Hong Kong. It is easy to understand such a state of 
affairs because, as mentioned above, the scope and intensity of state intervention in 
i 
I the economy are comparatively small. The common tools of industrial targeting, i 
j industrial financing and other specific preferential treatments towards industrialization 
in other East Asian NICs are largely absent in Hong Kong. So how can these theorists 
situate this case neatly in their theoretical enterprise? Two common ways out are 
examined here. 
One could search for the "functional equivalents" of the state in Hong Kong's 
political economy. Deyo (1987) argues that the developmental experiences of the East 
Asian NICs can be subsumed under a “strategic capacity model”. The logic of this 
model is that because of its relative autonomy from different societal forces (a 
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resultant of the "linkage sequencing" with the world-economy and growth of different 
class forces), the states in these NICs have the necessary capacity and developmental 
interests in directing industrialization by a variety of tools. The Hong Kong case can 
also be explained by the model, though similar public bodies or state authority is 
absent. In Deyo,s (1987: 244) words, “the peak economic organizations" (for 
example, the major banks and large British trading companies), working with close 
collaboration with the colonial state, are the alternative centers of industrial 
development. If this is really the case, then the model can be saved and the Hong 
Kong case is just another instance of confirmation. 
- -
j But this argument cannot stand up to empirical reflitation. Chiu (1993) has 
I 
demonstrated the institutional separation of industry, especially the small-sized 
factories, with the state and financial institutions (see also Lau 1994). And we can 
fmd numerous complaints from the Chinese factory owners and their spokespersons 
1 that public support to financing and accommodation is far from adequate (Lo 1967， 
1968，1970; Sutu 1964, 1965a, 1965b). Ifthe central role attributed by Deyo (1987) to 
1 these alternative centers is indeed ineffective or non-existent, it is safe to argue that 
•s 
j such a revised version ofthe statist perspective is far from accurate. Nonetheless, it 
does not mean that “politics” does not matter. As I would show in Chapter Five, the 
lack of state support would limit the possibilities of size growth of domestic 
producers. That domestic producers are small in size will in tum affect how the input-
output system is constituted and how production is governed. 
There is'a second variant of the statist argument that, in my view, is more 
helpful in explaining the success of industrialization in Hong Kong. Though the direct 
intervention of the state in industrial development is comparatively scant, the Hong 
Kong government has assumed an indirect role in facilitating capitalist production by 
subsidizing the social wages of workers in the colony. The most notable way is the 
provision of cheap public housing accommodation (Castells et al. 1988). The state is 
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also directly involved in the determination of prices of basic commodities, for 
- example, water and foodstuffs (Henderson 1993; Schiffer 1983，1991). This kind of 
explanations fares better because it focuses on the political base of the provision of 
cheap labor. But, firstly, to repeat, cheap labor power is not a sufficient condition of 
economic growth. Various “factors of production" (labor power is just one of them) 
. 
I must be socially combined so as to accomplish commodity production. Inter-
1 organizational relations among small-sized domestic producers are also important 
I 
I 
dimensions in the organization of the domestic production system. Secondly, though 
prices ofwater and foodstuffs are politically administered, the provision of electricity 
and public transport is monopolized by a few large corporations, which are protected 
from competition by the state. It does not mean that if they are supplied through pure 
market, efficiency is necessarily enhanced and prices lowered. My argument is that 
I the lowered price of the administered commodities may be compromised by the 
monopolistic pricing of other daily necessities. That the state is really subsidizing 
capitalist production is cast into doubt. 
'、 
I • 
On the whole, the major arguments of the above three perspectives are 
inadequate in the analysis of the success of industrialization in Hong Kong. As is 
j glanced in my discussion, only a social organizational perspective is capable in 
i explaining such a phenomenon. In this thesis, I would talk about two major topics, 
i 
I namely, the mode ofinsertion of the domestic productive capability into the world-
economy, and the organizational setup (which can be further sub-divided into two 
aspects, namely, the input-output system and the mode ofgovernance). According to 
Storper and Harrison (1991: 408，411)，an input-output system denotes the “collection 
ofactivities which lead up to the production of a specific marketable output"; whereas 
“a govemace structure refers to ther degree of hierarchy and leadership (or their 
opposites, collaboration and cooperation) in coordinating the input-output system”）. 
i i 
I _ -- -
1^ have bracketed the third dimension "spatiality" in Storper and Harrison's (1991) analysis of 
organization of production system. 
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Put it into the context here, I would show how the production of the commodity 
required by foreign buyers (the mode of insertion) is accomplished in Hong Kong 
(that is, how the commodity [a marketable output] is jointly produced by various f .. 
I producers in the domestic production system) and how these economic activities are 
f 
coordinated. The second topic is extremely interesting in Hong Kong because the 
» input-output system is constituted by a large number of different tiers of domestic 
producers. To focus on the organizational setup of the domestic production system is 
thus a preliminary, but indispensable, research question before we can explain the 
developmental success of the Hong Kong's industrial economy. 
I 
i . • I 
I 
2.2. The Social Organization of Production in Hong Kong 
Through the critical examination of the existing explanations of Hong Kong's 
( economic growth, I advocate that the social organization of production should be 
incorporated into every successful and adequate account of the phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, even when we recognize the necessity to incorporate such a view, 
problems still remain in the conceptualization of this social organization. An anatomy 
ofthe capitalist production is appropriate here. 
Capitalist production can be seen as an arrangement in which commodity 
producers combine the physical means of production and labor power in order to 
produce commodities. These are then sold in the market, so as to make a profit by 
i appropriating surplus value. Capitalism can then be conceptualized as the sum of 
flows in various commodity chains. Raw materials are worked on by the workers，the 
\ 
I latter expending their labor in the capitalist labor process. Labor power is, a step 
backwards, reproduced by the consumption of various daily subsistence commodities. 
Then the products produced are sold, perhaps through some agents, in the market, in 
which the products "meet" the consumers. Indeed, a particular commodity is the 
i j 
j 
“ ~" Page 19 
Chapter Three 
convergence of several commodity chains, because different “factors of production" 
in themselves are commodities in tum. 
Simply put, to utilize an organizational perspective in the study ofthe process 
of production means to inquire about the combination of different "factors of 
production" or transactions of economic activities in capitalist production, with a fall 
recognition of the mediating role of the existing organizational arrangements in which 
such transactions take place. This is indeed another way to define the input-output 
system and the mode of governance of a production system. This organizational 
perspective has been extensively applied to the workings of the Japanese economy. 
Her organizational arrangements are said to be an important mediating medium in 
encouraging industrial dynamism and facilitating structural adjustments. For example, 
despite the appreciation of the yen and the pressures to liberalize entry barriers, the 
penetration of imports into the final product and intermediate goods markets is 
^ surprisingly low, as the continuous rivalry between the United States and Japan over 
i •« 
i the "non-tariffs" barriers has demonstrated to us. That the Japanese economy is highly 
I 
I 
adaptable to international changes and conducive to product and process innovations 
are also said to be related to the various organizational arrangements of the economy, 
>； i 
for example, the life-time employment system, the close relationships between 
suppliers and final producers, as well as the cohesion between the different units in 
the keiretsu (see，for example, Dore 1983, 1986; Gerlach 1992; Sheard 1983; Sheard 
and Findlay 1992; Smitka 1991). In sum, a study of macro phenomena (development 
or industrial dynamism) requires one to focus on the organizational (or institutional) 
setup in which the micro movements of “factors of production" are taking place (see 
also Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). 
The employment of labor is the most favorite topic in the inquiry of this social 
organization. For example, one can focus on the capitalist labor process, and see how 
labor power is transformed into labor proper. The capitalist labor process is 
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principally characterized by the extraction of "surplus value", in contrast with the 
extraction of "surplus product" (for example, rents and feudal labor) in the feudalist 
1 
‘ mode of production (Burawoy 1985). The task ahead for the capitalists thus is to I ^ 
： ensure the above said transformation, because what they buy is just the labor power 
I 
within, say, ten hours. These labor-process theorists are interested in the ways of 
: organizing in which this "actualization" takes place, and the conflicts and struggles 
involved in the process. 
] The other favorite field is about inter-corporate relations (Cf. Mizruchi and 
Schwartz 1987). Inter-corporate or inter-organizational transactions offinished goods, 
components, fmance, personnel as well as technology are important components of 
the organizational setup of an economy. The literature on flexible specialization and 
regionally agglomerated production complexes can also be put in this genre. In these 
literature, close relationships among small-sized and specialized firms are said to be 
the most important factor in engendering innovation and rapid response to market 
changes in these districts (Becattini 1990a, 1990b; Blim 1990; Bmsco 1982，1986, 
1990; Brusco and Sabel 1981; Foray 1991; Inzerilli 1991b; Ottati 1991; Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Pyke and Sengenberger 1990; Scott 1988a, 1988b). Inter-organizational 
ties figure prominently in the picture, especially when production is decentralized. 
These theorists are thus interested in the problems of integration or governance of 
these external transactions^ (Cf. Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985; Lindberg, 
Cambell and Hollingsworth 1991; Storper and Harrison 1989; Traxler and Unger 
1994). They focus on the social embeddedness of economic transactions, including 
‘ state sponsorship, community ties in coordinating economic activities, and the social 
origins of technological innovation and market responsiveness. 
4 It does not mean that the problem of coordination or governance appears only when production is 
I accomplished across organizational boundaries. A vertically-integrated firm ("hierarchy") has also to 
I deal with intra-organizational conflicts and cooperation (Cf. Bradach and Eccles 1989; Eccles and 
j White 1989; Perrow 1986). 
i 
I 




2.2.1. Labor Utilization and Inter-Organizational Relations within the 
Domestic Production System in Hong Kong 
Few scholars have studied these two organizational aspects of production in 
Hong Kong, and even fewer have put them in their developmental context. 
I Exceptions, of course, are at hand. Lui (1990, 1991) has documented the pattern of 
I outwork utilization in the export-oriented factories, especially the garment-making 
！ 
i factories. He demonstrates the social relations embedded in the employment ofthese 
^ 
outworkers. For example, outworkers are concentrated in public housing estates, a 
spatial arrangement that facilitates the transportation of semi-finished products 
between different phases of production. The recruitment of outworkers relies on the 
‘ existing social network between the “subcontracting heads" and their neighbor and 
I 
• friends. The employment relations are not just economic in nature; they are masked 
！ by some friendship ties, and infused with traditional Chinese customs, for example, 
the giving of "red pockets" to the children of the outworkers during the Chinese new 
year. Lui (1990, 1991) relates this use of industrial outwork and its peculiar social 
practices to the attempt ofmanagement, especially the small subcontracting factories, 
to maintain a higher level of production flexibility, which is indispensable in buyer-
driven commodity production. On the other side of the same coin, the "needs" of the 
； women outworkers should be introduced into account. The sharing of family 
5 responsibilities, especially child care and family life rhythms, is a conditioning factor 
j in the supply of these outworkers. In sum, the utilization of outwork is socially 
; embedded. 
I i ， f 
I Similar phenomenon has also been studied by Sit and Ng (1980). They focus 
on the use of"ambulatory labor" in Hong Kong. Ambulatory labor is often employed 
in "skilled" and male-dominated productive processes, for example, ironing and 
cutting in the garment-making industry. Some guild-like system is established to 
restrict new entry, by which higher wages can be commanded. Factory owners are 
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thus obliged to employ this form of labor, because the skills are monopolized inside 
their circle. However, they are willing to resort to it, because the production steps 一 
performed by these workers are often just one of the various tasks in the whole 
production chain. In the case of ironing, the labor and skill needed to perform this 
work task are only required in the final phase of production. It is in the interests ofthe 
factory owners to employ ambulatory labor because to maintain a permanent team of 
these workers is a waste of money. In addition, the utilization of this kind of labor can 
help the owners cut production costs. For example, certain labor regulations do not 
apply to these workers, nor to the outworkers. This seems advantageous in the 
employers' point of view. 
The advantages of using this kind of labor, in the eyes of the contracting 
factories, are more than those listed above. In Sit and Ng's words (1980: 508), the use 
of ambulatory labor can fulfill “the desire of small firms for manpower flexibility in 
order to cope with the seasonal fluctuations that characterize their product markets 
and production schedules". Flexibility in the use of labor is again crucial in buyer-
driven commodity production. Yet the possibility of the use of this kind of "flexible 
i 
\ labor force" is conditioned by the availability of trust between the head of ambulatory 
labor team and the contracting factory. There must be some mutual understanding 
between the two parties on the amount of work guaranteed by the contracting factory 
over a definite period and on the availability of labor whenever it is needed. Only 
when such a kind oftrust or mutual understanding is in place can the strengths of this 
use of flexible labor be actualized. Trust is also indispensable because there is often 
no written contract in between. It is through the mutual adjustment ofthe demand and 
supply ofthis kind oflabor (which is in tum buttressed by trust) that ambulatory labor 
as a flexibility can be made meaningflil. As we will see in Chapter Six, trust is not 
only important in governing economic exchanges of labor power, but also in 
regulating inter-organizational transactions. 
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Chu (1992) systematizes the above two studies in her analysis of "informal 
work" in Hong Kong. There are four kinds of such work in her view: namely, 
• 
； homework (always in the form of outwork), ambulatory work, subcontracting and 
3 
"^ out-processing (Chu 1992: 426). While the minimization of labor costs is surely an 
important motive to utilize these different forms of production arrangements, the 
t imperative to suit the rhythms of export-oriented production in the context of 
务 
"dependent development" (or in our terminology, buyer-driven commodity 
production) is also a major consideration of the first-tier producers. Production 
flexibility，a constant requirement of such a mode of insertion into the world-
economy, is achieved and maintained by a “conscious manipulation of the 
organizational features of the informal work arrangements" (Chu 1992: 434). For 
example, in the case of subcontracting, the first-tier producers would farm out part of 
:i 
I their production overloads to these subordinate factories, especially when demands 
are fluctuating and orders are in a rush. These lower-tier factories act as the 
production buffers and occupy a subordinate position. Specialized production tasks 
may also be subcontracted out, so that the contracting factories can enjoy external 
economies of scale and scope, and simultaneously the subcontractor can gain 
economies of scale. In other words, the mode of insertion would affect how the 
domestic production system is organized. Chu's (1992) attempt to construct a full 
chain of industrial production (schematically, from the foreign buyers and/or their 
agents, via formal first- and second-tier subcontracting factories, to homeworkers, 
informal workshops and out-processing^ and the social dynamics (for example, in the 
case of homework, the negotiation of housework responsibility and, in the case of 
‘ subcontracting, the regulation and integration of the division of labor) in its operation 
^See Shieh 1991，1992 for the notion of"network labor process" in Taiwan's dependent development. 
His portrayal ofthe social organization of production in Taiwan is very similar to that in Chu's (1992) 
account. His argument is that because production is highly fragmented (mainly through subcontracting 
linkages) and because class consciousness of the proletariat is hard to crystallize (due to the wide-
spread inclination, and its actual possibilities, of becoming "one's own boss"), flexibility ofthe whole 
system and "hyper-self-exploitation" of laborers are achieved, which make the reproduction of export-
oriented production possible. Note that his central problematique is about the reproduction of this 
mode of industrialization, which is not exactly equivalent to the issue of dynamism of such a mode of 
economic organization. 
f 
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is also reflected in the works of the global commodity chain framework. I would 
i . 
I further elaborate this framework in the next chapter. 
Sit (1983), in a study of"factories in domestic premises", also offers us a good 
picture on the organization of external transactions. His research problem revolves 
around the locational factors behind the siting decision of these factories, which are 
often small and as a household operation. Besides the “environmental，，factors, for 
example, unavailability of suitable accommodation and low rentals, the owners of 
I , 
these factories would select a particular site so that proximity to their production 
I partners can be gained. By this token, factories in the same industry would 
concentrate in one particular area. In the case of clothing and fabricated metal 
manufacturing industries, it is found that the factories are concentrated in Shamshuipo 
• and Taikoktsui (two densely populated residential areas in the Kowloon peninsular) 
respectively. Such a concentration would facilitate inter-organizational transactions, 
which are crucial in fulfilling small and rush orders and in sustaining subcontracting 
relations. Additionally, in a domestic premise, the family members can utilize the 
factory floor space as their residence. This would facilitate the utilization of family 
labor in production. Flexibility, which is a crucial "functional imperative" in the 
developmental context of buyer-driven commodity production, is gained by these 
organizational strategies (Sit 1983: 9). 
While cooperation from other organizations must be secured in order to 
enhance responsiveness to foreign buyer's demands, a fact implying an egalitarian 
relationship, there are indeed inequalities and uncertainties in these inter-
organizational arrangements. For instance, when a foreign buyer wants to claim a 
local trading firm after receiving the products, the latter would force the first-tier 
producers to shoulder the claim. The first-tier producers, on the other hand, would 
then urge their second-tier partners to share this burden. These burdens are 
externalized down the "chain". Thus, Chu's (1992) notion of dependent 
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industrialization is a good description here, because it implies an unequal, perhaps 
exploitative, relationships between the different layers of the production chain and the -
internalization of external dependency (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). The fact that 
power is unevenly distributed along the input-output system is helpful in our analysis 
of the mode of governance of this production system. 
. 
I When we talk about the social aspects of industrial production, we have in 
mind the social mediations of the transactions between economic actors. We have 
already talked about inter-organizational transactions. The other major aspect of the 
organizational setup, the labor-process, has also been tackled by various scholars. The 
maintenance of a pool of outworkers, which requires a creative intermeshing of the 
I 
productive (economic) and family (social) spheres, is a good case here. The 
management practices within a factory also demonstrate the social mediations in the 
actualization of labor. 
I 
As I mentioned in Section 2.1.1., Djao (1981) relates the use of patrimonial 
I . . 
authority to the issue of extraction of labor power. Lee (1993) also reaches a similar 
conclusion in her study of electronics “shop floor" in Hong Kong. Adopting 
Burawoy's (1985) notion of factory regimes, Lee (1993: 531) pays specific attention 
, on the use of familial hegemony in disciplining the female workforce. The factory 
i 
regime is hegemonic in the sense that discipline is often directed to the very 
subjugation ofthe "bodies" of the female workers. This is important in an electronics 
i factory because accuracy and quality of assembly work are very much emphasized. 
This regime is more than one based only on the "market whip"; discipline is 
！ 
j constituted by the active deployment of cultural “agencies', of both management and 
workers, especially gendered practices and familial notions or discourse. For example, 
authority structure and workers' solidarity on the shop floor are often clothed in 
familial terms, like "grandfather" and "sister". This kind of cultural discourse is 
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directed at the level of appropriateness of workers' attitudes, which takes up many 
connotations oftraditional authority and submission. As Lee (1993: 535) reminds us: 
Control measures were not targeted at production activity proper, nor at workers' 
technical performance. They were more for creating docile and obedient work 
attitudes through daily enforcement of comportment. 
Yet, discipline is not one-sided as it sounds. Domination and control are an 
open and contested process. As management may try to exert labor power through the 
use of familial discourse, "counter-surveillance" is also attempted by the workers 
through the use of "innate femininity" to limit management's deployment of their 
labor power. Thus one can easily detect the creative combination of traditional 
cultural notions and economic rationality in the deployment oflabor. 
In a study ofa small glassware factory in Hong Kong, Ward (1972) shows that 
many aspects of the internal organization of production (for example, the factory 
layout) are determined by technical requirements. In a glassware factory, this finding 
is not surprising at all, because a timely and efficient flow of materials is required to 
meet the technical nature of its production. But Ward (1972: 364) fmds that the 
recruitment practices are somewhat different. For example, skilled workers, like the 
bottle blowers, are recruited through personal contacts and social network. It is 
misleading to infer from this fact to say that it is a characteristically Chinese or 
traditional (that is，inefficient) practice. It is because that the form ofrecruitment and 
reward systems in relation to other kinds of workers are totally different. The 
unskilled jobs, for example, the coolie labor, are filled by workers responding to 
advertisements or bills posted in the streets. Extra rewards are attached to workers o fa 
permanent status but not to the latter kinds. The differences between the two kinds of 
practices stem from, firstly, the differential tightness of different segments ofthe labor 
market, and secondly, the imperative for the factory owner to ensure the level of 
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requisite skill of, for example, the blowers, because it is the most crucial step in the 
whole production. A reliance on social networks can guarantee that suitable skills are — 
being employed. The factory owner would prefer personal networks to market, not 
because of some pre-given cultural preference, but because more information about 
the employees can be gathered. Thus Ward (1972: 370) concludes: 
It is not easy to deduce from these data the extent to which the stability and 
industriousness of the labor force in this glass factory are to be connected with 
peculiarly Chinese patterns of reward and punishment. The findings can also be 
explained by reference to universal economic considerations. 
All these studies employ a social organizational perspective in the study of 
labor utilization. They focus on the firm level, because it is in the manufacturing firai 
that produces the commodities. In other words, they have opened the black box ofthe 
production process. Furthermore, they have recognized fully the social mediations of 
the production process. Economic actors would try to build trust and long-term 
relationships with others so that cooperation can be secured. These studies also excel 
in their attempt to link these firm-level processes to the characteristics ofthe domestic 
economy. For example, the utilization of a particular type of workers is conditioned 
by the technical nature of production, the labor market formation (a societal-level 
i variable), as well as the labor regulations imposed by the state (testifying to the inter-.i 
\ 
j penetration ofthe economic, the social and the political). One would be delighted by 
i their attempts to bringing in the social aspects of labor utilization and inter-firm 
j transactions into the analysis of organization of production. But these studies, 
i 
j possibly except those of Chu (1992), Sit (1983) and Lui (1990, 1991), who have tried 
i 
j to connect the domestic sphere to the world-economy, still could not give a more 
complete account, because their conception of production is too narrow, or because 
they have slighted the impact of the developmental context on production 
organization. How these firms (and indeed all of the small-sized factories in Hong 
Kong engaged in export production) receive their orders and how the economy as a 
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whole captures the opportunities are still absent in these accounts. And it is clear from 
the aforementioned studies that the utilization of labor and inter-organizational 
relations among domestic producers are heavily conditioned by the requirements of 
product market conditions. I thus argue that we should focus on the mode of insertion 
ofthe domestic production system into the world-economy. 
2.2.2. The Mode ofInsertion 
As I have mentioned earlier, capitalist production can be conceptualized as 
composing of several commodity chains. It is important to bear in mind that capitalist 
production is oriented to the market (it does not mean that production is subordinated 
by the market processes), and that it is the sale of commodities that completes the 
"full circuit ofcapital" and generates the necessary profits for the capitalists. In Hong 
Kong, the marketing function of the small-sized factories is indeed an extremely 
interesting topic for further pursuit. 
t 
I . 
In a study of the condition of industrial development in Hong Kong in the 
early 1960s, it is argued that "[t]he active agent in the export ofHong Kong goods are 
not manufacturing but trading firms" (Economic Intelligence Unit 1962: 8). Why are 
•K 
, local tradingfirms important actors in the system? To answer this question, we could 
tum to the sources of orders of the small-sized factories in Hong Kong. The study just 
mentioned above estimates that over three quarters of all manufactured exports of 
: Hong Kong in the early years of industrialization were handled by the “local 
I 
1 import/export houses" (Economic Intelligence Unit 1962: 8). The importance of local 
trading firms as export intermediaries during the process of industrialization in Hong 
Kong is also noted by many observers (Brown 1971; Chan 1984; Epsy 1970; Lo 
1967; Oliphant 1967; Sutu 1964). Unfortunately, such an interesting topic has not 
been systematically tackled in the early years. Only in 1969 did the first one appear, 
in which the marketing conditions of 149 factories employing under 100 persons were 
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explored (Sutu et aL 1969). While 62% of the respondents were engaged in export 
production, only about 20% ofthese exporting factories had over 75% oftheir exports 
effected by direct sales to overseas customers; and "[m]ost of their [the remaining 
80%] exports are ... through local export houses" (Sutu et al. 1969: 3)'. A more 
grounded picture can be gathered from a number of surveys in more recent years. In a 
1978 survey of415 “small and medium" factories (those engaging under 50 persons), 
it is found that the respondents are indeed very reliant on these local trading firms for 
their export orders: 44.8% of these factories obtain their orders solely from these 
agents; whereas 12% of which are partially reliant on the latter for their orders (Sit, 
Wong and Kiang 1979: 340). Only a small portion have direct contacts with 
consumers (3.4%) or foreign buyers or their agents (11.1%). This heavy reliance on 
the trading firms for export orders is also demonstrated in the findings ofasurvey of 
295 small-sized factories in 1987 (Sit and Wong 1989). Again, over a third (35.1%) of 
the respondents are commercial subcontractors for the local trading firms; and only 
8.9% can gain direct access to the foreign markets (Sit and Wong 1989: 153). This 
leads the authors to note that ‘‘[i]t is fortunate that Hong Kong has a support system 
that has done much in overseas marketing, and there exists a large population of 
import-export housMm such that they help to bridge the gap between the small 
producers and the international market..." (Sit and Wong 1989: 154). 
In addition to the two comprehensive surveys, other smaller-scale studies also 
reveal the importance of local trading firms in mediating between producers in Hong 
Kong and foreign buyers. In a survey of 98 small-sized factories (employing 10-50 
persons, belonging to clothing and electrical/electronics industries) in 1984，a similar 
pattern is also found: about 35% ofthe respondents obtain their exports solely form 
local import/export companies, and another 8% obtain part of their orders from the 
same source (Yip 1986: 39). Again, only a small number of small-sized factories 
^Curiously enough, the exact marketing channels adopted by the remaining factories are nowhere 
specified in the report. 
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(14%) have their products directly exported. A survey conducted in 1992 of 69 
factories in the garment-making industry also reveals such a heavy reliance on local -
importy^export houses for organizing outputs for exports: about halfofthe respondents 
have over 50% of their exports effected through these local trading agents (Chiu and 
Lui Forthcoming: Table 3). Local trading firms, in other words, are an important 
connection of the productive capability of Hong Kong as a whole and the world-
economy. These trading agents are the intermediaries in international commercial 
subcontracting arrangement (Watanabe 1978: 72). 
It is thus clear that export-oriented industrial production in Hong Kong is 
different from the patterns of other larger NICs, in which production is always carried 
I out directly by foreign investors. In the Global Commodity Chain framework, 
I domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaging in buyer-driven commodity 
production. This type of commodity production is different from a producer-driven 
type. Domestic production is commissioned and initiated by foreign buyers or their 
agents, who have clear specifications before appointing domestic producers to 
旱 production tasks. In addition, these foreign buyers control the marketing and design 
functions of such commodity production. As we will see in later chapters, this mode 
\ of insertion into the world-economy would affect how domestic producers would 
I 
； organize their own production networks and internal labor deployment. Put it slightly 
different, in order to maintain a position in the global division of labor (amid 
competitive pressures from other NICs), the domestic production system has to be 
responsive to foreign buyers' demands. How this responsiveness (as a ftmctional 
imperative) is enhanced, in tum, is related with how commodity production in Hong 
Kong (as a node in the global commodity chains [Cf. Amin and Thrift 1992]) is 
organized. I would show in coming chapters how this functional imperative is 
fiilfilled, by focusing on the constitution of the input-output system and the mode of 
j governance of the domestic production system. But before that, it is appropriate to 
I 
j elaborate this global commodity chain framework. I would explain the nature of 
I 
:f: 
I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ 





commodity chains in which domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged, and the 
specific requirements placed on the domestic production system. This is the major 




i I j 
i 
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Table 2.1 
Number ofEstabUshments and Persons Engaged in the Manufacturing Sector 
(as Registered with or Recorded by Labour Department), 1947-67. 
Year No. ofEstabUshments No. ofPersons Engaged Average EstabUshment Size 
1947 961 47356 49.28 
1948 1120 56815 50.73 
1949 1251 60205 48.13 
1950 1478 81718 55.29 -
1951 1720 86136 50.08 
1952 1902 85322 44.86 
1953 2038 92178 45.23 
1954 2201 98196 44.61 
1955 2434 110574 5^.43 
1956 2944 128818 43.76 
1957 3080 137783 44.73 
1958 3524 156556 44.43 
1959 4541 177271 39.04 
1 1960 4784 215854 45.12 
1961 5624 215914 38.39 
1962 6178 255198 41-31 
1963 7108 276699 38.93 
1964 8132 325286 40.00 
1965 8137 329214 40.46 
- 1966 8941 346990 38.81 
1967 10234 399918 39.08 
1968 11667 472412 40.49 
1969 14078 524371 37.25 
1970 16507 549178 33.27 
1971 18612 564370 30.32 
I 1972 20474 578855 28.27 
1973 21470 587855 27.38 
1974 31318 600128 19.16 
1975 31034 678857 21.87 
1976 36303 773746 21.31 
1977 37568 755108 20.10 
j •j 
Source: HongKongStatistics, 1947-67. 
Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 1978 
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Table 2.2 
Number ofEstabUshments and Persons Engaged 
in the Manufacturing Ladustry, "Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment" 
(As Registered with or Recorded by Labour Department), 1947-77 
Year No. ofEstabUshments No. ofPersons Engaged Average EstabUshment Size 
1947 93 5440 58.49 
1948 142 7608 53.58 
1949 175 10787 61.64 
1950 218 14361 65.88 
1951 242 13451 55.58 
1952 276 14314 51.86 
1953 301 15472 51.40 
1954 310 17331 55.91 
1955 370 21461 58.00 
1956 465 24743 53.21 
1957 470 25861 55.02 
1958 511 25105 49.13 
1959 557 23809 42.75 
1960 568 25571 45.02 
1961 637 25332 39.77 
1962 721 28302 39.25 
1963 859 30978 36.06 
1964 1020 32329 31.70 
1965 1037 32745 31.58 
1966 1190 32178 27.04 
1967 1460 34505 23.63 
1968 1849 42585 23.03 
1969 2219 45835 20.66 
1970 2586 46673 18.05 
1971 2934 45850 15.63 
1972 3350 49690 14.83 
1973 3651 50915 13.95 
1974 4799 52446 10.93 
1975 4974 57322 n.52 
1976 6113 69781 U A 2 
1977 6481 70931 10.94 
Source: Hong Kong Statistics, 1947-67. 
Hong Kong Annual Digest ofStatistics 1978. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Trade Ratio, 1959-91 (in Percentage). 
Total Trade/ Domestic Export/ 
Year GNP Total Export 
1959 N.A. 69.9 
1961 N.A. 74.8 
1966 129 75.8 ‘ 
1971 147 80.1 
1976 141 78.5 
1981 158 65.8 
1986 185 55.7 
f 1991 244 30.2 
Note: N.A-=Not Available 
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Chapter 3 Domestic Node in Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that we have to analyze the mode of 
insertion ofthe domestic node into would-economy, as well as to treat the production 
process as a social phenomenon. These two points have fully been recognized by the 
Global Commodity Chains (hereafter as GCC) framework. In the first section of this 
chapter, I would ftoher elaborate its basic tenets, which would serve as an organizing 
device ofmy coming discussion. The framework, as its name suggests, pays particular 
attention on the transnational or global linkages in capitalist production; in other 
words, it has placed the social organization of production onto a world-wide scale. It 
is believed that only when we give the social structure its proper weight in analyzing 
the structure and governance of economic activities, especially that of inter-
organizational ties, can we have a better understanding on the production system in 
Hong Kong. In the second section, I would reframe my argument according to the 
^ 1 
precepts of the GCC framework. 
3.1 The Global Commodity Chains Framework and Domestic Node 
3.1.1. The Global Linkages of Productive Processes and Buyer-Driven 
Commodity Chains 
According to Gereffi, Korzeniewciez and Korzeniewciez (1994)，a global 
commodity chain is a network of labor and production processes, spreading over the 
different parts on the globe; the combination of which, the end product, is a finished 
commodity ready for consumption. In their words, “[a] GCC consists of sets of 
I • • 
interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking 
households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy. These 
networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and locationally integrated, 
underscoring the social embeddedness of economic organization'' (1994: 2’ emphasis 
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added). The capitalist world-economy can thus be conceptualized as the summation of 
different commodity chains, in which specific nodes (or specific kinds of nodes) are 
unevenly distributed in spatial terms. A GCC, in tum, can be conceptualized as the 
collection of all economic activities (which may scatter around the globe), which lead 
to the production ofafinal commodity; or, in our words, it is the input-output system 
of a particular commodity. 
As Arrighi (1990) has demonstrated in a quantitative analysis of the global 
distribution of “income” (indicated by GNP per capita, as a proxy of surplus 
accumulation), the structure ofthe capitalist world-economy over the past decades has 
remained a stratification ofzonal regions, contrary to the “developmentalist illusion". 
As Wallerstein (for example, 1979，1984, 1987; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986) points 
out, the three zones in the world-economy are inter-connected by commodity chains, 
in which political and economic power are muscled to ensure the uneven distribution 
of surplus, most notably by instituting monopolies. The mobility of individual states, 
hence, should be "interpreted as part and parcel of a larger historical process: the 
contradictory development ofasingular, capitalist world-economy" (Martin 1990: 4). 
Under the GCC framework, development of a particular nation-state is reflected in its 
position in various GCCs, because there is a definite amount of surplus appropriatable 
in each position. If we want to inquire about the development (or mobility) of a 
particular nation-state or economy, we have to finish two tasks: the first one is to 
show the position of that nation-state in the global division of labor, and how much 
surplus is being appropriated; the second one is to demonstrate how and why that 
nation-state is able to occupy such position. The focus of this thesis is on the latter 
question. 
To understand why a particular nation-state is able to occupy a specific 
position in the global division of labor, we may begin by focusing on its “natural 
endowment" and local characteristics. We should also pay attention on the nature of 
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commodity chains in which the nation-state is engaged. The world-economy may 
"invite" specific nation-state to industrialization or upward mobility, subject to the 
specific requirements of a particular kind of commodity chains. In plain language, we 
should focus on the reason why "many are called but only few are chosen", that is, the 
historical conjuncture of, firstly, the specific “demands，’ of globally mobile capital 
(manifested by its agents), and secondly, the "supply" of specific factors or attractions 
of the state or region in question, with reference to the specificities of the kind of 
capitalist production or GCC concerned. 
So two question follows: what is the specificity of the kind of productive 
processes in which domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged, and, 
simultaneously, what are the attractions of the domestic node in Hong Kong, with 
respect to the globally mobile capital? These require us to construct a typology of 
global production, commodity chains or industries, and the associated social and 
political dynamics of the organization of production^ 
.i 
^ 
! Gereffi (1994a) distinguishes two basic types of commodity chains, the 
"buyer-driven" and "producer-driven" ones. The major difference lies in the location 
I of the sources of initiatives and domination of the decentralized productive activities. 
The implication is that it may either be the buyers or producers that capture the lion's 
share of surplus and control the actual organization of (transnational) production. The 
: 
surplus in "buyer-driven GCCs" is said to be concentrated in the marketing spheres, 
which are monopolized by the core regions (Gereffi 1994a，1994b). In this kind of 
chains, foreign retailers, brand-name merchandisers and trading companies organize 
their sourcing or industrial manufacturing by setting up globally decentralized 
production networks. These core capitals control the research, design, marketing and 
the like activities, which give them a disproportionate share of rewards and surplus in 
'See also Kitschelt 1991, for the advocacy of a similar "sectoral" analysis. 
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the whole production pipeline. It is because these buyers' capitals are enjoying 
monopolies, whereas the productive processes they command and control are highly 
competitive. Competition for foreign investments or orders for core markets is fierce, 
because many would-be industrializers would try their best to erect favorable regimes 
and economic environments to attract these productive activities, for example, by 
establishing export-processing zones. It follows that in this type of GCCs, 
industrialization cannot be equated with development or upward mobility in the global 
division of labor. Only when the productive capital can gain access to the 
consumption and distribution networks (for example, the retail chains in core 
countries), the possibility of which is limited because of the constraints of financial 
and cultural resources, can it gain a larger share of rewards. As Gereffi (1992: 41) puts 
it, the NICs engaging in this kind of commodity production can only “capture higher 
levels of economic surplus through integrated production and marketing strategies at 
the global level". 
While the marketing activities are controlled by core capitals, the actual 
organization of productive activities may be entrusted to local agents or the factories 
themselves, which are responsible for the delivery of final products according to the 
specifications demanded by the buyers. Though production is initiated or coordinated 
by these foreign capitals, they may not necessarily produce their commodities on their 
own. Indeed it seems profitable for them to entrust production responsibility to other 
producers, because they can now shift their source according to the dictates of market 
demands. Thus one can easily imagine the nested nature of commodity production 
networks, spreading over the globe,- connecting different units to one another. An 
introduction of a leather footwear GCC and the inter-organizational relationships in 
the Nike Corporation in athletic shoes can help clarify the above point. It also 
underpins my emphasis on the organization of domestic production system in Hong 
Kong, with due respect to its mode of insertion into the world-economy. 
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As mentioned above, the GCC framework places particular attention on the 
role of consumption trends or patterns in analyzing the integration of globally 
decentralized productive processes in the buyer-driven commodity production. The 
leather shoe industry is typical in this regard. According to Korzeniewciez (1992)，the 
whole GCC (or in his terms, Global Commodity Network) is initiated by the 
American distributors and retailers (see also Gereffi and Korzeniewciez 1990). These 
agents derive their strength (and, one may also add, their bargaining power as well as 
domination) because of their proximity and access to the expanding US markets, in 
which product variety and short reaction time are much emphasized in a "postmodern 
world". 
While Italy remains an important shoe producer for the US markets, Brazilian 
shoe manufacturers have gained a larger share of US imports since the mid-1980s. 
The growing strength of the Brazilian manufacturers is attributed to two factors: the 
access to quality leather produced in Argentina and the flexibility of the "industrial 
districts" to which the Brazilian manufacturers belong. Firstly, Argentine leather 
producers prefer exports to Brazil to domestic producers, because they can gain fiscal 
benefits in foreign exchanges and that the Brazilian markets for leather are larger and 
more stable than the domestic one. The complaints from domestic shoe producers in 
Argentina are curtailed because of the organizational and political strengths (because 
ofclose alliance with the state) ofthe leather producers. In other words, the domestic 
political formation in Argentina is a crucial factor in ensuring the supplies of leather 
to the Brazilian assemblers. 
Yet the competitive bases of the Brazilian shoe producers are not just limited 
to the steady and reliable access to quality leather; the pattern of social organization of 
production within the industrial district engenders a specific competitiveness, which is 
indispensable in capturing the volatile US markets. As the notion of industrial district 
implies, the various shoe manufacturers and their component suppliers in Brazil are 
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tightly knit, so that external economies of scale and scope, as well as flexibility, are 
gained. This is buttressed by the physical and social proximity of the economic actors 
within the district. Substantively, dense transactions and close cooperation (both 
material and informational) between the units are made possible by the social 
structure in which they are embedded. Korzeniewciez (1992: 320-1) relates this with 
the trusting relationship among producers and common ethnic community of the 
Germanic Brazilians. In this sense, there is much similarity with the organization of 
production in Hong Kong. As I would show in later chapters, the network of 
interdependence among the small-sized industrial establishments in Hong Kong is 
also governed by trust, which is facilitated by close personal connections. A further 
point of relevance is noticed in the role of trading agents, "lead agents" (Storper and 
Harrison 1991)，or intermediaries in connecting the (domestic) node ofmanufacturing 
to the marketing and distribution spheres in the target markets. These agents have a 
rather close contact with the foreign buyers, and they monitor changes in consumer 
tastes closely. Information exchange and technological support are achieved because 
ofthe existence of a "close symbiotic relationship" between the manufacturers on the 
one hand, and the trading agents on the other, within the district (see also Ritaine 1991 
and Storper and Scott 1989 on the role of impannatore in Prato in the "Third Italy”). 
Local trading firms in Hong Kong also play an identical role, in connecting the 
demands of foreign buyers and domestic producers as a whole. I would retum to this 
issue in the next chapter. 
In sum, the whole analysis demonstrates the social and political embeddedness 
of economic activities, locational specificity (and its associated distribution of 
rewards) and inter-organizational ties in this leather footwear GCC. The crucial and 
dominating role ofUS capitals in buyer-driven GCC, much emphasized in this study, 
:; can be further clarified by an examination of another footwear GCC, the global 
subcontracting relations between Nike and their suppliers or assemblers. 
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Similarly, Donaghu and Barff (1990) begin with the growing but increasingly 
diversified athletic footwear markets in the core countries in their study of the Nike 
athletic shoe "manufacturer". In strict sense, Nike is no longer a shoe manufacturer, 
since all production processes (components supply and assembly) are subcontracted 
out to other producers. This strategy was adopted in the early 1980s when new 
product models were rapidly introduced to capture the highly competitive market. 
Flexibility now is much emphasized and subcontracting or work decentralization is a 
good means to gain responsiveness to a changing market (see Harrison and Kelley 
1993; Homles 1986 and Imrie 1986). As such, the subcontracting relationships 
established between the parent company and subcontractor-assemblers (now 
concentrated in Southeast Asia) should figure out in the forefront when we try to 
decipher the organization ofNike footwear production. Donaghu and Barff(1990) do 
not taUc explicitly in GCC terms; yet their emphasis on the management of 
subcontracting relations and their changing spatial manifestation can be put 
comfortably inside the GCC framework. 
To the managers in the parent Nike corporation, the management of these 
relationships is the major job in accomplishing the integration of different nodes in 
this buyer-driven GCC. They would search for the appropriate sourcing sites, and 
combine the semi-finished commodities into the final product, which is marketed by 
the parent company. Here its initiating role is as typical as in other buyer-driven 
GCCs, in which the consumption node is monopolized by core capitals. Donaghu and 
Barff(1990: 542-3) distinguish these "classes" of "first-tier production partnerships" 
among the shoe assemblers in Nike's global production network. The “developed 
partners" are those subcontractors who have maintained longer-term relationships 
with the parent company. The two parties have engaged injoint product development; 
and the subcontractor-assemblers are responsible for production for the less price-
sensitive segment ofthe athletic shoe markets. That Nike decided to assign their shoe 
assembly productive processes to these developed partners (for example, those in 
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Taiwan and South Korea) is that they have already possessed a relatively developed 
manufacturing capability and well established infrastructural support system before 
their incorporation into the Nike global production network. The fact that these 
developed first-tier production partners have organized a responsive local production 
network is also an important attraction to foreign buyers. 
When manufacturing capability is ftoher strengthened by technological 
support and information exchange with the parent company, made possible by the 
long-term and trusting relationships in between, these developed partners are now 
well positioned in the "tutelage" ofthe "developing sources" (the second class offirst-
tier production partnerships) in the other Southeast Asian (for example, South China) 
assemblers. These developing sources are responsible for the assembly of lower-end 
athletic shoes. This latter class of assemblers is exclusive producer for the Nike 
corporation, their main attractions being the availability of cheap labor power and 
potential for sourcing diversification. It is hoped that manufacturing capability in 
these countries can be improved through the support and guidance given by the 
developed partners and the parent company itself. The implication is that the sourcing 
base can be enlarged, and this will be an advantage simultaneously to the developed 
partners (their role being upgraded to a partial initiator) and the parent company (the 
growth of possibility in further disciplining the developed partners by incubating 
competing sources). 
The remaining one among the first-tier partnerships, those constituting the 
“intra-regional division of labor" within Southeast Asia, is the “volume producers". 
Their subcontracting relationships with the Nike Corporation are more "market-like", 
i that is，more short-term oriented and less persistent, which are principally regulated by 
J the price mechanism. These volume producers are incorporated into the global 
sourcing network because the corporate strategy of the Nike parent company requires 
them to act as production smoothing buffers as well as low-cost production sites in a 
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volatile and highly competitive market. As such, the will on the part ofNike managers 
to maintain long-term and stable relationship with them is much lesser than that with 
the other two partners; and consequently, little technological support and tutelage are 
offered to these assemblers. 
Though the production of athletic shoes remains quite labor-intensive (for 
example, because of the resistance to automation in stitching and assembly), the 
whole system of subcontracting relations should be seen as flexible, Donaghu and 
Barff (1990) argue, in relation to the satisfaction of the volatile and diversified 
markets. The first-tier subcontractors composes of different classes ofproducers, each 
responsible for the production of athletic shoes for different market segments. This is 
the essence of "ftmctional flexibility" of the whole organization of production. 
Furthermore, the contracts with volume producers can be terminated easily and 
production sites shifted, so that "numerical flexibility" can be gained (Cf. Atkinson 
1985). Of course, this is the major principle of production smoothing function or 
capacity subcontracting (see Watanabe 1978). 
This study has highlighted the role offoreign buyers in initiating production in 
a dependent economy. Such a mode of insertion into the world-economy would affect 
how domestic production is organized. The reason is that these globally mobile 
capitals are extremely foot-loose. Domestic producers have to adjust their production 
capability and to enhance their responsiveness to market demands, so that a 
continuous flow of foreign buyers' orders can be maintained. It follows that domestic 
producers would try to organize their production processes as responsive as possible 
and to suit the various needs of foreign buyers, since the actual organization of 
production processes is entrusted to the domestic producers. In other words, when we 
want to explain why a particular nation-state is able to occupy a particular position in 
the global division of labor, we should focus on the social organization of production 
within a domestic node. 
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3.1.2. Domestic Organization of Production in a GCC 
t 
Donaghu and Barff (1990) have actually directed us to the local organization 
of production within a country, because the parent Nike corporation has entrusted all 
production tasks to the first-tier partners. Likewise, Korzeniewciez (1992) has argued 
i 
that Brazilian shoe manufacturers are able to capture a larger market share because 
they are situated in industrial districts, in which production is highly responsive to 
I market needs. However, these first-tier producers do not necessarily produce the 
I 
fmished commodity solely on their own; they would further subcontract out some 
productive processes to the “second-tier subcontractors", which form a "complex 
network of material, component, and subassembly industries" (Donaghu and Barff 
1990: 543-4). Put it slightly differently, first-tier producers engaging in a global 
network of production would organize their own local network of production (Cf. 
Amin and Thrift 1992). The developed partners farm out the different productive 
processes or phases to domestic producers (for example, through specialization 
subcontracting) from which semi-fmished products or components are combined. The 
finished products are then ready for distribution and marketing by the parent Nike 
corporation. That the developed partners can organize a responsive local production 
network is a crucial factor for these producers to gain a firm place in the global 
commodity chain. 
As the typology of commodity chains suggests, whether a country or region 
can attract this kind of "make-to-orders" in buyer-driven GCCs is sensitive to factors 
different from those in the other kind ofproductive activities. In a buyer-driven kind 
of commodity production, a free trade regime, a developed industrial capability and 
infrastructural support are the main attractions, because the tasks for foreign capitals 
are to integrate the globally scattered productive processes, so as to merge them 
together as a finished commodity. The local organization of production, its ability to 
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•i 
meet the foreign buyers' demands, enhanced responsiveness as well as punctual 
delivery are a must for the first-tier producers. The needs of the companies initiating 
this kind ofcommodity chains are thus different from those in producer-driven GCCs, 
in which a large domestic market and low unit cost of production figure out in the 
< 
forefront. When seen in this light, what we need to do is to "match" the requirements 
of the transnational capital and the locationally-specific advantages of the recipient 
countries. One way to do this is to "domesticate" the GCC framework. 
‘ Though the central problematique of the GCC framework is on the 
structuration of a stratified world-economy, their notion of organization of production 
f. 1 • -
can be applied on the level ofproduction node. Indeed, it is legitimate to focus on the 
commodity chain within a nation-state or a region, since every transaction, exchange 
! across "interfaces", can be conceptualized as a full chain of commodity production. In 
the terminology of the GCC framework, we could concentrate on the production 
network within a node. In other words, we can focus on the social organization of 
production on a local scale and relate it to the dynamics of the integration of 
production on a global scale. By this way, we can lay explicit the "developmental-
organizational context" (Cheng and Gereffi 1994) of a local production system, as 
well as the possibilities ofthe system to occupy a place in a GCC. This is exactly the 
point I have made repeatedly in the previous chapter. By focusing on the organization 
of a local commodity chain or that ofthe domestic input-output system and its mode 
of governance, we can then know how the matching of the demands of foreign buyers 
and the domestic characteristics of a production node is being made. The basis ofthis 
attempt can be clarified by understanding the “elements” within a node in a GCC. 
Specific processes or segments within a commodity chain can be represented as 
boxes or nodes, linked together in networks. Each successive node within a 
commodity chain involves the acquisition and/or organization of inputs (e.g., raw 
materials or semifmished products), labor power (and its provisioning), 
transportation, distribution (via markets or transfers), and consumption. The analysis 
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i o f commodity chain shows how production, distribution, and consumption are 
shaped by the social relations (including organization) that characterize the 
sequential stages of input acquisition, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and 
\ 




‘ We can thus conceptualize the organization of production in a local region as a 
“mini-commodity chain". Inside this domestic production network, productive phases 
‘ or tasks may be farmed out to different domestic producers. The end products 
produced by the network as a whole may be further merged with others commodities 
I (in the case of semi-finished products when seen in a global angle), or just directly 
t marketed and distributed by some organizing agents, so that they can reach the hands 
j • 
I ofthe consumers in the core market. In other words, the global production network is 
nested and extended down a definite number of layers, perhaps down to the household 
j in the case of industrial outworking. 
As in the commodity chain on a world-scale, the distribution of rewards and 
power is uneven in a local mini-commodity chain. While cooperation between 
domestic producers is necessary to accomplish commodity production (particularly 
when production is decentralized or when domestic producers are bound by a limited 
scope and scale), it does not mean that relationships in between are egalitarian ones. — 
Why is this point so important in our discussion of the social organization of 
production? While transaction costs involved in external transactions are minimized 
or eradicated by the presence of trust (as demonstrated in the case of Brazilian shoe 
manufacturers and other industrial districts), the upper-tier producers in a commodity 
； chain can utilize their power to ensure expected actions from the lower-tier ones. A， 
i recognition of the uneven distribution of power along the commodity chain is 
important in our analysis of the mode of governance, as well as the developmental 
consequences to various actors within a domestic economy. 
\ 
I . I 










In my study, I would treat the foreign buyers as an unmoved mover. The 
reasons behind their varying demands could only be sought in an analysis of the 
. 
！ secular changes in foreign markets, for example, in a postmodem or post-fordist 
i 
context (Korzeniewciez 1992; Raynolds 1994). This is well beyond the scope of this 
^ project. Such a self-limitation is also appropriate, because the central question in this 
f . 
project is about the specificities of Hong Kong's domestic organization ofproduction 
vis-a-vis those of other NICs. Specifically, my empirical analysis would begin when 
i . ， an order is ready to be placed in international sourcing. 
I 
I • 
3 So why are buyers attracted to this domestic node? My hypothesis is that one 
； of the principal factors is the responsiveness of the production system. Because 
I producers here are highly responsive to foreign buyers' demands, and that varying 
production orders can be fulfilled, there is a strong magnet attracting the foreign 
buyers to place their orders on producers in Hong Kong. Another question then 
follows: how can this responsiveness be enhanced? I contend that it is the social 
•t 
organization ofthe domestic production system that matters. There are two tasks here. 
Firstly, we should describe the input-output system. By this I mean more than the 
local production network (narrowly defined); it also refers to the linkage between the 
f 
whole domestic production system and the world-economy. As we will see in the next 
chapter, industrial outputs from domestic producers in Hong Kong are able to reach 
I the hands of foreign buyers because local tradingflrms are playing a significant role 
!i 
i 
j in matching the two. That is，the world-economy and domestic production capability \ -
i are connected through the efforts of these trading intermediaries. I would then show in 
j 
！ Chapter Five that commodity production is accomplished in elaborate networks of 
interdependence among domestic producers. The reason is that when the average 
scope and scale of a particular first-tier producer are small, the resort to external 
linkages is a necessity. However, domestic producers would tum this into a virtue, 
I 
since a decentralized production system is highly adaptive to changes in foreign 
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buyers' demands. Specialization and capacity subcontracting are two major means in 
this regard. External economies of scale and scope are enjoyed in this way. 
Furthermore, when a buyer's order is to placed, a new local commodity chain would 
靈 
I be created (ifno existing ones are able to deliver the goods). The "membership" of an 
existing commodity chain would also be altered if some of the occupants do not live 
i 
^ up to the requirements laid down by the buyers. Such constant reshuffling of 
production partners in local production networks would enhance the responsiveness of 
the whole production system. 
I 
For this decentralized system to work, inter-organizational ties among 
1 . 
^ domestic producers must be governed. Actually, economic transactions in any 
\ production system, be it a highly integrated one or a decentralized one, have to be 
i governed. That the question of governance of productive activities in Hong Kong， 
«' 
which I would take up in Chapter Six, is extremely important is because commodity 
production here is accomplished across organizational boundaries. For instance, local 
trading firms must ensure (or force) the first-tier producers they have appointed to 
production to finish the required commodities and to satisfy the demands of the 
buyers. For the first-tier producers, cooperation from their own capacity and 
specialization subcontractors (the second-tier producers) have to be solicited. This is 
also imperative for the first-tier producers because they are in a highly vulnerable 
situation. In sum, domestic producers are in a precarious symbiosis. To survive in a 
buyer-driven GCC, they have to cooperate with each other (that is, symbiosis); but 
: such cooperation cannot be taken for granted (that is，precariousness). To ensure this 
i integration of decentralized commodity production, or to secure cooperation across 
organizational boundaries, domestic producers have to devise creative tactics in 
managing these inter-organizational ties. One important means is to embed these 
economic transactions into social and personal relationships so as to create trust. For 
example, local trading firms would only entrust the responsibility of production to a 
specific first-tier producer only when it is “trustworthy，，. Shifting down a level, first-
I 
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tier producers may only distribute their orders for capacity and specialization 
subcontracting to second-tier ones which are familiar or trustworthy. Tmst_(amid 
unequal power relations) is an important element in the mode of governance. As 
I indicated by the GCC framework, inter-organizational ties in a global (now we may 
I . 
: add here, local) commodity chain is socially embedded and situationally specific. By 
i 
i focusing on the two major components of a local production system, and putting the 
whole analysis in its specific developmental context, I hope we can gain a better 
^ 
ground in deciphering the problem ofdevelopment ofHong Kong, 
i -
I 
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Chapter 4 The Connection: Local Trading Firms in Buyer-Driven GCCs 
M o s t domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in buyer-driven 
commodity chains, as reflected by the data reported in Section 2.2.2. I have also 
1 argued that the mode of insertion into the world-economy would affect how the ‘ 
j domestic production system will be organized. In this chapter, I would try to further 
substantiate this latter claim. I would first analyze how the domestic production 
capability as a whole is connected with the world-economy. My contention is that 
I 
I local trading firms are important intermediaries in mediating production on the one 
：••：, 
hand (the whole domestic node) and distribution as well as consumption, on the other, 
I 
in the global commodity chain. 
,-s 
I In Section 4.1,1 would distinguish four major types of local trading firms, in 
.1 
terms of the closeness of their relationships with the buyers. Such a distinction is 
helpful, because the nature of relationships between trading firms and foreign buyers 
would affect those between trading firms and first-tier producers. In Section 4.2, I 
would then describe the major roles or jobs of the local trading agents in handling 
fabricated metal products�By reviewing the roles (or functions) of local trading 
firms，we can have a better understanding of the question why Hong Kong can 
continue occupying a place in the global division of labor, despite competitive 
pressures from other NICs. 
In order to explain this insertion of a layer of merchant capital in the 
production system, we would answer three negative questions in Section 4.3: firstly, 
why foreign buyers do not go to domestic producers directly; secondly, why local 
trading firms do not take up a producer role; and finally, why domestic producers do 
»To be sure, there are differences in the trading of different industry goods. Yet, as all of the trading 
firms I intewiewed also take up the trading of other industry goods (as official statistics for the trading 
business also adopt a less detailed classification than in the manufacturing sector), and the basics are 
more or less the same, the argument of this study has wider applicability. 
j “ ‘ Page 54 
I 
Chapter Four 
not transcend the trading agents and hence go to foreign buyers directly. I argue that 
the vulnerable and precarious nature of buyer-driven commodity production can -
explain this organizational arrangement. This echoes with my previous argument that 
local organization ofproduction is affected by the developmental context. 
4.1 Major Types ofLocal Trading Firms and their Relations with Producers 
Local2 fading firms can be roughly classified into four types, in terms ofthe 
buyers they are affiliated with and the "closeness" of such an affiliation. These are: (1) 
zhuangkou (Chinese trading firms) specializing in Southeast Asian markets; (2) 
moluocha hongs (Indian trading firms) specializing in Middle Eastern markets; (3) 
resident buying offices established by large foreign importers; and (4) independent 
trading firms, the latter two types both specializing in the developed world. The first 
type is operated by immigrant Chinese, most importantly those from Chiuchow (on 
the Southern coast of China). As a historical legacy, these trading firms have 
j extensive and tight linkages with overseas Chinese businesses in Southeast Asia. 
I Many overseas Chinese businesses, like those in Malaya and Singapore, were 
established by these Chinese traders a century ago. As such, they can be seen as 
belonging to a quasi-integrated trading network, with importing and wholesaling (in 
fmal markets) tightly connected with purchasing (in Hong Kong and possibly in 
China) (Cf. Kuo 1991). In a few cases too, they have in addition established their own 
manufacturing capability anchor they would have a very stable pool of independent 
suppliers. These trading firms also have tight connections with various agents in the 
export trade in Hong Kong, for example, bankers and forwarders. All goods were 
handled by these specifically Chinese agents. Indeed, zhuangkou are notjust traders in 
manufactured exports; they are also important agents supplying Chinese-styled goods 
and foodstuffs to the overseas Chinese markets. 
2rhe term "local" here means operating in Hong Kong. Some of them, as we will see, are owned by, or 
are close affiliates with, foreign buyers. 
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The second type is operated by Indians and thus nicknamed moluocha hongs, a 
Cantonese phrase noting people from India and Pakistani These firms specialize in 
Middle Eastern markets, because, as in the first type, they have elaborate networks of 
business connections in these markets. In the early years, if domestic producers want 
to export to these markets, they have to go through these trading firms. The reason is 
that only these firms possessed the requisite cultural (mainly language) and social 
霧 
(friends and relatives) capitals in trading with the Middle East. Their bases of 
advantages are thus identical with those of the first type, since, firstly, they can 
transcend local banking or financial facilities*，and secondly, they can organize a 
rather integrated framework in doing business. In other words, these trading agents 
•l •.< 
can be conceptualized as the exclusive buying agents or resident buying offices for 
these foreign importers or as a purchasing office for a multinational distribution 
corporation. As I have mentioned above, they have the necessary connections with 
！ foreign buyers and hence domestic producers have to go through them. They have 
\ controlled producers' output outlet and consequently, the power these two kinds of 
i 
！ firms possess is enormous. The power of these trading firms can be utilized to the 
,i brink of exploitation, in that a near oligopoly enables the trading firms to fix price and 
I other terms of trade. An owner of a metal ware producer has described the situation, 
The trading frnns just typed the contracts, specifying the product specifications. They 
would tell the factories to come to a restaurant.…They have typed the contract, but 
left the name and price quotations blank. They ask for price quotations from different 
，3people in Hong Kong generally are unable to distinguish these two nationalities. A social division of 
labor is indeed existent. Most Pakistanis take up more peripheral jobs, like security guards and 
bellpersons, whereas most Indians are better endowed to occupy upper-class positions. 
"Since the two parties (importer/foreign buyer and trading firm) are subsumed under a common center 
ofadministrative command, no external fmancial service is required, like the issue ofLetters ofCredit 
from buyers and the resort to credit insurance offered by the Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation. They can thus save a significant cost. Though integrated they are, it does not imply that 
coordination between these two "profit centers" is as smooth as depicted in transaction-cost economics 
(Cf. Eccles and White 1989). As we will see later, these trading agents may develop a long-term 
relationship with (or be captured by) a producer, which may be detrimental to the interests of both the 
buyer and the whole firm. 
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factories consecutively. They then add the name of the factory which offers the 
lowest price (Peter). 
‘ I ^  
； Distribution ofpower, by definition, is an important feature of the governance 
…� • 
� of economic transactions. As we will see later, the dominant position oftrading firms • 1 . 
would affect how domestic producers would organize their own production networks. 
ii 
I 
The third type, resident buying offices, can also be seen as affiliates of foreign 
夢 buyers; they are the sole representatives for a particular foreign buyer, mostly large 
I importers and chain department stores. These buyers possess a firmer (and wider) 
control of markets, which makes the establishment of a permanent overseas buying 
I - •-
office possible and economical. Resident buying offices here often take the form of 
wholly-owned subsidiary, in which the head of the office is an expatriate from the 
考 
buyer's country. Other employed staff, the most important of which are the 
merchandisers, are recruited in Hong Kong. A definite buying budget is placed by the 
parent buyers on a seasonal basis; resident buying offices (or more specifically, the 
employed merchandisers) would then source appropriate products in Hong Kong, 
'i 
I according to the exact specifications placed by the buyers and upon their own 
i — judgment. Hong Kong was originally selected as the principal sourcing base in Asia 
•！ j for lower-end products; in recent years, resident buying offices here slowly become j I the sourcing headquarters for the whole Asia. Now many of them have extended theu: 
？ 
i sourcing programs to different Southeast Asian countries, mostly notably to China 
! and Thailand, which substitute Hong Kong in the production of lower-end and 
I \ 
quantity products. 
The final type of trading firms^ is strictly local (in terms of both capital 




^such a division between the third and the fmal types is sometimes hard to make. An independent 
trading firm may transform into an exclusive agent for a particular foreign buyer, but remain 
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firms are the smallest in size among the other types; and they are often owner-
managed and operated. They can be classified as independent trading firms, because 
they are financially and functionally ‘‘detached” or disintegrated with foreign buyers. 
Thus they are the least endowed ones; they lack the same resources as in the other 
three types. The principal way to find buyers for this type of trading firms is to 
participate in trade fairs in Europe, like those held in Germany and France regularly. 
Foreign buyers (mostly small-sized importers) are invited to these fairs, who would 
I select a range of products from a pool of manufacturers andy'or their representatives. 
These trading firms are better prepared to go to these fairs than domestic producers, 
because they can enjoy economies of scale, by pooling the products from a number of 
factories together. Of course, that these trading firms are proficient in English is also 
— 
j an advantage that the ordinary Chinese factory owners cannot match. In Chapter Two, 
角 
i we have already noted the importance of this "support system" in overseas marketing 
I to the small-sized and specialized producers. By this way, orders from foreign buyers 
can be fetched, and sometimes a stable relationship with these buyers would be built. 
1 Nonetheless, the closeness of such relationships is still not comparable with the other .« 
� three types. These buyers would not commit so heavily to these independent trading 
firms as in the other three types. Hence these firms tend to be smaller, and the orders 
- they take up are also smaller in size and more fluctuating than the other three types. 
I Furthermore, the buyers they contacted are less likely to have a firm control of 
\ markets and/or large geographical coverage. That these buyers would source from a 
•] number of independent trading firms at the same time and that consequently a definite 
‘ buying budget is diluted would exacerbate the situation. These trading firms have to 
» rely on external services, like finance and freight. These independent trading firms are 
I 
i thus the most precarious ones among their counterparts. 
•3 
j — ： 
5 independent in ownership terms; or a resident buying office may take up "outside" businesses and 
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Though small the individual independent trading firm is, the importance of 
this final kind of trading firms as a whole grows in recent years, because the export 
markets they target expand at a faster rate than the others. While resident buying 
offices remain a crucial figure in handling manufactured exports in Hong Kong, the 
importance of Southeast Asian markets for manufactured exports becomes negligible 
relative to the developed world. The advantages of moluocha hongs also slowly erode, 
as the independent ones have gained access to their markets, ln other words, the 
monopolies these firms enjoy slowly disappear. 
These four types of trading firms are characterized by the different closeness 
of their relationships with the foreign buyers and the export markets to which these 
buyers belong: the first two types are vertically integrated (either the trading firms in 
Hong Kong and the foreign buyers belong to the same firm, or they maintain an 
exclusive trading relationship) and specialize in declining markets, whereas the last 
ones are the most detached, with resident buying offices somewhat in the middle. 
How their relationships would affect those with domestic producers would be left in 
the next section. But on the whole, all the four types of local trading agents are 
vertically disintegrated with domestic producers. I argue that the reason is related with 
the market conditions the Hong Kong producers are targeting and the resources and 
capabilities of different entrepreneurs possess. In other words, the mode of insertion 
would affect the local organization of production. But before we tum to this in Section 
4.3, a description ofthe majorjobs and roles oflocal trading firms is indispensable, as 
these can help clarify the raison d'etre of this vertical disintegration. 
9r-
4.2 Connecting the Domestic Node and the World-Economy 
In Chapter Two, I have documented the importance of local trading firms in 
handling manufactured exports of domestic producers. That is, these local trading 
firms connect the domestic production capacity with foreign buyers, demands. In this 
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section, we would review how this connection is being done. Connection means the 
matching between foreign buyers' demands and products from domestic producers. It 
follows that the principal job ofthese trading firms is to fmd both foreign buyers (or 
more accurately, their orders) and appropriate producers. We would talk about the 
former first. 
4.2.1. Finding a Buyer and her Orders 
. 
There are two principal ways for local trading firms to fmd their prospective 
buyers. Trading firms may adopt a proactive strategy in introducing products to their 
prospective buyers. For the first three types of trading firms, they (or their employed 
merchandisers) may refer products to their closely affiliated buyers on their own 
initiatives. Two principles, however, must be met in this case. Firstly, the buying 
j budget allows them to do so. For example, for resident buying offices, about 70% of 
n 
the budget laid by the buyers is to source designated products. Resident buying 
； offices by definition, are established to serve their buyers and subject to their 
I ’ 
I commands. Only a small portion is reserved for this kind of products. Secondly, these 
I 
products are judged by the merchandisers as appropriate. Since these trading firms � — 
： maintain a very close relationship with their buyers, their demands are well known to 
I the agents, for example, about the price range and styles buyers are likely to accept. 
‘ Only when the products are deemed as suitable for the foreign buyers do the trading 
firms introduce them. Often, buyers are willing to accept new products the local 
‘ trading agents refer to them, because buyers on their own may not know clearly the •� 
i recent developmentof the domestic production capability. A merchandiser, being at a • 
I smaller distance with various suppliers, can monitor these changes more closely than 
^ the foreign buyers. By accepting the offers by local trading agents, buyers can 
hopefully out-compete their competitors. However, this referral of new but 
undesignated products would imply an additional task for the merchandisers. They 
would do this only when their own interests can be furthered, for example, to increase 
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the chance of internal promotion, and, more importantly, to strengthen their own 
personal relationships with particular suppliers. In Chapter Six, I would relate this 
"gift-giving" to the construction of trust. 
However, for the independent trading firais, to adopt a proactive strategy to 
fmd buyers is more difficult, by "virtue" oftheir lack of close relationships with any 
ofthem. As I have akeady noted in Section 4.1, they have to go to the trade fairs in 
the target markets to search for the buyers. Unfortunately, such attempts may not 
necessarily yield, because, firstly, there is a considerable chance that no buyers would 
show interests in the products; and secondly, even when there are such buyers, they 
would instead command their local trading agents to source for those products for 
them, if they have already established their own trading agents here in Hong Kong^ 
Only smaller-sized foreign buyers (or importers) would rely on these trade fairs and 
accept the offers by independent trading firms, because it is more likely for the larger 
ones (for example, chain department stores) to have established their own out-
sourcing departments. To resort to this way of sourcing is，furthermore, more risky. 
Thus even when buyers are contacted in these trade fairs，the orders placed by them 
are doomed to be smaller. These buyers would adopt the principle of "gradual 
commitment", because ofthe lesser risks involved. That the buyers would not commit 
themselves too heavily would make local trading firms and, by extension, domestic 
producers, expose to highly vulnerable or fluctuating market conditions. 
The other way by which trading firms receive foreign buyers' orders is that 
buyers go to the trading firms directly; that is，the trading firms receive orders 
passively. This way of obtaining orders is more important for independent trading 
firms. It is because ifbuyers have tight connections with any purchasing agents, as in 
6xhese buyers are not aiming at the purchasing of any products in these fairs. They do go to these fairs 
because information on market trends, the products their competitors are likely to possess, as well as 
recent developments in production technology can be gathered in these occasions. After such 
information is at hand, these buyers would then request their own agents to source similar products. 
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Other three types, they would not resort to this way of placing orders. They would 
instead command their own agents to source whatever products they want. For most 
independent trading firms, such a kind of orders may constitute over half of their total 
turnovers. In this case, buyers would come to Hong Kong directly, perhaps having 
notified a number of prospective trading firms in advance about their visit. These 
buyers may have done their homework before they leave their home countries, with a 
list of local trading firms gathered from their colleagues. Or, if not, they can contact 
the Trade Development Council (TDC) after they have arrived in Hong Kong. The 
latter way, of course, is only possible after TDC was established in 1966. As we will 
see shortly, the establishment of such a kind of trading institutions would affect the 
mode of governance of the relationships between local trading firms and domestic 
producers. 
After such a list has been compiled，buyers would go to the offices of a 
number of local trading firais. These buyers may not have a very clear specifications 
of the products they want. Recommendations and suggestions by local trading firms 
are important means for these buyers to finalize their specifications and demands. 
These buyers would select their products among a large number of samples in the 
sample-rooms ofthe trading firms. Generally, these buyers would select one particular 
trading frnn which offers the best “service，，. Service here means a lot of things, in 
which price (the commission rate) is clearly the most important one. Nonetheless, 
delivery time，credit arrangements, independent initiatives and more generally, 
trustworthiness, are also important decision criteria. It follows that an on-going 
relationship is in itself a value, which may sometimes compensate for a small margin 
of lesser service. 
On the whole, orders obtained through this second way tend to be much 
smaller and less stable than those through the other, because the buyers resorting to 
this way of placing an order in tum tend to be smaller and/or they do not have a 
“ Page 62 
Chapter Four 
control of a wide market. Furthermore, like the above case, it is more risky for the 
buyers to resort to this way of placing an order, because they may not know the 
trading firm and the supplier very well, thus leaving room for their opportunism. 
Hence they would not over-commit themselves at a time. For the other three types of 
trading firms, this way ofplacing orders by the buyers means that the local agents are 
authoritatively commanded to source the designated products. For example, in the 
case of resident buying offices, buyers would clearly specify which products they 
would like to buy in the next season, and of course, the budget limits. 
4.2.2. Finding a Supplier and Determining Trustworthiness 
Assuming that an order is at hand, local trading firms have to appoint an 
appropriate producer to supply the products. The basic criterion is the possession of 
actual technical capability. Only when there is a considerable possibility that the 
prospective supplier can manufacture the specified products within a specified period 
would it be shortlisted. However, this is not always transparent to the trading firms. 
！ Incompetent suppliers may deliberately deceive the trading agents; or suppliers have 
actually made an erroneousjudgment. Post-contractual conflicts would be extensive if 
% -
I these problems are not detected ex ante. To ensure there is a near-perfect match, the 
trading firais have to rely on their own judgment, and more often, a leap of faith, on 
the appropriateness of a supplier to the order. They may inspect the factory; 
i specifically, they would examine the factory management, its layout, its workforce, its 
technology and its previous products as well as the product catalog. The trading firms 
may also ask which buyers these factories have done businesses before, and see 
whether they can answer without hesitation. This is important, because ifthe factory 
has business transactions with some famous customers (say, Marks & Spencer)，the 
trading firm can have a guarantee on product quality. Sometimes, advice by their 
fellows (both traders and suppliers) would also be taken into account, particularly 
when the prospective factory is a new partner. Information acquired through personal 
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networks is indispensable when a local trading firm is to do business with a new first-
tier producer. Of course, past dealings with a factory are also one of the most 
important considerations^ By doing these kinds of things, local trading firms can have 
a clearer understanding ofthe technical capability as well as the trustworthiness ofthe 
suppliers. Trustworthiness is important, because what is being transacted is not a 
price-clearing good, and because "extra-contractual" initiatives and adjustments are 
often required. Thus we would witness a stable (or on-going) linkage pattem between 
trading firms and suppliers, since this would enhance mutual understanding and 
possibility of settling future contingencies and disputes. Likewise, the attempt to 
maintain an ongoing relationship with a specific supplier would sometimes override 
the other considerations (for example, price, quality, delivery, and credit limits) in 
searching for an appropriate supplier. 
If the trading firm cannot find one that is trustworthy enough or that no 
existing factory that it knows at present can have that technical capability, it has to 
utilize other channels to fmd an appropriate one. It may select one from the telephone 
directory or TDC publications. However, it is very risky to appoint these unfamiliar 
suppliers to production^. Lay referral by some existing partners is thus more favored 
by local trading firms, since the new supplier that is introduced by these suppliers 
must be a more reliable and trustworthy one. The reason is that, if it is not the case, 
the referees' own reputations and trustworthiness would be affected and relationships 
7jhese are all indirect measures. For instance, a good internal management or past record does not 
necessarily mean that the producer can accomplish the prospective orders. It is impossible to be 
absolutely certain about the future performance of a supplier. Furthermore, contracts are necessarily 
incomplete (or intendedly made so), which fail to include all fliture contingencies. Thus nsks must be 
incurred. That is what I mean by a leap of faith. How large the leap and the risks would be is related 
principally with the volume of information gathered. 
^ll does not mean that trust can only be created through personal relationship (Cf. Granovetter 1985, 
1990). As Shapiro (1987) and Zucker (1986) have shown, "impersonal trust" is always required in our 
complex society, where the "principal" is unable to ensure the performance of some remote “agents，，. 
"Institutional means" are thus important, particularly where direct control is unfeasible and “first-order 
personal trust" is insufficient. However, TDC in Hong Kong is not such an institution, in that the lack 
of intemal checks or entry restrictions, for example, cannot foster the development of this type of 
"second-order" trust. 
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with the trading firm disrupted. As producers that the trading firm already knows may 
have that -piece of information (that is，the producers themselves have their own 
networks), they can introduce their colleagues to the trading firm. A merchandiser has 
aptly explained the willingness of existing factory bosses to introduce new partners to 
him, 
Principally, new suppliers are introduced by the bosses of the factories I have already 
known. The bosses would do this, because they have the will to "look after" 
{guanzhao) you. They have in their minds some reciprocal considerations. They 
think that they have looked after you once, and that they know your company is a 
large one, you must have many orders to be placed. So later, if you want to fmd a 
supplier, you would "shoot" (she) the order to him fkst. This is always the case. But 
possibly they do this just for friendship. When we have been in partnership for a long 
time, we would become friends indeed. We have lunch and go to the bar together. Or 
we play ball games on Sunday. (David, a merchandiser of a resident buying office, 
established by a Swiss department store) 
The existing factories are likely to do this, because, for one thing, they are 
bound by friendship ties (“I should help him when he is in need, because we are 
friends”)，and, for another, by giving a favor, they may be reciprocated in the future, 
because the recipient is indebted and obligated. Long-term and stable relationships 
can only be built in this way. 
After one or two factories are shortlisted for this order, the trading firms would 
bargain on more specific details, for example, price, delivery time, and, if required, 
adjustments of specifications. The trading firms would bargain on behalf of both the 
buyer and the factory, so that a mutually acceptable solution can be reached. To 
elaborate this important step of constant negotiations, I would concentrate on the 
g 
independent trading firms and resident buying offices below . 
b e c a u s e my case factories have business transactions with these two types of local trading firms only 
and that the importance ofthe other two types is diminishing in recent years. 
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4.2.3. Ensuring a Perfect Match 
After a buyer comes to Hong Kong and shows interest in a particular product, 
or she decides to place an order on a factory upon referral from the local agents, the 
J trading firms have to negotiate with the buyer and the prospective supplier, to come to 
terms acceptable to the three parties involved. This is the most important step in the 
whole business. Sometimes, the buyer has a complete new product specification in her 
\ mind to appoint a factory for exclusive production (this is called "appointed 
I 
production"). In this case, the factory has to adjudicate whether it is technically 
-
capable to fulfill this new order, or if it is not, whether the buyer can adjust her 
specifications. Of course, trustworthiness of the factory has also to be taken into 
I account. The buyer may also have clear demands on quantity, price and delivery time. 
These are common for both appointed production and the purchasing of a product in 
the existing product range of a factory. More often than not, however, buyers would 
just have a rough idea on all these aspects. Here the role of trading firms is extremely 
crucial, since buyers do not have direct access to the prospective factories, and/or the 
factories would not want to contact the buyers on their own, z/the buyer has made 
j. contacts with the trading firms in advance^^ All negotiations on price, product 
？ 
i specifications, quantity and delivery are done through local trading firms. Actually, ^ 
the owner of independent trading firms (since many of them are owner-managed and ^ -
^ 12 
i personalized businesses^�and the merchandisers of resident buying offices would 
t 
i�Though it seems advantageous for factories to contact the buyers directly (by transcending the trading 
agents), they may not do so because it would disrupt the relationships in between. I would explam this 
reluctance in the next section. 
"Because trust is important in the integration ofthe domestic commodity cham, busmess is revolved 
around an individual rather than an abstract firm. A juxtaposition of personal relationships onto 
； economic transactions can help stabilize the exchange pattern. For the independent trading firms，the 
tendency of "fission" (which would be flirther elaborated in the next chapter) would discourage the 
owners to delegate authority to the employees; otherwise, after they have built good connections with a 
number ofdomestic producers, they would have that incentive and social capital to establish their own 
trading firms, which unquestionably would "fetch" a considerable portion of business from the parent 
company. Th'us it is in the interest ofthe owners to deal with their clients on their own. 
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be physically present when face-to-face meetings between the buyers and suppliers, as 
well as when factory inspection requested by the buyers, are required. 
After such a resolution is agreed upon (or, more often, when details are 
roughly settled in oral agreement), production proper commences. Normally, 
production is the sole responsibility of the manufacturers; no intervention or 
whatsoever would be made by the trading firms or the buyers. Sometimes, the trading 
firms would send a representative or merchandiser to the supplier for product 
\ inspection or quality control. At first glance, this appears to be a reflection of the 
closeness of relationship in between. However, on the contrary, this actually denotes 
the weakness of linkage, because sending a representative means that the trading firm 
does not have complete trust (and information) on the supplier, and relatedly, its 
^ products (Cf. the notion of"competence trust" in Sako 1992). But ifthe supplier is a 
new "partner" (paidang), it is engaged in appointed production, andA)r the size of the 
specific order is large, the whole production process would be monitored more 
closely. Local trading firms would inspect every production phase, and keep a very 
close eye on whole production process. The gist is that monitoring has its own cost; 
only when there are high stakes involved (with respect to the buyers and, by 
extension, to the trading firms) does such close monitoring pay. Of course, the most 
effective method is still the examination of the final products against the 
specifications, since money is paid only after the products are received (that is， 
producers extend credits to the trading firms; and the trading firms in tum extend 
credits to the buyers). But if defects and mismatch are detected at this very fmal stage, 
problems and disputes (for example, a claim) arise and the trading firms would be 
i2while the owners of the independent trading fums are able to conduct business in a personalized 
fashion (because the firms are often smaller in size and that business volume is lighter), the resident 
buying offices have no other options but delegate these functions to their employees. Size of the 
business handled is certainly an important factor, but that a common "characteristics-base" (that is, 
I Chinese) between suppliers and merchandisers often facilitates the building of trust and consequently a 
smoothed economic transaction (see Zucker 1986) is an asset that a foreigner (that is, the head of the 
I buying office) cannot create from without. 
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^ subject to pressures from both sides, suppliers and buyers. So independent trading 
.M 
;i; 
firms and buying offices would-keep a closer eye on the whole production process so 
V 
as to minimize their troubles. 
A rather interesting point can be noted about the role of trading agents on the 
production process in Hong Kong. While in Japan, buyers/distributors and suppliers 
have tight and stable linkages in between, which facilitate information exchanges (for 
example, on market trends, technological development, future business plans and 
1 consumer demands) between the two quasi-integrated parties^^ and innovation on the 
i 
！ part of suppliers, such a close relationship and intensive exchanges are generally 
:i! .-
absent in the case of Hong Kong. The principal difference, of course, lies in the fact 
that a layer of merchants is inserted between the buyers and manufacturers in Hong 
^ 
！ Kong. In other words, while the foreign buyers and trading agents may be tightly 
f 
connected (as in the first three types of trading firms), the trading firms here maintain 
a rather distant relationship with the manufacturers as a whole. This is reflected by 
several empirical indicators. Firstly, after a specific order has been finished, no 
connections between the two parties remain. They would not tightly bound together 
over time (relative to the Japanese practices). A new order is a new round of checked 
competitioni4. Secondly but relatedly, factories in Hong Kong would not attempt to 
become over-dependent on one particular trading firm, since a trading firm on its own, 
especially the independent ones, cannot guarantee a stable and adequate flow of orders 
to the factories over a definite time horizon. The fluctuating nature of a buyer-driven 
： commodity chain inhibits the trading firms to do so. Though a long-term relationship 
is deemed so valuable that local trading firms are eager to establish and maintain one, 
f 
i it is always beyond their control to create the necessary conditions, that is, a stable \ 
"Such a tight relationship is often buttressed by mutual share-holding, equity ownership and personnel 
exchanges. For a comprehensive study of the structure of vertical (and horizontal) keiretsu in Japan, 
see Gerlach 1992 and Smitka 1991. 
； >^ it does not mean that every supplier is given the same priority or that each competes on the same 
ground. 
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I access to foreign buyers' orders. This is in tum related with the precautions taken by 
.| . 
: l o c a l trading firms.-They would not dare to become over-dependent on one particular «• 
producer, because other producers would be less cooperative and more demanding if a 
trading firm has maintained a tight linkage with a particular supplier. Other producers 
.i' 
would believe that if an order is profitable, the trading firm has no reason to place it 
on other factories. Objectively, this may be so; but the kemel is that the other factories 
€. 
can list an infinite number of reasons and pieces of evidence to justify this perception 
or belief. In other words, distrust breeds itself. Thus local trading firms would be very 
,: careful when they are building stable relationships with their suppliers. The resultant 
pattem is that a trading firm would possess a "reasonably" large number of factories 
as their chief suppliers, and that a first-tier producer would also maintain a 
“reasonably”i5 large number oftrading firms as its principal output outlets. The basic 
i reason behind this organization is related with the nature of foreign buyers' demands. 
Fluctuations in market reproduce themselves in the relationships between the factories 
and trading agents. 
Yet, the link between local trading firms and producers is not as fragile nor as 
adversarial as in the US. Though not eternal, the relationships are not one-shot games. 
A delicate balance is struck here: while guarding against over-dependence, a certain 
degree of m/er-dependence and cooperation is clearly indispensable, because, for one 
thing, a rush order can only be fulfilled with the cooperation and adjustment on both 
parties. In this case, the trading frnn would bargain on behalf of the supplier for a 
longer delivery period; and the supplier would try to adjust the current production 
schedule so that this order can be processecL first. Essentially, only by mutual 
adjustment can such an order be jointly fulfilled. However, whether both parties are 
able to deliver the goods is conditional on their respective relationships with other 
i^What is reasonable or acceptable is an important issue for the stability of the subcontracting system, 
i because, for the factory, it has to introduce competitive pressures into its product market and 
i simultaneously to maintain a stable pool of frequent customers. Similar considerations are also present 
for the trading firms. It is, as my thesis title suggests, a "precarious symbiosis". 
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parties. The trading firm can bargain for a longer delivery period only when it has 
maintained a good relationship with the buyer, and when the buyer in tum can adjust 
the distribution schedule. Similarly, the supplier can deliver the products in a shorter 
time only when cooperation and adjustments of lower-tier producers (say, raw 
materials vendors and specialization subcontractors) are granted. Hence we should not 
i . 
I place our focus on the dyadic relationship between the trading firms and the first-tier 
producers only; we should take the system or the networks of interdependence as a 
whole as our level ofanalysis (Cf. Elg and Johansson 1993). As we will see in coming 
chapters, a minor change in the buyer's demand would instantaneously trigger off 
ripples throughout the whole system or along the domestic commodity chain. 
j j 
1 While a precarious inter-dependence is certainly needed when an order is in a 
I rush, a cooperative relationship is also required when a “new，，product has to be 
I developed. To call this genuine product or process innovations may be a little bit 
exaggerated, all small-sized factories in Hong Kong alike. But since the specifications 
j of the buyer may not strictly coincide with the current production capability of any 
! producer and/or the buyer has only a rough idea, some modifications ofthe production 
1 process and of the very specifications are always needed. Here only a long-time 
\ partner would attempt the development of a new product, as the trading firm cannot j 
1 guarantee any retum to it (because whether the buyer would approve the sample and , 
place the order on this factory is uncertain). These suppliers are often dubbed as 
"house factories" {zijichang) by the trading agents. House factories, in the eyes of 
local trading firms, are more helpftil and flexible in both the fulfillment ofrush orders 
and minor modifications of the production process. A merchandiser explains the 
reasons to maintain a pool ofhouse factories, 
1 House factories would be more "easy-going" {rongyi huawei). For example, we have 
i 
to give a sample to the buyer in short notice. We must ask the supplier to make it 
quick. I fyou have some house factories at hand, it's much easier to do that. They are 
"relatively more helpful" {bijiao bangshou). For example, they would fmish it in just 
j 
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one or two weeks. And they would tell you you're not gonna pay for this sample. Or 
they would say, "There must be expenses in order to have gains. This is the way of 
doing business". That's what the boss really says. If the buyer rejects the sample or 
decides not to place an order, we just "put our hands on each other's shoulder" {pai 
botou) and say OK. The other suppliers are different. (David) 
In these cases, the distance between the trading firm and factory would be 
pulled closer. Exactly because house factories are more helpful (for example, in 
attemptingi6 ^ rush order or new production technologies and in introducing new 
suppliers to the trading firms), they would be given priorities in obtaining an order in 
the future, and business transactions in between are more frequent. Coupled with the 
fact that trust is important in curtailing opportunism and overcoming uncertainties, we 
can see that, while the transactions between local trading fmns and first-tier producers 
are not organized in an wholesale hierarchical fashion, they are not as pure market 
ones. In other words, it is less organized than internal organization, and less chaotic 
than an anonymous market. Nonetheless, the nature of these network transactions is 
I 
not as "thick" as in Japan and other industrial districts; we may call it a "precanous 
quasi-integrated production partnership". 
Though thin these relationships are, information flows^ are still existent. The 
most important of these informational exchanges is about market information. 
Industrial dynamism in Brazilian shoe manufacturing and other industrial districts, as 
I have noted in Chapter Three, is said to be related with the "market intelligence" 
efforts oflocal trading agents or impannatore. The case in Hong Kong is similar; local 
trading firms would try their best to find as many prospective foreign buyers as 
possible. Yet my point goes further in that the dissemination of market information 
can be used in an instrumental fashion. As I have said above, local trading firms ., 
16八 willingness to attempt is more important than actual accomplishment. Whether a house factory can 
accomplish the task is known (by both parties) to be out of its own control (for example, the 
technological limits and availability of external specialized services); whereas a genuine attempt does 
suffice to demonstrate its "goodwill". 
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would like to maintain a small pool of house factories, so that a rush order can be 
fulfilled or adjustment in the production process be attempted; or in a word, someone 
would (try to) help when you are in need. Local trading firms, exactly in order to 
maintain such a pool of house factories, have to reciprocate, most notably by 
disseminating information about buyers' demands in the next season in advance. For 
example, foreign importers would send some booklets or information about market 
trends to the merchandisers, so that the merchandisers can prepare for the next 
sourcing program. By notifying some factories in advance, the trading firms can 
extend a favor to them; and these factories can thus gain a first-mover advantage vis-
a-vis others and hence compete on a better position. 
However, as I have mentioned above, when a trading firai has maintained a 
very close relationship with a particular supplier, or when it goes so far in establishing 
its own, other factories would be less cooperative and more demanding. The trading 
firm must deliberately avoid this kind of affairs and the abuse of this freedom. Thus, 
though preference would be given to a small number of suppliers, this has to be done 
in a fair manner; or more accurately, appears to be so. Other factories must be given a 
near-equal opportunity to compete for an order and a close relationship cannot be 
stretched too much. As an owner of an independent trading firm distinguishes the 
difference between the building of"trustworthiness" and "favoritism": 
"Trustworthiness" refers to the integrity of doing business. It just refers to this. . . . 
When we want to fmd an appropriate supplier, we would consider the reasonableness 
of the prices offered by the factories and the quality of products they supply to us. 
We would, without question, select the one that excels in these regards. Under equal 
opportunity.…If bad quality can be compensated by good friendship, it would 
damage your own integrity of doing business and your own trustworthiness. If you 
really do so, you just dispose o f the word of "trust", and you're out of the track of 
fair competition. Once "personal sentiments" {renqing) are involved, there must be 
problems. (John, an owner o fan independent trading firm, which was established 18 
years ago) 
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The management of relationships with suppliers, as we can see, cannot be 
more delicate than this. A trading firm has to build a close relationship with a 
particular supplier; but such a relationship cannot be too close to lead other suppliers 
to question the faimess of its business practice. The creative combination of 
cooperation and competition signifies the precarious nature of the relationship 
i: between local trading firms and domestic producers. 
While market information is an important asset offered by local trading firms, 
sometimes technical information and assistance would also be extended to the 
producers. This flow is doomed to be rare, simply because local trading firms do not 
know the technical details very well. Yet, technical assistance can take a form other 
than tangible technical advice or technological "nurturing"; they may help the first-
tier producers to fmd appropriate parts suppliers (second-tier producers) when they 
fail to accomplish the order on their own. As one of my interviewees recalls, 
\ 
j I have placed an order to a factory, to produce a tableware set. But this factory is a 
j producer only; it has no packaging capability. Weird it is, but it's true. So I have to 
introduce a printer to this metal ware factory; and the printing factory supplies it with 
color boxes. It can then do the packaging. We would do this, introducing other 
suppliers to the appointed factories. (David) 
Though local trading firms do not have the necessary technical knowledge to 
offer to suppliers, they, as a center or grid in a network, possess the necessary 
connections with different kinds of producers, which enable them to extend preference 
to one particular supplier. If such connections are currently lacking, the trading firms 
can also activate the existing ties to create new ones (Cf. Granovetter 1973, 1983), for 
example, with a new but more trustworthy supplier introduced by other house 
factories, as I have already noted. However, whether the merchandiser would offer 
such help, and whether the supplier would accept this, are conditioned by the 




: relationships in between. For a trading agent, such assistance is an extra work; and 
f^ 
：! 17 . 
hence only when the supplier is a house factory - does the trading agent lend a helping 
hand. The same consideration is also present in the minds of the factory bosses; only 
when a longer-horizon is adopted do they accept the help, because they would be 
i 
indebted to the trading agent if they do. As an owner of a metal ware factory puts it in 
, i 
a lively way, 
I fyou have been given a favor by others before, you are often difficult to elbow them 
away (tuo ren shouzhou) later. (Peter) -
I 
j Reciprocity is surely an important integrating mechanism in linking the 
trading firms and domestic producers, and I would return to this issue in Chapter Six. 
i i. j 
1 
Though the principal job of a trading firm is to act as a transmission and 
mediating belt, sometimes it may take up a portion of "producer" role. For example, 
when a buyer has placed a production order (say, a complete tableware set with salt 
and pepper shakers and pieces of plastic mattresses), which is outside the technical 
production capability of any one particular producer, the trading firm may pool the 
final products from a number of different kinds of producers and then assemble them — 
together. Only when local trading firms are able to merge various local commodity 
I chains together can the demands of the foreign buyer be satisfied. Of course, its 
I feasibility lies in whether the trading firm has the requisite producers in its own hands, 
i 
I Like the case mentioned just above, the trading firms, being at the grid of an elaborate 
I 
I network, are in a good position to take up this integrating role. The trading firm here 
丨 , 
can then be seen as a merchant who integrates the production lines of different 
producers, which are，individually, parts or components suppliers. This is similar to 
i7xhat means the factory in question has extended preference to the trading firm before and that it has 
the potential and the will to develop a good relationship in the future. 
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the role of the Nike corporation in organizing the networks of subcontracting 
producers that I have noted in Chapter Three. -
After the matching of an order and a supplier and after production process has 
commenced, the role of trading agents does not end; they still have to "follow the 
: , 
I order" {gendan) and to do the "things in between". As I have mentioned above, how 
I the supplier actually finish its production (for example, arranging the production 
1 
schedule, the subcontracting-out of various jobs) does not really concem the trading 
agents. Thus the "things in between" are less related with the technicalities than the 
communication work between foreign buyers and suppliers. For example, if the order 
： is an appointed-production one, communications between producers and buyers are 
： very dense. Samples have to be approved by the buyer; and local trading firms have to 
prompt the buyer to give a more rapid reply. If the buyer wants to alter her 
specifications in-process, negotiations with the factory are indispensable. Since the 
supplier does not have direct contact with the buyer, the trading agent has to take up 
the mediating role in solving these apparently tedious problems. These problems may 
range from the very specifications, the quantity, the delivery time, to a minute one like 
where the labels are to be pasted. On the other side, if the producer finds problems 
during the production process, such as the inability to find suitable parts and to deliver 
1 on time (these problems, as post-contractual contingencies, are very frequent), the 
trading firms have to notify the buyers so that a solution is reached and adjustments 
！ approved. All these things require the mediation of local trading firms. 
't 
I In addition to these, local trading firms have to arrange the freight schedule ， 
\ 
\ 
I and the payment, that is, "following the order". Ordinarily, products are shipped by 
sea; but if producers cannot meet the specified deadline, air freight has to be used, 
with the cost difference shared mainly by the producers. However, the exact portion to 
be shared by the supplier is also a bargaining topic. It is because a delayed delivery is 
not necessarily associated with any fault on the part of suppliers (for example, the 
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sudden rupture of materials supply) or that it is caused by the in-process adjustments 
demanded by the buyers. Contracts "signed"^^ by both parties do not specify these 
contingencies and the procedures of their possible settlement; in other words, they are 
incomplete. Bounded rationality, on the first hand, makes it difficult to specify clearly 
and completely all the components of a “perfect contract", like the definition of good 
(or acceptable) performance (and its converse), sanctions of non-performance, as well 
as settlement of future contingencies. Granted that it is possible to draft one, the costs 
of such doing may be quite daunting, as many transactions are carried out each day. 
One step further, a contract as complete as rationality allows may not be favorable to 
all parties engaging in buyer-driven commodity production, because, firstly, this 
renders the relationships too formal; secondly, it reflects the lack of trust; and finally, 
when constant adjustments are the rule, too detailed a contract may act as a hindrance 
to rapid and flexible response (see also Vong 1993). Complete contracts are not 
practical nor appropriate in other words. Thus in the case of a claim, it is hard to 
I determine who should share the burden and how large it is. Local trading firms has to 
coordinate and make the conflict resolve. How this kind of post-contractual conflicts 
is resolved and a compromise reached is conditioned by the level and nature of trust, 
as well as the power relations between the different parties. I would talk more about 
this in Chapter Six. 
Payments to suppliers are made by local trading firms after the products are 
received, normally after two-week time. But if the supplier is in need of money and 
that it is trustworthy enough, payments would be made in advance. However, local 
trading firms have the sole discretion here, as this deviates from the contractual 
specifications and the trade-wide norms. The nature of the relationship in between is 
^^More often than not, production would commence (for example, the preparation work such as 
adjustments of the current schedule and notification of subcontractors about the order) before the 
signing of a written contract. Furthermore, the written contract is often very brief; it just includes the 
price and the date of delivery. The trading agents and producers rely more on oral agreement and "a 
man's word" than on this brief"purchasing form". 
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an thus important decision factor. Only when a "good relationship" is already in place 
would local trading firms offer "mutual adjustment" {huxiang qianjiu). 
Payments to producers ordinarily is the last job of local trading firms. But if 
the buyer are not satisfied with the products shipped, she deserves the right and, more 
importantly, has that power to claim the producer. This is another troublesome job for 
the trading firm, because, by a similar token, it is difficult to adjudicate where the 
fault really lies. One possibility is that after the order has been placed, the buyer finds 
that it would not be a best-selling one. To minimize her loss, she would tell the 
suppliers to "hold shipment". Or ifthe products have already been shipped, she would 
lay an unreasonable claim after receipt. It is quite difficult for both the supplier and 
trading firm to determine whether the claim is really a bogus one. The other 
possibility is that the supplier deliberately deceives the trading fmns. This is possible 
because examination of the final products is again not complete enough. As a trader 
reminds me, 
We are so busy that we cannot go to every factory to check its products. ... At most, 
we send a cargo inspector to the factory and check a few boxes. You cannot check 
everything.…After the cargo inspector has checked the products, and then he left, 
whether the factory "has the bags changed" (diaobao), no one knows.…The cargo 
inspector is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. (John) 
It is impossible to examine all the finished products against the specifications; 
it is also inappropriate to do this even when it is possible, because this means the 
questioning of (personal) integrity of the suppliers. When the supplier believes that 
the trading firm has cast doubts on its own trustworthiness, the relationship between 
them would certainly sour. While quality (over-)inspection is always inappropriate, it 
may also transform into a formality, which leaves room for opportunism. A 
merchandiser or quality controller may go to the factory premises to fulfill other 
purposes, 
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We only check the packaging when we go to the factory for product inspection. 
Among 1000 boxes, we just check 5 or 6. It's not uncommon for buyers to find 
problems after receipt. When we go to the factories, we just want to build "mutual 
rapport" {ganqing). After checking for a while, we go to lunch together. (David) 
In addition to the uncertainties and the resultant conflicts when a buyer files a 
complaint, the interests of a merchandiser would be also affected. 
When the buyer wants to claim, there'll be a bad image in the eyes of my company. 
Secondly, i fthe buyer wants to claim the factory, you must disrupt your relationship 
with the supplier. You have to negotiate, and it's troublesome. (David) 
When these post-contractual conflicts arise, external arbitration or legal 
sanctions are also unfeasible or inappropriate. Firstly, too tough and formal a stand 
would "rigidify" the relationships between the trading frnns and suppliers. A threat to 
use these sanctions in itself is more than sufficient to eradicate all chances of 
compromise. Secondly, the costs of resorting to the court outweigh the possible gains. 
Thus, it is natural for local trading firms to let the file "pending" than to resort to legal 
action, if no compromise can be reached. All said, to avoid these problems, local 
trading agents have to ensure the matching of the products and the demands. 
However, since a trading firm is separate from a producer, coordination and dispute 
resolution cannot be accomplished through authoritative commands. Thus these 
transactions have to be governed through other mechanisms, for example, a reliance 
on trust, norms of obligation, community pressures and, of course, economic 
sanctions. ‘ 
Apparently, the structural position of local trading firms in the commodity 
chain requires them to settle the dispute in a manner as fair as possible. But since the 
buyer and the supplier are both infected with uncertainty, local trading firms are given 
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room for maneuver. A merchandiser of a resident buying office would sometimes 
utilize this freedom iniavor ofhis supplier. As he explains, 
We're different from independent trading firms. Our buyer would not go away. 
Suppliers are the most important ones to us. If our suppliers are "played to death" 
{wancan) by the buyer, how can we do business again? You have to establish a new 
relationship with a supplier; and it's not just a matter of time. It's a matter of how 
many orders you can place on a particular supplier until a long-term relationship can 
be developed.…We must pretend to help the buyer in front of the buyer; we must 
pretend to help the supplier in front of the supplier. (David) 
The merchandisers, because of their employee status^^ and their structural 
position at the organizational boundary, may be captured by a supplier. On the more 
positive side, it is natural to extend favors to particular suppliers, as I have explained 
just before. But an independent trading firm is less free in this regard. Its relationship 
with the supplier is qualified by its more precarious nature of the relationship with the 
buyer. As an owner of an independent trading firm explains, 
After the buyer received the shipments and discovered problems, we would stand in 
the middle. We have to see whether the claims are reasonable or not. If the claim or 
complaint is reasonable, we would then demand the supplier to shoulder the 
responsibility.…We are at the center of a triangle. We should treat everything as fair 
as possible. We should be responsible to the factory, and we should be responsible to 
the foreign buyers or clients. (John) 
To repeat once again, an analysis of the relationship between local trading 
firms and first-tier suppliers requires one to include the respective relationships with 
other occupants along the commodity chain into our explanation. 
i90r more accurately, the loose coupling of incentive structure and performance. The job of 
merchandisers is a dead-end one; at most, you become the chief merchandiser in the resident buying 
office. He is still subject to control and command by the head of the buying office and, of course, the 
buyer. Thus the incentive is to build up the necessary connections with a pool of suppliers during his 
employment, and then to hop between different trading frnns after these social capitals are 
accumulated. The fmal destination is becoming a trader (for example, an owner of an independent 
trading firm) himself. 
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_ As I have already shown, the main job of local trading firms, on an abstract 
level, is to connect the production capability to the world-economy. Local trading 
firms, specifically, have to satisfy the demands of both sides. By this token they are 
interdependent. Yet, the relationships between local trading firais and first-tier 
producers are not symmetrical. Exactly because local trading firms have controlled the 
marketing outlets, their power over first-tier producers is clearly considerable. With 
this point in mind, we can proceed to the actual production organization and 
governance in the next chapters. Before that, a few comments on the existence of this 
decentralized and fragmented structure are necessary, because they help highlight the 
need of all parties to maintain such a precarious symbiosis by adopting a variety of 
creative tactics. 
4.3. Two Vertical Disintegrations 
In Section 4.3.1, we would first talk about the vertical disintegration between 
buyers and producers. After we have explained this, that is，there is raison d'etre for 
the existence of this layer of trading firms, we would then taUc about the rationale 
behind the vertical disintegration between trading frnns and domestic producers, for 
there exists the possibilities of trader-plus-producer. By explaining these two vertical 
disintegrations, we can understand why local trading frnns are indispensable in buyer-
driven commodity production. My contention is that the two parties are vertically 
disintegrated because, firstly, there is an upper limit in the size and scope of a 
particular producer in Hong Kong, and secondly, the fluctuating nature of a buyer-
driven GCC would inhibit such integration. 
4.3.1 Buyers and Suppliers 
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To entrust the local trading firms to do the mediating role, foreign buyers have 
to pay a price. A commission (around 5% of sales, but decreasing in recent years) is 
charged by independent trading firms, and resident buying offices have to be 
financially fed directly by the buyer. But why do the buyers not transcend the trading 
firms in placing their orders directly on domestic producers? This is curious when we 
realize that, in addition to the extra costs, foreign buyers have to negotiate with an 
extra layer oftrading firms themselves. An extra "technologically separable interface" 
is added, with “extra” transaction costs to be cut or managed. That buyers would not 
go to the factories directly, I argue, is related with incomplete information the buyers 
possess andA)r the costs of searching for the required volume of information on the 
performance ofthe suppliers, as well as the need to guard against opportunism after an 
order (based on an incomplete contract) has been placed. 
Since buyers may not know which domestic producer is the best endowed in 
the production of their specified products, a search for a number of prospective 
suppliers is necessary when an order is to be placed. Local trading firms are better 
equipped to do this than foreign buyers, because they have more information (though 
not necessarily complete) about a large number of domestic producers. That is，local 
trading firms maintain a wider range and level of production capacity to meet foreign 
buyers' demands. The difficulties for foreign buyers to contact domestic producers are 
compounded by the fact that what they want is not a pure market transaction. It is 
seldom the case that products with the exact specifications and in the exact quantities 
are already available for foreign buyers to buy. In other words, there is no market in 
its strictest sense. More oftea. than not, adjustment of and negotiations on 
specifications, delivery time as well as quantity is required, both before and after 
production commences, as I have demonstrated in the above paragraphs. That the 
production specifics are made congruent with foreign buyers' demands is premised on 
constant coordination and communication with domestic producers. Local trading 
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firms, being physically and socially more proximate to domestic producers, are more 
efficient to do these "things in between" than by foreign buyers themselves. 
Furthermore, opportunism on the part of appointed producers (for example, 
upward price revision, delayed delivery) after the placement of the order has to be 
checked, particularly in the case that products demanded by this particular buyer can 
also be sold to others (that is，low transaction-specific investments). In the case of 
appointed production where buyers would often demand exclusivity, the losses 
associated with opportunistic behavior on the part of producers (for example, what the 
insiders call the “dissipation” [san] of the exclusive product information) are 
extremely high. Local trading firms are in a better position to determine the 
trustworthiness (because of social proximity and personal familiarity) and to check the 
possibilities of opportunism of domestic suppliers than foreign buyers on their own. 
The reason is twofold: firstly local trading firms are able to gather more information 
to determine the trustworthiness of prospective suppliers. A trustworthy supplier is 
believed to be (or actually is) less opportunistic. Secondly, local trading firms have 
more sanctioning devices at their disposal, the threat of which is quite powerful in 
deterring domestic producers from behaving opportunistically. I would further 
elaborate how trust can be utilized to curtail opportunism in Chapter Six. Now we can 
safely argue that by incorporating a third party into transactions, foreign buyers can 
have their risk and possible loss shared. 
However, when entrusting local trading firms to monitor domestic producers, 
problems afopportunism on the part of trading firms (for example, shirking) arise and 
have to be managed. Independent trading firm are given the incentives to monitor the 
supplier more closely, that is, less likely to be opportunistic, because they in tum 
^°Especially in the earlier years, when telecommunications is not as developed as in recently. 
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extend credits to the foreign buye r s��For resident buying offices, their tendency of 
opportunism is checked by internal authority��. Thus, the commission and 
maintenance costs paid by the buyers (to independent trading firms and resident 
buying offices, respectively) can be seen as a risk premium and the costs of 
information collecting. 
However, the explanation above is not yet complete; even though we now 
have explained the reason why foreign buyers would not go to domestic factories 
directly, we still beg the question of why domestic producers would not go to foreign 
buyers on their own. The rationale would be elaborated in conjunction with the reason 
why local trading firms would not vertically integrate downwards, as this second 
vertical disintegration is a two-way question. 
4.3.2 Trading Firms and Suppliers 
j 23 . 
I That the two parties are vertically disintegrated can be explained by 
examining two negative questions: firstly, why do producers not incorporate the 
trading business or the handling of direct exports?; and secondly, why do trading 
firms not take up a producer r o l e � I would tackle them in tum. 
As I have demonstrated in Chapters Two and Three, the export markets in 
which Hong Kong producers are engaged are fluctuating; and an existing commodity 
2iQn the other side, oppominisrn (for instance, an unreasonable claim) on the part offoreign buyers in 
tum have to be checked by local trading fmns, for example, by asking for letters of credit ("hostage 
exchanges"), by relying on reputations and peer information, by transforming the transactions into 
personal relations etc. 
22rhis does not mean that the problems are eradicated completely, because of information asymmetry. 
2;As I have shown in the previous section, though they are disintegrated in ownership terms, 
transactions in between are more stable than in pure market transactions. 
24八 producer role here is defined narrowly. As we have seen, sometimes the trading firms may take up 
a coordinating role in integrating various outputs from a number of producers to finish a marketable 
final output. Yet, in this case too, no actual production (the transformation of nature) is taken up by the 
trading firms. 
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chain can be easily ruptured when the markets are saturated andA)r the demands of 
foreign buyers cannot be satisfied. This creates not only the tendency of vertical 
disintegration among producers (a theme taken up in the next chapter), but also the 
tendency for domestic producers to broaden their marketing channels. Only when a 
large number of prospective foreign buyers can be contacted and orders placed by 
them can domestic producers maintain an adequate volume ofbusiness. 
Possibilities exist that a stable and large enough flow of orders can be obtained 
by the adoption ofdirect and independent marketing strategies, like the establishment 
of a direct marketing office in the target markets. However, as we will see in the next 
chapter, an average producer in Hong Kong is small in size and limited in scope. It is 
also financially under-nourished. These characteristics of domestic producers would 
inhibit such proactive marketing strategies. The collection of extensive information 
(for example, on market trends and the creditworthiness [or more broadly, 
trustworthiness] of foreign buyers), and participation in trade fairs are vital for this 
attempt. Financially, it is near impossible to incorporate all the trading business. Even 
when it is capable, the limited scale and scope deter domestic producers from setting 
up a permanent direct marketing office or department. This difficulty is compounded 
especially when domestic producers have to deal with a large number ofimporters and 
retailers, who are individually controlling a snippet of markets. Information collection 
is a problem; the provision of unstandardized products (for example, different 
specifications, delivery time and quantities) requires extensive coordination and 
cooperation between buyers and producers. Given that the typical Chinese firms are 
lacking such experience and social capital, it is natural and economical to let local 
trading firms perform these jobs. These trading firms enjoy economies of scale and 
scope, which make marketing searching more feasible. Furthermore, the profitability 
of the trading business is conditional on the coverage of, and imperfections in, 
markets they are able to target. Local trading firms thus would have that incentive in 
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the exploration of virgin markets, an important means for domestic producers to 
broaden the scope of targets and thus to survive market fluctuations. 
Though it is impossible and uneconomical for domestic producers to organize 
all exports on their own, they can adopt a dual marketing strategy, namely, they 
handle only a part of exports on their own and let the trading firms take up the 
remaining ones (see Gundlack and Achrol 1991; Heide and John 1988). It seems 
advantageous to domestic producers to do this, firstly, because its dependence on local 
trading firms as a whole can be lessened (Cf. Emerson 1962)，and relatedly, it enables 
them to check the market price and hence discipline local trading firms. This •{ - ‘ 
dependence-balancing strategy or "plural form" in governance mechanisms (Eccles 
and White 1989; Bradach and Eccles 1989)，however, is also unfeasible^'. The 
！ rationale is interesting: when local trading firms know that a particular producer has 
its own direct marketing, they would be less cooperative (for example, lack of 
incentive to bargain on behalf of the producer with foreign buyers) and offer only less 
profitable orders to that producer. Local trading firms would be less cooperative 
because there exists the possibility that the producer would ‘‘fetch’，{qiao) the buyers 
who have existing business contacts with a local trading firm. This would affect the 
profitability of the trading firms. Hence the trading firms would discipline these 
producers, perhaps at an extremely high cost, when the norms of obligation and 
faimess are violated. To fetch a buyer from local trading firms is defined as unethical. 
The dissipation of exclusive production information is also seen as a serious breach of 
business ethics, 
2^0ther options still exist. While domestic producers would not actively search for foreign buyers, they 
would accept the orders offered by buyers if they contact the producers directly. But norms of faimess 
still apply producers would offer an identical price with that offered to local tradmg firms so that the 
relationships with trading fmns can be maintained. Otherwise, the trading business would be squeezed 
to death and exactly because ofthis possibility, local trading firms would terminate their relationships 
with this producer This is a credible threat to the producers because the relationships themselves 
remain valuable, even when the foreign buyers can now place their production orders directly. 
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'i Even though we have been in partnerships for a long time with a supplier, and that its 
•s 
products are very good, when this supplier dissipates the product specifications, even 
just once, we would not do business with it anymore. ... We would only appoint an 
"honest" {laoshi) factory to exclusive production. (John) 
4 
More interestingly, producers know this delicate balance also very well. As 
Peter explains: 
r： 
You would always fetch a buyer who has tight business contacts with a local trading 
fmn. This would happen in every minute. If the buyer has done business with a 
• trading firm for a long time, and when you try to fetch this buyer by sending a letter 
to her, possibly she would transfer your letter to that trading firm. The trading firm 
i would say, what the hell it is. We helped you, and we bought your products. Now 
you fetch my clients. We would not place any order on you anymore. Thisfrading 
firm would ask other factories when it wants to buy similar products.…we depend 
I principally on the local trading firms for business and marketing.…We would not 
fetch the buyers from the trading firms.…It's not ethical to fetch them in the very 
first instance— we have been partners for a long time, and they actually deserve their 
part. 
From the producers' point of view, it is inappropriate or unethical to fetch an 
existing buyer from a trading firm. Indeed, it is a joint product of self-interest (long-
term positive payoffs Vs short-term opportunistic gains) and the sense of a diffuse 
obligation to the trading firms ("we are partners"). Furthermore, when it is the way as 
it has always been, this way of conducting business may evolve into an organizational 
routine (Cf. DiMaggio 1988，1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 1991b; Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Meyer, Scott and Deal 1981; Powell 1988; Scott 1987，1990, 1992; 
Zucker 1983, 1987). It is perhaps difficult to separate these motives or causes so 
neatly. However, even when we grant that self-interest is the motive, it cannot be 
separated from the social connections in which the actor is embedded. This is 
reflected by the cautious attitude ofthe trading firai, when the buyer asks for a name 
card from the producers. 
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Ifthe buyer asks us for a name card, we would ask the trading frnn for its permission 
first. Because, on the card, our name and address are printed. Ifthis buyer is a "good-
friend customer" {sidangke) to the trading firm，it would say OK. Otherwise we are 
1 not permitted to give her one. Unless we are permitted by the trading fmn, we would 




The trading firm has to be careful, because if the buyer has no tight (social) 
relationship with this trading firm, she would have that incentive to transcend the 
trading firm and save that part of commission. This does not contradict my previous 
argument, because, in this case, the buyer has dealt with that supplier before (and feels 
satisfied with its products), and the problems of lack of information and inability to 
determine its trustworthiness are minimized. It thus follows that whether producers 
I 
would incorporate the marketing sphere is a dichotomous one: either you organize all 
your exports on your own, or you do that all through local trading firms. However, as 
we have seen, the former option is closed by the limited capabilities of the producers. 
On a more positive side, a reliance on trading firms can help spread the risks 
associated with buyer-driven commodity production. The issue of creditworthiness is 
I the most important. Producers have to extend credits to buyers; only when the buyers 
I receive the products will money be paid. In addition, after production has commenced 
I (that is, some non-trivial transaction-specific assets have been invested), producers are 
j exposed to the opportunism on the part of buyers, for example, unreasonable 
j alternations of specifications, price, quantities and delivery time. Whether foreign 
buyers would keep their promises is uncertain to domestic producers, if they do not 
I have complete information on their creditworthiness. As I said above, it is too costly 
for producers to monitor foreign buyers very closely. Furthermore, it is either 
impossible or improbable to draft a complete contract to account for these post-
j contractual contingencies. By inserting a layer of local trading firms in between 
i 
1 I 
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producers can have other parties sharing the risks. Firstly, information on the 
creditworthiness on local trading firms is more complete than that onforeign buyers. 
Only when the order is offered by a familiar trading firm would it be accepted, 
1 because a familiar trading firm would monitor the buyer for the producers so as to 
1 . 
I protect them. Domestic producers can minimize their risks, since (they would believe 
奪 that) a trustworthy local trading firai would try its best to "protect" its own suppliers, 
l{ . 
Secondly, if local trading firms behave opportunistically, it is possible for domestic 
producers to sanction them, for example, by terminating business transactions with 
this trading firm forever, and by activating community pressures. It is more difficult to 
; do these on the buyers. With the possibility of these "second moves" at hand, 
producers would feel more secure in doing business. Thirdly, the credit period 
;i extended to local trading firms (normally a two-week time) is shorter than that offered 
j directly by producers to buyers (equals to the length of shipment). This would, on one :! 
hand, be less risky (a "nearer" future contains fewer contingencies than a "far" one), 
and on the other, working capital will flow more smoothly. That first-tier domestic 
producers have to pay extra costs (the 5% rebates [xiaohuo zherang], also decreasing 
in recent years) when their exports are handled by the local trading firms can be seen 
again as a risk premium and the costs of information collecting^^ 
Local trading firms are also subject to the fluctuations of market conditions. It 
is seldom the case that a trading firm would specialize in one particular product area, 
because, firstly, the jobs are basically the same in handling different products，and 
secondly, specialization in one industry would expose the trading firm to wide 
I fluctuations in business volumes. Thus an adequate flow of business can only be 
achieved when local trading agents, as we can see, handle a large number of different 
industry products. However, production proper is a job totally different from the 
1 . • i -^ ^ — ^ — ^ ^ ^ " ^ ― ‘ 
！ 26And also rents enjoyed by the oligopolistic trading sector. 
i I 





handling of trade business; thus it is impossible for the trading firms to take up the 
producer role to produce all the products they are now handling. 
Similarly, question still remains on why local trading firms would not take up 
just one kind (perhaps the most important one) of industrial production and rely on 
I external suppliers to produce the rest. As I mentioned above, a product range of one 
. ;par t icu lar factory is not wide enough. All buyers' demands on this industry goods 
^ cannot be satisfied by one particular factory. If the trading frnn wants to produce all 
that their buyers demand, then the scope of production it takes up would be extremely 
large. Nonetheless, there are numerous constraints in attempting to do this in Hong 
Kong, as I would explain in the next chapter. The consequence is that the trading firm 
‘ m u s t resort to other factories. But other factories would be less cooperative when the 
I trading frnn has its own manufacturing capacity. These other factories would raise 
4 
doubts on the sincerity of, and the profitability of the orders placed by, this trading 
firm, because its own factory would certainly be given priorities. Hence the resultant 
range of choice for a trading firm is again a dichotomous one: all or no production 
capability. The former option is dearly unfeasible, and thus we come to the existing 
disintegration. 
-..- - --— 
Though disintegrated they are, local trading firms can manage transaction 
costs in between and opportunism on the part of domestic producers in a number of 
ways. That domestic producers extend credits to local trading firms is a good 
； deterrence. Similarly, the building up of trust, the imperative for domestic producers 
i to maintain their reputations, the efficacy of community sanctions, etc., are all 
I 
important means for local trading firms to ensure the necessary performance of 
domestic producers and the possibility of meeting the various demands by the buyers. 
i In sum, it is the coincidence of the fluctuating nature of buyer-driven 
commodity production, scale and scope constraints of one particular firm as well as 
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the possibility of employing a wide repertoire of creative tactics in the management of 
precarious symbiosis between small-sized producers that explains the vertical 
disintegration between trading firms and domestic producers^: 
4.4. The Next Questions 
In this chapter, I have distinguished the four major types of local trading firms 
and reviewed their functions in connecting foreign buyers' demands and the 
j 
production capability of domestic producers. And I have also explained the reasons 
behind the vertical disintegration between local trading firms and domestic producers. 
The next questions would be: how does the appointed first-tier producer finish_the 
] required commodity? How is the remaining part of the input-output system 
constituted? How is the decentralized domestic production system governed. These 






2 7 ^ i l e I explain these disintegrations from the negative side, there are perhaps positive gains in these 
arrangements. For example, the continual positive payoffs in this repeated game weakens the mcentive 
of all parties to adopt alternative contractual setups (that is, a small [or even negative] quasi-rent [m the 
short-run] derived from such alternations). The effects of structural inertia or path dependence 
perpetuate this institutional arrangement (see Eggertsson 1993 and Itoh 1992). However, such an 
approach may commit illegitimate functionalism and tautology, especially when ones argues that an 
existing institutional configuration serves to minimize transaction costs the most efficiently, and that, 
simultaneously, transaction costs are defmed elusively. Nonetheless, this approach has also its merits, 
as it highlights the various coordination and integration problems in commodity production, 
particularly when we focus on inter-organizational transactions. “ 一 Page 90 
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Chapter 5 Local Organization ofProduction and the Networks of 
Interdependence 
In the previous chapter, I have talked about the mode of insertion of the 
domestic node into the world-economy. I have argued that local trading firms are 
facilitating the matching of foreign buyers' demands and the domestic production 
capacity. This is crucial because to succeed in a buyer-driven GCC requires that 
domestic producers are well connected with, and able to satisfy, the demands of 
foreign buyers. However, whether local trading firms can accomplish this matching is 
somewhat beyond their own control; it depends on whether the appointed first-tier 
producers can "deliver the goods". This requires us to analyze the local organization 
ofproduction or networks ofinterdependence. By this we can complete our picture on 
the input-output system of the domestic production system. 
In Section 5.1, the structure ofthe industrial economy or the configuration of 
i the domestic commodity chain is described, mainly based on statistical data and the ! 
I 
！ existing literature on relevant topics. The first feature we can observe is elaborate 
•i 
networks of interdependence among small-sized productive units as the input-output 
I 冊 - - -一 
system. Why is there such an elaborate local production network? I would argue that 
I it is mainly the result of limited scale and scope of one particular producer and the 
I fluctuations in buyer-driven commodity production. Elaborate external transactions 
I are hence a necessity in the local organizing in Hong Kong. However, this necessity is 
tumed into a virtue, in that responsiveness to different foreign buyers' demands would 
be enhanced in this production system. ， 
In Section 5.2, the organization of production of a buyer-driven metal ware 
domestic commodity chain would be outlined. While this metal ware commodity 
chain has both typicality as well as atypicality with respect to the average local chain, 
this case study can nonetheless shed much light on the mode of governance of the 
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1 • 1 production system. The question of governance is extremely interesting: since 
二 external transactions (in the context ofbuyer-driven commodity production) cannot be � 
coordinated by "administrative fiat", nor by “pure” market mechanisms, domestic 
producers have to devise creative tactics in organizing the local commodity chain. An 
I . . 
introduction of the input-output system of a local buyer-driven commodity chain 
prepares us a good ground in understanding the governance of the domestic 
production system, which is the topic of the next chapter. 
5.1. The Configuration ofthe Domestic Node and its Social Construction 
As I have mentioned in Chapter Two, the industrial economy ofHong Kong is 
populated by a large number of small-sized factories (see Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). 
I How do such small, and always specialized, firms organize their production? 
Specifically, how do they organize their inputs and outputs, so that foreign buyers' 
demands can be satisfied? In Section 5.1.1, the morphology of the domestic node 
("the input-output system") would be described. I would show that external 
transactions (both inputs and outputs) are extensive between the small-sized 
productive units. It is related with the limited scale and scope of one particular 
productive unit, since only when inter-organizational linkages are resorted to can 
buyer-driven commodity production (or, indeed, the production of any commodity 
ready for consumer use) be made possible. It thus bears resemblance to Pyke and 
Sengenberger's (1990: 4) observation on Italy that ‘‘[t]he key problem for small firms 
appears not to be that of being small, but of being isolated”. To put it in a slightly 
different way, the survival and dynamism，of small-sized factories is highly 
conditional on their linkages with various units in the industrial structure. It is a 
logical conclusion from the above-stated starting point, that internal specialization 
demands an elaborate network of “externalized” relations, in order to complete the 
j domestic commodity chain. But these relations are not pure-market ones, however. As 
1 I would show later, they are less chaotic than an anonymous market, and less 
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organized than a hierarchy. Furthermore, based on an analysis of the differential 
reliance on inputs and outputs by different size categories, we can also find that the 
structure is stratified by different sized factories. Specifically, the smaller ones tend to 
occupy a bottom position in the domestic commodity chain, whereas the larger ones 
tend to be at the upper positions. The reason behind this stratification is associated 
! w i t h differential resources and capabilities different firms possess. This property of 
layeredness, as we will see in the next chapter, would affect how the domestic 
production system is governed. 
In Section 5.1.2, we would talk about the social construction of these 
networks. That external transactions are extensive basically springs from the fact that 
the productive units are small in size (that is, with a limited scope and scale). So I 
argue that an understanding of the genesis of this configuration should be sought by 
exploring the trend of continuous multiplication of small-sized factories. My 
.'j 
contention can be stated as follows: the construction of these networks is embedded in 
its socio-economic context, especially the political one in which the small-firm sector 
1 is situated in relation to the colonial state, and the mode by which the whole domestic 
production system is inserted into the world-economy. It thus echoes with the basic 
I - _ �------
principle of new economic sociology that the process of construction of economic 
institutions should be problematized, with a ftill recognition of the existing social 
world in which they are created and reproduced (Cf. Eggertsson 1993; Granovetter 
I 1985, 1992). An attention on the genesis of this input-output system is helpful in 
'i understanding the possible changes in the social organization of production as well as 




5.1.1. Networks of Interdependence 
The base point from which we start here is the existence of a large number of 
small-sized factories. In the following paragraphs, I would attempt to draw a 
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schematic picture of the configuration of the input-output system. But a point of 
caution should be noted first. The analysis of a commodity chain cannot be complete 
enough, because a single commodity is composed of various outputs of a large 
number of commodity chains. Here the focal point would be a typical first-tier 
producer, that is, a producer whose output is a finished commodity that is ready for 
consumer use (though such a commodity may not necessarily go to the consumers 
directly). Just one or two layers "above" and "below" the first-tier producers in the 
domestic commodity chain are included in the picture we draw, so that a reasonable 
yet manageable scope is delimited. The production of labor power and business 
service, for instance, would not be elaborated in my account. 
Most domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in buyer-driven 
commodity production. This is reflected by a heavy reliance on local trading firms and 
foreign buyers to organize their industrial outputs, as well as the source of initiatives 
\ in their organization of production. When a foreign buyer wants to place an order to j . 
i producers in Hong Kong, she may go through local trading agents. Local trading 
1 agents, then, would appoint an appropriate first-tier producer to production. However, 
the appointed producer may not necessarily complete the whole production process on 
its own: it may further subcontract the order to lower-tier ones. Just beneath this layer 
I of first-tier producers, then, we may fmd the existence of a large number of second-
j tier (or tertiary-) producers�This is bome out by many surveys and government 
statistics. We would talk about the organization ofoutput first. 
In a survey of295 “small and medium" factories in 1987, it is found that about 
30% of the responding factories obtain their arders solely from other local factories 
(Sit and Wong 1989: 181). An earlier survey of415 factories in 1978 also discovers 
ijt is impossible to distinguish the two from the survey data employed here, because the use of 
subcontracting-out has not been controlled by the source of orders, that is, whether the contractors 
themselves are subcontractors for other local factories. Yet, a layer of tertiary producers is surely 
existent, as my interviewees have revealed. 
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such a layer of second-tier producers, as over 35% of the respondents receive all or 
part oftheir orders from local contracting factories._(Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 341). 
In another survey of98 small-sized factories (in the clothing and electrical/electronics 
雪 industries) in 1984, a higher percentage (40%) is found (Yip 1986: 39). The survey 
I 
'：conducted by Chiu and Lui (Forthcoming) in 1991 also confirms this pattern, with 
. , a b o u t a quarter of the responding factories received over 50% of their orders from 
‘ l o c a l factories. A smaller-scale study by Chu (1992: 431) in 1986 of 16 garment-
making factories also finds that 6 out of these 16 factories have received 
I subcontracting orders from local factories. Another survey of 80 "squatter workshops" 
j (with less than 50 employees) in Tseun Wan (in the New Territories) in 1978 reveals 
� t h a t 22 of them depends solely on subcontracting orders (Tang 1979: 60). All these 
studies suggest that many small-sized factories act as second-tier (or tertiary-) 
producers in the domestic node of commodity production. One question follows: what 
are the organizational differences between the first- and second-tier producers? 
Indeed, the differences in output destination are related with the size of the 
factories. That is, the structure of the configuration of the domestic commodity chain 
is principally layered in terms of sizel In the 1987 survey (Sit and Wong 1989), the 
pattern of reception of subcontracting orders has been analyzed by the number of 
persons employed in the sampled establishments. For factories with 0-9 employees, 
about 32% have all or part of the orders received from the contracting factories. The 
extent of outputs to other factories in larger size categories is lesser than the smaller 
' ones; the corresponding figures for 10-49 and 50-199 persons are 27% and 18% 
j respectively (Sit and Wong 1989: 183). We can infer from these figures that the 
I small-sized factories are more reliant on subcontracting arrangements for organizing <' 
their outputs than the larger ones; and hence they occupy a "bottom" position in the 
2size has important implications on the organizational and ftinctional characteristics of the firms in 
question For example, small ones have less elaborated control structures and are weaker in both social 
and capital resources. Thus their ability of occupying an upper position in the domestic commodity 
chain is weaker than the larger ones. 
! 
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domestic commodity chain. This finding is also supported by Chu's (1992: 431) study 
mentioned above, arguing that "[i]n general, the smaller the factory, the more likely it 
] is to be a subcontractor". That a definite layer of second-tier producers (often smaller ] 
i ones) is existent to supply the various products or services into the first-tier producers 
i 
is also supported by data on the input side. 
:•! 
.¾ 
In the 1987 survey, it is found that about 25% ofthe respondents have offered 
subcontracts to other local factories (Sit and Wong 1989: 182). In other words, a large 
1 portion of inputs into a first-tier producer is composed of outputs of second-tier 
I 
subcontractors. About the size differences, Chu's (1992: 432) study reveals that while 
I 
7 ofthe 16 sampled factories have not engaged in subcontracting-out, 4 ofthese 7 are 
factories with an employment size under 100 persons. Given the fact that smaller-
j sized factories are more likely to be subcontractors, it follows that, as argued above, 
they are situated near the bottom of the commodity chain, and thus their inputs are 
less likely to be fed by other local establishments. 
Unfortunately, these two studies do not distinguish the nature of jobs 
contracted out; so the reason why the second-tier producers are linked with other local 
factories is not clear. The survey conducted by Chiu and Lui (Forthcoming: Table 4) 
on the garment-making and electronics industries in 1992 fares better in this regard. 
Among the 69 garment-making manufacturers surveyed, 46.4% have resorted to 
capacity subcontracting. The figure for the 50 sampled electronics factories is 22%^ It 
: is thus clear that many inputs into the first-tier producers are fed by other local 
factories in the form of whole products, and these second-tier^producers survive by 
_ _ _ ^ _ _ _ « « ^ _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ _ > « ^ ^ _ « « « ^ ^ ^ » ^ ^ i ^ « » ^ « » « « » « ^ ~ " " " " ^ " " " ^ " * " ^ " " ~ » 
3jhe difference in the extent of capacity subcontracting is related with the possibilities of relocating 
their productive processes to China and that of upgrading the technological level, as well as the 
technical nature of production and the maturity of external transaction networks. Since the garment-
making industry is constrained in relocating the trade-restricted processes to capture the provision of 
cheap labor, the nature of its production is more resistant to automation, and a large pool of external 
producers i's available, the garment producers are "locked" in the utilization of various flexible 
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taking up production overloads of the first-tier ones. In other words, they act as 
capacity subcontractors, as buffers for production smoothing. The 1978 survey also 
includes a question on the nature of vertical (downward) linkages of the responding 
factories, and this can shed some light on the reason why second-tier producers are 
recruited into the production networks of the first-tier producers. The survey finds that 
about 22% of the respondents have jobs farmed out to other local establishments; in 
which25.8% ofthe subcontracts are for whole products (Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 
345). The extent of capacity subcontracting is thus considerable, especially in the 
garment-making industry. The second-tier producers are also responsible for the 
production of specialized service and/or components. Over 47% ofthejobs contracted 
out are for "one process" and about 27% are for "parts or moulds" (Sit, Wong and 
Kiang 1979: 345). So we can argue that the first- and second-tier producers are linked 
by both capacity and specialization subcontracting. The reason is that, the limited 
scale and scope ofone particular factory requires extensive externalized linkages with 
other factories. Moreover, external economies of scale and scope can also be enjoyed 
in this way: lower-tier specialized producers can pool orders from a number of first-
tier producers together, and the production system as whole can achieve a higher 
i 
i throughput level. 
That there are extensive linkages between the first- and second-tier producers 
is also bome out by Government statistics. In Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, the values of 
"payments to industrial work/services rendered by other establishments"^ and "sales 
of industrial worky'services to others" are listed. The first figure denotes the inputs 
feeding into the focal factories rendered as outputs by other industrial es tab l i shments ,， 
while the latter denotes the output ofthe focal factories feeding into other producers 
•s 
;— 
4jhe category "industrial work/services rendered by others" is the sum of "payments for subcontract 
work" and “cost ofrepair and maintenance service rendered by others". In Table 5.1, the latter two are 
not distinguished. In Table 5.2, only the values of "payments for subcontract work" are listed. 
Nonetheless, since "the cost ofrepair" is only a minor portion of the whole (under 1%), the two tables 
can be taken as roughly equivalent. 
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as inputs. But these two figures are only partial measures of the extent oftransactions 
among domestic producers, because they just include the amount of "industrial work" 
transacted, that is，the buying and selling of labor respectively in the accounting 
system. Hence they are under-estimations of the extent of externalized linkages 
between the producers in the domestic commodity chain, since domestic producers are 
I • 
1 also linked by the transactions of goods (no matter they are components or semi-
I . 
I finished products, with respect to the first-tier producers, as we have just seen), which 1^ ‘ 
I are not included in the figures^ With this caution in mind，we can proceed to a more 
comprehensive picture of the networks of interdependence among domestic 
producers, as well as the temporal changes. 
-._ 
From Tables 5.1 and 5.2，we can discem the increasing percentages of 
I "payments for subcontract work" over "total purchases"^ over the years where data are 
I available. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, the percentage increases from 7.20 
in 1976 to 13.47 in 1991. This increasing reliance on outputs of other establishments 
into one's productive processes is also visible in the manufacturing industry of 
"fabricated metal products’，?； the corresponding figures are 9.87 and 14.79 
respectively. In other words, as the number of small-sized factories grows relatively 
参 
'\ — 
i ^we are going to analyze the pattem by size and an assumption that the errors are the same for 
j different size categories has to be made. 
i 6 ^ e category of"total purchases" includes � “fUels”；（2) "electricity"; (3) "materials and supplies for 
j production" and (4) "industrial work/services rendered by others". To repeat once again, the 
percentages listed in the text are under-estimations of the extent of linkages between producers, since 
"materials and supplies for production" may also come from other factories, 
j ^ o u g h such industry statistics are the major source of information in the analysis below, it is at pains 
to point out fu-st that, no matter how detailed these industry classifications are, they are necessarily not 
congruent with the inputs and outputs of a particular commodity chain. For example, the outputs_of a 
glassware factory (belonging to another industry group "non-metallic mineral products") may be 
purchased as a component in the manufacturing of a fabricated metal product. This is exactly what we 
observe in my empirical cases. Industrial establishments, furthermore, are classified according to their 
principal product; the "side-lines" are thus neglected in official statistics. Yet, because ofthe lack of 
more suitable data, we must accept the inexactness of industry classification. Indeed, as I said above, 
I an analysis of a commodity chain can never be complete enough. For instance, the production of labor 
power (which is then fed into other commodity chains) requires the fmal outputs of, say, a foodstuff 
and a wearing apparel commodity chains, and many others. The best we can do is to delimit a 
reasonable and manageable scope ofanalysis out of a nested whole of different commodity chains. See 
Storper and Harrison 1991: 408. 
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(see Section 5.1.2), outputs of other industrial establishments are increasingly required 
to complete the production of a final commodity. . _ 
When the figures are decomposed by the number of persons engaged, a more 
interesting pattem can be found. For the size category of 1-9 persons in “fabricated 
metal products", the percentage ratio of payments for subcontract work over total 
purchases are 8.06 in 1984 and 17.29 in 1991. These figures are lower than those in 
the two larger size categories. Higher-than-average percentages are found in them, 
namely 10-19 and 20-49 persons; but it drops in the largest category. The same 
pattem is also observable in the manufacturing sector as a whole. One can thus infer 
from this that the medium-sized factories are more reliant on outputs of other 
establishments and that they are in the middle or top positions along the commodity 
chain; whereas the smallest ones are situated near the "bottom" of the layered 
structure, as their reliance on outputs of other factories is less than their larger 
counterparts. The slight drop in the percentage for the largest category may perhaps be 
a reflection of their lesser extent of specialization (see also Chu 1992: 431, for the 
same observed pattem). 
We can tum to the output side of the focal factories in Table 5.3 and reach a 
similar conclusion. The extent of "industrial work/services rendered to others" in 
proportion to "total sales"^ is also considerable. The average figure for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole is around 10%; whereas that of “fabricated metal 
products" is around 12%. Both figures suggest that many producers are subcontracting 
firms for other factories. Coupled with the above observations on the input side, it is 
unmistakable that there exists an elaborate network of inter-organizational linkages 
8xhe category "total sales" includes (1) "sales of goods produced (including machinery produced for 
own use)，，； (2) "goods resold in same condition as purchased" and (3) "industrial work/services 
rendered to others". The last sub-category measures only part of the outputs of the industrial 
establishments feeding into other factories, as part of the "sales of goods produced" may direct to other 
local factories. A similar assumption that errors are constant across different size categories is made 
here. 
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within the domestic node. Furthermore, on the size differences, larger-sized 
establishments are less reliant on other factories for consuming their outputs, in both 
the manufacturing sector as a whole and in “fabricated metal products". In other 
words, they are more situated at the "upper" end of the domestic commodity chain, a 
position that is nearer to the destined final markets. All size categories, to be sure, are 
intensively linked with other establishments in terms of their outputs, but the intensity 
I of such linkages is different for various size categories. The magnitudes are generally 
；highes t in the size category 10-19 persons, followed by 1-9，20-49 and 50 or more, in 
that order. So the argument that the small-sized factories are situated at the bottom of 
the chain is also supported by these output figures. 
- -
From the above analysis ofthe inputs and outputs of industrial establishments, 
it is indisputable that there are extensive linkages or elaborate networks of 
interdependence among domestic producers. We can also envisage a layered 
\ 
structure, in which the smaller-sized factories are more situated in the bottom of the 
I 
commodity chain. The causes of this pattern, of course, is related with the limited 
scale and scope of industrial establishments, especially the small-sized factories, a 
i 
point that has been mentioned several times in the analysis above. This point is nicely 
captured in the findings in the 1987 survey of 415 small- and medium-sized factories. 
The major reasons for offering subcontracts^ are, in that order, insufficient capacity 
(33.2%), labor shortage (28.0%), cost reduction (13.3%)，requirements of specialized 
equipment and process (11.2) and business cycle (9.5%) (Sit and Wong 1989: 187). 
The first, the second and the last reasons are concerned with the imperative to enhance 
responsiveness to foreign buyers' demands, particularly to their constant fluctuations. ， 
The resort to capacity subcontracting here reflects the limited scale of production in 
one particular factory. The fourth reason is related with the extent of specialization in 
small-sized factories. Here the reliance on outside specialized services and/or products 
9jt is safe to argue here that the larger-sized industrial establishments are more likely to do this than 
their smaller counterparts. 
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is a necessary consequence. By resorting to external transactions when circumstances 
arise (for example, when an order received is larger than intemal production capacity, 
when some productive processes are outside the technical abilities of one producer, or 
when new components are required to finish a new commodity), the whole production 
system can enhance its responsiveness to foreign buyer's demands. 
In sum, in order to complete the production of a final commodity ready for 
consumer use, the inputs and outputs of various industrial establishments in the Hong 
Kong's industrial economy must be merged together. This point is fully echoed by the 
conductors ofthe above-mentioned surveys. Interestingly, a vivid description can also 




Many small[-] and medium-sized operations are closely linked with the bigger , 
factories through an efficient network of subcontracting processing arrangements, 
providing Hong Kong's manufacturing sector with a flexibility which enables it to 
respond swiftly to changes in external demands (Industry Department 1993: 7). , 
Given that the input-output system of the production system in Hong Kong is 
constituted by elaborate networks of small-sized domestic producers, it is imperative 
to shift our level of analysis to the system level. A focus only on the internal 
operations of an industrial establishment in understanding the dynamism ofthe Hong 
Kong's industrial economy would certainly miss the mark. The quotation above also 
brings us another interesting point. That both capacity and specialization 
subcontracting are widely practised is a nice reflection of the production strategies of 
firms engaged in a buyer-driven GCC, namely, the maintenance of flexibility and 
responsiveness. As a study conducted in the earlier years of industrialization has 
already noted, "[t]o a considerable extent, Hong Kong industry is manufacturing 
goods to designs and specifications dictated by the purchaser, and where it is not，the 
initiative in any transaction comes more frequently from outside than from within the 
firm,, (Economic Intelligence Unit 1962: 8). It is not surprising then that whether 
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Hong Kong can continue occupying a place in the global division of labor (or whether 
she can continue attracting foreign buyers' orders) is highly contingent on the 
responsiveness and flexibility to market changes on the part of domestic producers. 
The heavy reliance on externalized industrial linkages is a production strategy devised 
exactly to actualize this imperative. 
I • 
As the above analysis has made clear, the bottom layers of the domestic 
commodity chain are occupied by smaller-sized industrial establishments than in the 
upper layers. While I argue that such a configuration is a manifestation of the 
imperative to enhance responsiveness in a buyer-driven GCC, the existing literature 
has also singled out the motive of cost reduction in the use of subcontracting or 
I 
I vertical disintegration (a major component of a decentralized organization of 
1 production), and related such use with the existence of a secondary sector of small-
sized firms ready for exploitation. The logic of argument is this: since wage rates are 
generally lower in small-sized firms O^ossibly because of weaker labor organization 
and the inability of more peripheral workers in a segmented labor market to bargain 
I 
I for higher benefits), jobs would be farmed out from the larger ones to their smaller 
I counterparts. Production costs are thus reduced, which is furthermore reinforced by 
work "restructuring" inside the larger ones, made possible by (the threats of) capital 
flight and forced redundancy (see, for example, Rannie 1993). Flexibility hence 
denotes exploitation. 
Undoubtedly, this is true to a certain extent, as this is the third major reason of 
offering subcontracting to other factories, as we have just noted (Sit and Wong 1989: 
187. See also Watanabe 1978: 73). To adjudicate the cost-reducing argument, we may 
tum to the relative wage in different size categories. Taking the wage level (in 1989) 
ofthe manufacturing sector as a whole as 100，the wage index ofthe size category 1-
I 
19 persons is 76.9 (Liu and Wong 1991: 24). Apparently, that wage rates in small-
sized factories are lower than that ofthe whole industrialsector is validating the cost-
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reducing argument. Yet, after taking labor productivity into account, the explanation 
does not stand. Assuming the sector-wide level oflabor productivity (in 1989) as 100， 
the index for the size category 1-19 persons is 76.5, almost equivalent with the wage 
index (Liu and Wong 1991: 21). Thus the lower wage rates in small-sized factories are 
just reflection of the lower labor productivity in those establishments. Hence, i t i s 
mistaken to argue that the resort to subcontracting (at least in Hong Kong) is solely 
aimed at capturing the fault-lines of a segmented economy of large- and small-sized 
factories. The advantages of the use of subcontracting or putting-out system are, 
furthermore, often compromised by the ineffectiveness of quality control (Cf. 
Edwards 1979; Marglin 1974), which are not accounted for by the cost-reducing 
argument. So, why are external linkages between local producers so extensive, why 
are the smaller ones near the bottom, and how are the various transactional problems 
(most notably that of control) resolved when firms tend to resort to external \ 
transactions? The last question would be left to the next chapter; whereas the first two 
have probably been answered in my previous discussion. The most likely candidate, 
for the first one, should be the coincidence of limited scale and scope of factories in 
Hong Kong and the easy accessibility ofdifferent kinds of producers. The reason why 
smaller-sized factories are situated in the bottom of the domestic commodity chain is 
their lack ofrequisite resources, most notably money and social capital，which inhibit 
them to occupy an upper position towards the market. On the whole, the evidence 
suggests that extensive subcontracting arrangements among domestic industrial 
establishments are the major means to enhance responsiveness and flexibility. 
We have talked about the inter-organizational linkages of goods (and labor) in 
the above paragraphs. But commodity production requires also the inputs of various 
physical means ofproduction, for example, raw materials, machinery and technology. 
And my case studies Opresented in the next chapter) also point out that an efficient 
flow ofraw materials is crucial in enhancing responsiveness. Yet, existing researches 
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are often lacking such analyses, and so the account here is based on very fragmented 
evidence. We would just talk about the inputs of materials here. 
I In a survey of 149 small-sized factories employing less than 100 persons in 
j 1968, it is found that only 12 of them have over 75% of their raw materials directly 
: impor t ed from foreign suppliers (Sutu et al. 1969: 23)^^ Of course, it is not that the 
;| remaining factories have obtained their raw materials by transforming nature by 
themselves, but that, as the report has noted in passing (Sutu et al. 1969: 4, 6, 7), most 
,^' -
f of the raw materials are indirectly imported from foreign countries via some "local 
I 
j middle merchants". A better picture can nonetheless be obtained by the frequently 
f 
i mentioned surveys. In the. 1978 survey conducted by Sit, Wong and Kiang (1979: 
J 348), it is found that the most common channel to obtain raw materials is from 
"wholesalers and retailers" (53.6%), followed by "other manufacturers" (24.5%), 
“direct from overseas" (11.2%), and "import^xport houses" (10.7%). Over a half of 
the respondents are dependent on other organizations on their materials supply in 
other words. How to secure a regular supply is then an important consideration for 
domestic producers. The importance of local agents in organizing raw materials inputs 
is also demonstrated in the 1987 survey, as 35.4% of the responding factories obtain 
their raw materials from local wholesalers (Sit and Wong 1989: 157). All said, inter-
I . 
i organizational linkages are indisputably important means in organizing inputs, here, 
i those of raw materials. 
/' -
\ 
j In the above paragraphs, we have talked about the inter-organizational 
linkages in the domestic node of a buyer-driven GCC. But the picture we drew above 
is not yet complete; we should include the production and utilization oflabor into our 
account. Labor market formation, as we will see, conditions the adoption of specific 
modes of organization of transactions. A tight labor market would limit the size of 
I --———————"•""'""—~~"~""~~" ‘ 
lOAgain，it is curious (and unfortunate) that how the remaining ones obtain their raw materials is not 
specified in this research report. 




factories engaging in labor-intensive production, and hence reinforce the network of 
external transactions. Statist theorists also argue that the colonial state is subsidizing 
capitalist production by adopting a massive public housing scheme (Castells et aL 
1988). By this means, it is said that labor power can be reproduced by some collective 
agents. But since the focal point here is about the first-tier producers and especially its 
relationship with the trading firms, the account here includes just the use of labor. 
In Chapter Two, we have related the use of outworkers (often in the form of 
homeworkers) and ambulatory labor with the imperative to enhance responsiveness 
in a buyer-driven GCC. The logic behind such arrangements would not be repeated 
here. Only its extent and pattem would be outlined in the following paragraphs. Here 
we talk about outworking first. In the 1978 survey, it is found that about 60% of the 
respondents have engaged outworkers either regularly or frequently (Sit, Wong and 
Kiang 1979: 356). Over 60% ofthose using outworkers explain their use in terms of 
labor shortage (Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 355). But the feasibility of such putting-
out system is qualified by the technical nature of production processes; thus we would 
witness wide industry differences in this case. The garment-making industry is most 
favorable in this regard, as the whole production process is technically fragmentable 
into different phases, and the nature ofjob putout (for example, weight and size ofthe 
materials) can be easily handled by outworkers. Furthermore, the tools or machinery 
required are relatively simple and easily affordable by the outworkers (see Lui 1990, 
1991). That the use of outworkers is extensive, especially in the garment-making 
industry, is supported by the findings in the 1987 survey, as 37.7% of all responding 
factories and 54.2% ofthose in the garment-making industry claimed that they have 
employed outworkers regularly or irregularly (Sit and Wong 1989: 165). Chiu and 
Lui's survey (Forthcoming: Table 4) in 1992 of 69 garment-making establishments — 
also reveals that 47.8% have used such a kind of labor. 
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Now we would talk about the size differences and temporal changes. As the 
surveys have not analyzed the pattem of outworking by the size of establishments, we -
can only tum to the statistical data published by the Government to fmd our answers. 
In Tables 5.1 and 5.4, the percentage ratios of "payments to outworkers" over “total 
compensation of employees” are listed. The first point to note is the decreasing 
importance of the use of outworkers^. For the manufacturing sector as a whole, the 
percentages show an almost consistent decreasing trend. It drops from 4.99% in 1976 
to 1.05% in 1991. In "fabricated metal products", a similar trend can also be 
• discerned. Discarding the outlying figure of 9.09% in 1976，the drop is still obvious: 
from 5.79% in 1979 to 0.89% in 1991. A possible reason for this decreasing trend is 
:. . 
that after many productive processes have been relocated to China, there is no need to 
resort to the outworkers, as the problem of labor shortage (as the main reason of the 
！ use ofoutworkers [Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 355]) is solved. 
Likewise, we are also interested in the size differences. For both the 
manufacturing sector as a whole and "fabricated metal products", the extent of the use 
of outworkers is inversely related with the size of establishments. For example, in 
1985，the percentage in “fabricated metal products" for the size category 1-9 persons 
is 4.33; for 10-19, 2.99; for 20-49, 2.55; and for those with over 50 persons, it is 1.64. 
The corresponding figures for the manufacturing sector as a whole are 8.75，6.24, 
3.50, and 1.52 respectively. This pattem is congruent with that revealed in Chu's 
(1992： 431) study, that “ � t h e smaller factories rely more extensively on outwork". As 
I argued above, the smaller-sized establishments are situated in the bottom of the 
domestic commodity chain. Though they are less likely to tether subcontract out to 
other local factories, they can externalize the burdens of a buyer-driven GCC down a 
layer, that is, to the household level, by employing homeworkers and other flexible 
iiAn important assumption is made here. Since the figures are ratios of payments to outworkers over 
compensations of employees, changes in percentages may just reflect the changes in relative wages 
between in-house workers and outworkers. When we taUc about the extent of use of outworkers, we 
have probably in mind the absolute numbers. Thus the figures should be interpreted with caution. 
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f labor forms. Lui (1990, 1991) has shown us the constant (and always torturous) 
: readjustment in both the domestic and homeworking lives of the outworkers in taking •-
«i 
up these jobs. To actualize and maintain flexibility or responsiveness in commodity 
production certainly has to pay a price. 
i 
In this section, a number of surveys and tables of statistical data published by 
$' 
the Government are employed to decipher the network of interdependence among 
domestic producers. Combining the above findings, a schematic picture of the 
I 12 
I domestic node of commodity production can be drawn, as in Figure 5.1 . That 
I commodity production is highly decentralized would create problems of governance. 
) Before we tum to this in the next chapter, we are now going to talk about the factors 
i 
behind these elaborate production networks. 
j 
5.1.2. Multiplication of Small-Sized Factories 
I argue above that elaborate networks of interdependence are a resultant of the 
limited scale and scope of one particular factory, which in tum is related with the 
limited size of industrial establishments in Hong Kong^l Thus the origins of this 
input-output system can be deciphered by exploring the multiplication of small-sized 
factories. The implication is that when one of these factors is altered, the whole 
production system, both in its input-output system and its mode ofgovemance, would •. • 
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j i2^ere are surely industry and individual differences in the number and the extent of inter-
organizational linkages. For the sake of exposition, these are not taken into account in the figure. See 
also Chu 1992: 433 and Li 1981: 55 for similar figures. 
i3it does not mean that production networks are present only when frnns are small and specialized, 
/^^-organizational linkages (for example, in a multi-establishment firm with various profit centers 
and a transnational corporation with globally scattered productive activities) can be put in the same 
framework of analysis, as intemal transactions have also to be regulated. The differences between 
inter-and intra-organizational relations lie more on the mode of governance than its very existence. 
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From Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, one can easily discem the trend of decreasing 
average size of industrial establishments over the post-war years. Several figures are 
sufficient to highlight this trend. In 1951, the average number of persons engaged in 
an establishment (for all manufacturing industries) is around 50; it decreases to 45 in 
1960，33 in 1970，23 in 1980 and a mere 15 in 1990. The corresponding in "fabricated 
metal products" are 56, 45, 18 and 15, respectively (see Figure 5.2)^^. Turning to the 
percentage share of different size categories, the number of establishments (for all 
manufacturing industries) with under 10 persons engaged makes up about 60% ofthe 
total number of establishments in 1976; and their share accounts for 73% in 1990. 
This trend ofcontinuous multiplication in “fabricated metal products" is also obvious; 
the share o f the same size category grows from 70% in 1976 to 82% in 1990 (see 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In other words, the decrease of average establishment size is a 
J consequence of a "disproportionate" increase of the small-sized factories among the 
whole population. There are several causes responsible for this interesting trend; and, 
as will be demonstrated below, they are clear manifestations of the social 
embeddedness of economic institutions. 
The most obvious reason behind this trend is the limited availability of 
industrial accommodation and factory space (Dwyer 1971; Dwyer and Lai 1967; Lo 
1967； Pryor 1972; Sutu 1965b). Thus the practice of using domestic premises as 
workshops is widely spread, especially in the early years of industrialization (Sit 
1983). According to an estimate (Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 12), about 80% of small-
： sized factories are located illegally inside domestic premises. At first glance, this is an 
inevitable state of affairs (thus a plausible explanation), because of the smallness of 
the size of territory. But upon a closer observation, this "fact" is far from inevitable 
i4piease be noted that figures before 1976 are not strictly comparable with those afterwards, in that the 
former ones denote those registered with or recorded by the Labor Department (hence an under-
estimation o f t h e number of small-sized factories and an over-estimation of the average size, because 
the Government requires only those employing more than 20 workers, and those utilizing power-driven 
machinery and dangerous materials [no matter of their size] to register with it); and the latter are from 
respective surveys ofindustrial production, the coverage of which are more comprehensive. 
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and thus requires a more fine-grained explanation. Firstly, the reason why industrial 
establishments remain content in clustering together and thus limiting their- size 
should be tackled. Related to this, the causes and consequences of this smalbiess 
"symptom" cannot be neatly separated. The existence of a large population of small-
sized establishments would affect the constitution of the input-output system and the 
I mode of governance. The whole organization of production, in tum, would facilitate 
* the entry of small-sized (and specialized) producers, particularly when the 
) "roundaboutness" ofthe production system increases (Scott and Storper 1989). Thus 
when one of the components in the system changes, the whole system would also be 
altered. That is, we should treat it as an “historic bloc”，and recognize fully the 
\ internal logic ofthe system. . 
i • 
,1 -
Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) argue that the structuration of firms (and frnn 
systems) should be seen with an eye on the political relations it is situated. The case of 
Hong Kong is a good testimony to their argument. As I have mentioned in Chapter 
Two, the Government's refusal to provide cheap industrial land was conditioned by its 
weak linkages with industrial capital. While smallness in size does not necessarily 
mean political weakness (as the case of Japanese farming population shows us 
[Johnson 1987])，it seems that a vicious cycle is initiated, because of the increasing 
':£ 
difficulties of collective action of a large number of small industrial establishments 
！ (Cf. Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Olson 1971). Weak political power of industrial 
j capital is, of course, related with the political formation of the state. The colonial 
丨 state, by definition, is not responsible to the subjects in Hong Kong. And the adoption 
I of the principle of "administrative absorption of politics” (King 1975) makes the 
！ consolidation of political forces difficult. Until 1985, no elected representative is 
present in the Legislative Council, the nominal legislative organ in the regime. After 
I 
i • 
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its limited democratization, small industrial capital is still under-represented^ ^ . How 
does this organizational (and political) weakness affect the construction of firms? 
With an institutional separation of the state and industrial capital (or, indeed, 
separation ofthe state and [Chinese] society^^), it seems natural that there is a lack of 
interest on the part of the colonial state to grant any preferential treatment to these 
small-sized factories. The bases of power of the state simply lie elsewhere. The 
political embeddedness of industrial policy, in this case accommodation, is clearly 
demonstrated by the land policy of the state. Chiu (1993) has aptly shown us the 
hands-off (that is，not neutral) attitude in the sales of lands, which are nominally 
owned by the Crown. In the name of "positive non-interventionism", lands are sold 
mainly through public auction. The high price of land is simply out of reach of the 
j capital capability of small-sized factories. The problem of lack of industnal 




The second major reason of the smalhiess of industrial establishments can be 
I deciphered from an opposite angle, that is, the possibilities of expansion. Here I would 
I talk about the availability of finance or "venture capital" first. To repeat once again, 
the refusal ofthe Government to establish a specialized industrial bank (see Industrial 
Bank Committee 1960) should be seen in the context of state-capital alliance (Chiu 
1993). This refusal was seen as unwarranted by many industrialists, as we can hear 
numerous complaints about the lack of financial support to the manufacturing sector, 
especially by the spokespersons ofthe small-sized factories (for example, Chen 196S; 
Lo 1967，1968，1970; Sutu 1964, 1965a). 
i5por a sketch ofpolitical development in Hong Kong, see Miners 1986. , 
i6Lau (1982) terms this political formation as "a minimally-integrated social-political system". 
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In 1972, the Government, apparently in response to these complaints, initiated 
a small-scaled program, which is to overcome the financial difficulties-of the small-
sized factories. The aim of this program (known as “Loans for Small Industry 
I Scheme") is “to assist small industrial enterprises to increase their productivity by the 
\ purchase ofmodem machinery and equipment" (Sutu et al. 1973: 9). The Scheme was 
I not a great departure from the original state's policy towards industrial development, 
1 in that the Government, with an initial backup of HK$30 million, just guaranteed 
！ 
•； payments (an amount as half of the loss excluding interests) to the lending banks in 
case ofdefaults. It is still the commercial banks that have the final decision to lend to 
the petite industrialists or not. It is generally acknowledged that commercial banks in 
Hong Kong are reluctant to grant loans to the manufacturing sector, especially to the 
I 
small-sized factories. On the first hand, there are more profitable (and less risky) 
^ outlets ofmoney, for example, to the property market; and, secondly，the small-sized 
factories are difficult to demonstrate their "trustworthiness", hence unable to secure 
loans from the banks^^ (see Lau 1994). The Scheme was of good intention in that the 
risks associated with the loans to small-sized factories were reduced by the state's 
capital backup, but, as we will see shortly, it did not go very far in alleviating the 
financial limitations of the small-sized factories. 
Despite the availability of (limited) state support, the small-sized factories 
seem to be not interested in the Scheme. The response rate was poor; and the Scheme 
ceased operation in 1976, with a life-span ofonly 3 years (Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 
: 65)18. It is not that small-sized factories in Hong Kong are financially strong and that 
such state support is redundant, but that the terms put forward in the Scheme (for 
1¾ is not that the banks do not lend money to the manufacturing sector. The banks certainly do a good 
iob in providing short-term loans and working capital to industrialists (see Chiu and Lui Forthcommg; 
Goodstadt 1969 and Hang Seng Bank 1964). The point here is that, without strong collective here the 
state support the banks consider it risky to grant long-term and slow-retum loans (which are 
； characteristic 'of loans for industrial development, for example, extended scale of production and 
I technological upgrading) to the manufacturing sector. 
j '«For a c W e h e n s i v e discussion of the genesis and failure of this Scheme, see Cheung, Ko and Tan 
1979. 
i 
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example, a prior non-refimdable payment ofHK$1000 as feasibility study fee, and the 
interest rate almost identical to market price) were seen as no great assistance to them 
(see also Vong 1993). Over 76% of the responding firms in a survey in 1972 
(immediately after the onset of the Scheme) claimed that the terms were not attractive 
enough (Sutu et aL 1973: 17). Why is state support important, and what are the 
implications of the lack of such support? That the small-sized factories are capital-
deficient, and thus requiring strong state push and assistance (without which the 
possibilities ofexpansion are limited), can be highlighted by attending to their general 
financial conditions. 
In the 1987 survey, it is found that, among the 276 responding factories, only 
0.7% obtain their initial investment funds from loans from banks or other financial 
companies (Sit and Wong 1989: 149). The most common channel to obtain capital is 
from one's own pockets, or borrowing from friends or relatives^^ (see also Economic 
} Intelligence Unit 1962: 16; Vong 1993: 57-9). A similar finding is also obtained from 
an earlier survey of 415 small factories in 1978, indicating that over 88% of the 
responding firms use their own savings as the source of investment fund (Sit, Wong 
and Kiang 1979: 337). A survey conducted by the Department of Commerce and 
Industry in 1968 of200 industrial undertakings (those registered with or recorded by 
the Labor Department) employing less than 100 workers also indicates that over 89% 
of the respondents had their initial capital out of their own pockets (see Goodstadt 
1969)20. Indeed, over 67.1% ofthe responding firms in the 1987 survey claim that the 
most acute problem in establishing a new business venture is that of availability of 
capital (Sit and Wong 1989: 200). The same figure in the 1978 survey is 55.1% (Sit, 
Wong and Kiang 1979: 383), suggesting that financial difficulties are not alleviated 
1 >^Family support is not limited to fmancial matters only. Family labor (Sit 1983), family and/or kin 
i connections with the requisite resources (for example, market outlets) and emotional support (Vong 
1993) are all crucial ingredients in the process of construction of a new industrial establishment. The 
social sphere is tightly connected here, in other words. 
^^Paradoxically, this finding was utilized to justify the official argument about the redundancy of state 
support. 
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over time. A reliance on informal channels has placed an upper limit on the capital 
formation of the small-sized factories. Coupled with the fact that -most small-sized 
factories are family concerns or in partnership forms (Industry and Census and 
Statistics Departments 1991: 20; Sit and Wong 1989: 136; Sit, Wong and Kiang 1979: 
337), it is safe here to argue that the availability of capital for expansion is rather 
limited. 
When the small-sized factories cannot secure fmancial assistance from the 
state and/or the banks, most of them rely on "self-help" strategies, for example, the 
reinvestment of surplus for expansion and informal capital formation. Yet, as the 
profit margins ofthese small-sized factories are extremely small (just aj:ound 10%, see 
I Figure 5.3), the amount of the surplus available is consequently limited. One can 
easily detect the fmancial constraints in attempting expansion. This unfavorable 
I environment would certainly put a ceiling on the possibilities for expansion; firstly, 
because of limited capital; and secondly but relatedly, an adoption of labor intensive 
production, which has smaller optimal internal economies of scale and scope. And 
•；•! 
) m o r e fundamentally, this state of affairs would favor a "conservative" or “playing 
safe" attitude in doing business, which in tum is reinforced by the experience of 
V 
j unstable business (see, for example, Economic Intelligence Unit 1962: 16; Chiu and 
Lui Forthcoming). Domestic producers, then, would resort to self-help rather than to 
some remote and seemingly inaccessible channels. One can ask for assistance from 
family members and friends. This is the most common way to solve fmancial and 
production bottlenecks. If a factory has received a huge production order, for instance, 
which exceeds its current in-house capacity, it would expand its production networks, -
rather than lateral expansion. I f i t has received a totally new production order, which 
is outside its original technical capability, it is easier to transform into a middleperson, 
i connecting different units of production so that the order can be fulfilled, rather than 
internalizing a new production line. Of course, the feasibility of such strategies is 
premised on the availability of such helping hands. The existence of the elaborate 
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network of interdependence does play a crucial role here. In sum, it is the coincidence 
of lack of state support, a resort to -"self-reliance" and horizontal or vertical 
cooperation, as well as the technical nature of production (which is not solely 
technologically determined) that limits the possibilities of expansion of the size of 
industrial establishments. 
As we measure the size of establishments in terms of persons engaged, it 
seems natural that we cannot separate the issue from the labor market conditions 
throughout the years. As seen in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, labor intensity of industrial 
production in Hong Kong is extremely high. The ratio of compensation of employees 
to value added falls in the range of 60%. The same ratio in 1989 in Singapore is just 
30% (Chiu and Lui 1993: 7). The low ratio of value added to gross output also 
demonstrates the same point. That most productive processes are of labor-intensive 
nature has two implications (in addition to the smaller optimal scale compared with a 
more capital-intensive production) on the average size of industrial establishments. 
Firstly, wage rate should be kept at a minimum, or at least comparatively so, as the 
main component of production costs goes to the compensation of employees^^ As 
findings in surveys carried out by the Industry Department reveal, labor cost is ranked 
by the responding industrialists as the most important investment factor in Hong Kong 
(Industry Department 1992: 286; 1993: 291). When the unemployment rate in Hong 
Kong is as low as 3% and labor shortage is said to be affecting the health of the 
manufacturing sector (Joint Associations Working Group 1989)，it seems likely that 
the latter is difficult to recruit its required workforce, not to say for expansionl Of 
course, wage rates can be increased relatively with respect to the other sectors so as to 
2!Labor costs (or compensation of employees) make up about 18% of total production costs in the 
1980s (Industry Department 1993: 23). This percentage is an under-estimation of the unportance of 
labor costs in production, as inputs of supplies and industrial services also contam a high labor content, 
as I have mentioned before. . 
22It is areued in the report that the termination ofthe touch-base policy is detrmiental to the supply of 
cheap labor power (Joint Associations Working Group 1989: 1 and 11). The policy suggestion is the 
implementation of an Import Labor Scheme. 
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attract workers from a definite size of working population; yet it would surely dampen 
the (allegedly) principal competitiveness of the Hong Kong's industrial economy. One 
can hypothesize that the imperative to keep wages low in the context of tight labor 
market is limiting the growth possibilities of the size of the average industrial 
establishment. 
t 
I Secondly, as wage rates for the manufacturing sector are not attractive enough 
； 
I in relation to other employment opportunities, for example, in the tertiary sector, the 
size of total industrial employment is decreasing in recent years. The number of 
industrial employment reaches its peak in 1981 at 996121; it contracts to 651404 in 
I 1991，a 35% decrease (see Table 2.3). A self-fulfilling cycle of inter-sectoral outflow 
is established, in that lower wages and less comfortable working environment in the 
manufacturing sector further reduces the attractiveness of industrial employment and 
availability of industrial workers. This decrease of total industrial employment is 
concurrent with the decrease in average establishment size. Thus it is the difficulty in 
recruiting labor that partly limits the size growth of industrial establishments. 
The above explanation can be sharpened when we examine the problem from 
, an opposite angle. If the tightness of labor market is a limiting factor for expansion, 
！ then an access to a wider pool of cheap labor power would automatically lift off the 
I 
constraints. Such a test case is actually at hand. Amid intensifying world-wide 
j 23 • 
I competitive pressures and rising wage rates in Hong Kong，many manufacturing 
1 industries in Hong Kong respond by relocating their productive processes to Mainland 
China (see Federation of Hong Kong Industries 1992; Leung 1993; Lui and Chiu 
j 
I 1993). For example, it is estimated that production cost in Shenzhen is just about half 
I .. 
as that in Hong Kong (Smart and Smart 1991: 225). Relocation is thus a good means 
23xhe average nominal daily wages (for all manufacturing industries) increases from HK$73 in 1982 to 
HK$224 in 1992. The real wage rate increases from HK$73 in 1982 to HK$100 in 1992. The 
corresponding figures for "fabricated metal products" are 69，230，69, and 103，respectively (Industry 
Department 1993:24). 
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to cut wage costs. In the 1987 survey, about 18% of the responding firms have out-
processing facilities in the Pearl River-Delta in South China (Sit and Wong 1989: 
225). A survey conducted jointly by the Industry and Census and Statistics 
Departments (1991: 34) in 1990 reveals that about 25% of all establishments in Hong 
Kong have at least one manufacturing plant and/or contracting-out arrangement in 
Guangdong Province. In addition, these relocated establishments are also attracted by 
the favorable terms, for example, on tax exemption, and loose regulations on 
industrial safety, land use as well as pollution controls (among others), offered by the 
i 
socialist state eager to capture "technology transfer". A new spatial division of labor is 
said to be constructed, when industrial establishments shift part of their productive 
processes, especially those of labor-intensive nature to China (Cf. Hsiao and So 
1993). Hong Kong becomes more like a trading and financial center, which serves as 
J the nerve-center of the now-regionally scattered industrial activities; that is, moving 
up in the GCC (see Chiu and Lui Forthcoming), So how does the massive relocation 
affect the size of domestic producers? 
The lack of comprehensive data prohibits us to draw a definitive conclusion on 
the exact size ofthe relocated establishments. According to Smart and Smart (1992: 
51)，there are about 11000 or 12000 Hong Kong enterprises involved in out-
processing arrangements, employing 0.85 to 1.2 million workers in China. The 
estimate by the Government is 7000 manufacturing plants and 1.2 million workers 
(Industry and Census and Statistics Departments 1991: 36). These two estimates both 
point out the growing average size of the relocated establishments (ranging from 70 to 
170 workers). Another study discovers an even larger figure. In a survey of its 1256 
members in 1991，the Federation of Hong Kong Industries'' (1992: 9 and 18) finds 
out that over 40% of the responding manufacturers had investment in the Pearl River 
Delta, again 40% ofwhich with a workforce of over 500. The average establishment 
24xhe members of this Federation are skewed towards the larger-sized establishments. Hence the 
figures followed are perhaps an over-estimation of the actual average size. 
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size here is an astonishing 787 workers. Bearing in mind the quality of the data 
available and the difficulties in operationalizing the concepts^^ it is safe to say that 
the relocated "workshops" grow tremendously in size, perhaps at a magnitude of forty 
times. The growing size of relocated industrial establishments hence testifies to the 
J validity of the above explanation, that labor shortage, coupled with the imperative to 
i keep wage low, is the major limiting factor in the size of establishment. 
The process of relocation as a survival strategy also contributes to the abrupt 
； shrinkage of size of industrial establishments in Hong Kong. If the notion that many 
labor-intensive production processes are relocated to China is correct, then the size of 
the remaining workforce in Hong Kong's "base-stations" would be reduced, as almost 
all the processes performed prior in Hong Kong are of labor-intensive nature. The 
f slight decrease of the ratio of compensation of employees to value added may add 
support to such an argument (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). Of course, there is industry 
variation in this case, as the origin rules set the ceiling for the possibility ofrelocation, 
for example, in the case of garment-making industry (Lui and Chiu 1994). Some 
productive processes must be performed in Hong Kong so as to enjoy various forms 
of trade preferences and to satisfy quota restrictions. The remaining workforce may 
also be responsible for the last phases of production, for example, packaging; or it is 
retained so as to fulfill small-batch and rush orders C^ong 1993). As mentioned just 
before, the base-stations in Hong Kong may now act as the regulatory center of the 
relocated productive processes. No matter what the industry differences are, the 
consequence is that, when many productive processes are relocated, the average size 
( 
I of the Hong Kong's base-stations is further reduced (see also Industry Department 
1993: 7; 1992: 7 for the same argument). This is congruent with the trend we noted 
earlier. 
25poj. example what can be classified as a relocated Hong Kong establishment is not unambiguous, 
because there are various forms of foreign investment in China (for example, joint venture and labor-
only contracting-out). These legal definitions are, furthermore, only dejure. The scope of coverage of 
these surveys also varies. Caution must then be taken in cross-comparisons. 
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While we have analyzed the trend of decreasing average size of industrial 
establishments, we still beg the question of their multiplication. We must focus on the 
barriers of entry and the tendency of new firm formation. We begin by talking about 
the latter first. For the sake of exposition, the issue can be partitioned into two aspects, 
namely, the internal nature of (Chinese) firms and the environment in which they are 
situated. We come to a full circle here, because the level of barriers of entry is 




A base point for our analysis here is that many new industrial establishments 
are spin-offs from existing ones, that is, created by individuals who have been 
previously employed, often in the same industry. Survey findings reveal that 93% of 
� the respondents (in 1978) are employees before the establishment of a new 
备 undertaking; whereas the same figure in the 1987 survey is 95% (Sit and Wong 1989: 
103). A smaller-scale survey of 98 industrial establishments also reveals a similar 
finding, that about 92% of the respondents have been previously employed, among 
which about 70% remain in the same industry of their parent companies (Yip 1986: 
28). Most ofthe spin-offs are still in some way related with their parent company, for 
example, as junior business partners, or outright competitors. Only a minute portion of 
� the respondents becomes entrepreneurs without being employed in their career 
history. As will be seen, it is the coincidence of an immanent tendency towards 
fission, the perception of a favorable environment and the real existence of 
opportunities, that contributes to the continuous multiplication of small-sized 
factories. ^ 
What is the organizational nature ofthe firms in Hong Kong that encourages 
the fission of new units or "extrapreneurs" (Johnsson and Hagg 1987)? Taking the 
"cultural preferences" of “becoming one's own boss" and "utilitarian familism" (Lau 
1982; Redding and Tam 1985) as givens, we should include the structural position in 
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，which would-be entrepreneurs are embedded into our explanation. I argue that a 




formation. Without going into the details，we can relate this tendency of continuous 
spinning-off with the Chinese nature of firms in Hong Kong. 
d 
^ It is commonly recognized that the typical Chinese firm is managed in a 
patrimonial manner, in which the extent of delegation of authority is low, the distance 
between the employers and employees large, and trust in between rather limited, ifthe 
I ‘ 
； two are not bound by strong ascribed ties. There is a lack of development of firm-
I 
i specific skills on the part of employees; loyalty and commitment to the "firm" as an f _ 
abstract whole are consequently weak. Authority is personalized and centered around 
the owner-manager. Family or kin members are the only ones that can be trusted and 
i to which authority delegated (Djao 1981; Redding and Tam 1985; Sit and Wong 
1989； Tam 1990; Whitley 1992a，1992b; Wong 1985，1986^. As a result, the 
possibility of access to higher position within a firm is quite limited for a ‘‘detached，， 
employee. Indeed, it is found that one of the major motivations of establishment of a 
i 
‘ new industrial firm is to escape from mistreatment and the perception of blocked 
career path, both within the original firm and in the outside environment, for example, 
j in the government bureaucracy (Vong 1993: 42-4. See also Sit and Wong 1989: 107 
and 112). The establishment of a domestic workshop or small-sized factory is a 
favorable option to those "relatively deprived" individuals (Sit and Wong 1989). Thus 
one can see this “perennial fissioning" as the manifestation of the ever-present 
centripetal forces in Chinese business system (Tam 1990). 
26xhe most comprehensive studies on this topic are Redding 1990 and Whitley |992a. 
27八 contrast with the Japanese practice is often drawn here. See, for example, B i g g ^ ? 9 1 ; H ^ l t o n 
and Biggart 1989; Hamilton, Zeile and Kim 1990; Orru, Biggart and Hamilton 1991; Tam 1990 and 
Whit leri992a And the "business systems" of Taiwan and Hong Kong are often lumped together as 
^ typical Chinese system (see also the far-fetched analysis in Kim 1993) While it is natural to explain 
i the differences in terms of "culture", for example, the different natures of authonty(hence related with 
the "institutional settings" both before and during the process of industrialization [Biggart 1991; Clegg 
and Redding 1990. Hamilton and Kao 1990; Whitley 1992a]), an economic analysis ofthe system is 
also possible. SeeAoki 1984 r^ .nd 1990. Unfortunately, such an economic perspective has not been 
applied to the firms in Hong Kong. 
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i While the organizational nature, especially that of the bases of authority, of a 
.• 
K 
Chinese firm is clearly important in driving out the would-be entrepreneurs, the 
explanation is but incomplete if the environment and opportunities available are not 
« 
taken into account (Cf. Bouchikhi 1993). While a number of institutional factors is 
listed above to explain the difficulties in expansion, it is another matter on the 
爹 
formation of new firms. It is found that many environmental factors are quite 
favorable for the formation of new industrial establishments. I have already talked 
I about the easy "technical" requirements of a new industrial frnn，namely, a small 
j 
amount of capital (which can be gathered from one's own savings and informal 
. 
‘ channels) and the connections with the requisite resources, like market outlets (that is, 
I _ 
^ social capital [Coleman 1989]) (see Lo 1968). That about 70% of the spin-offs (Yip 
1986: 28) remain in the parent industry is a good validation ofthe latter point. Here 
we would focus on factors on the level of production system. 
I 
As I have already shown, the input-output system is first of all composed of 
j 
I elaborate networks of productive units. It is furthermore a layered structure, in that 
j 
many different kinds of productive processes are taken up by different kinds (for 
example, in terms of size) of productive units along the domestic commodity chain. 
One can act as a first-tier producer, which is directly connected to the final market 
(possibly via some trading agents). The scope and scale of industrial activities 
performed in such a first-tier producer are variable, the magnitudes of which are 
mainly determined by the technical capabilities and social resources one possesses. 
These first-tier producers are able to take upjust a-small number ofproduction phases, 
that is，without a high extent of vertical i n t e g r a t i o n � ^ because there are different 
i 28^g transaction-cost approach is clearly relevant here. Liu and Wong (1991: 16) explain the 
multiplication ofsmall-sized fmns exactly in these terms, for example, the highly developed nature of 
the market and transportation system, as well as the lack of state regulations on transactions (for 
example, sales tax). Yet their explanation, without specifying the magnitudes of different dimensions 
ofspecif ic transactions and then "matching" them with specific governance structures, is too general to 
be useful. They face the unresolved problem o fwhy firms exist at all (see also Levy 1991 on Taiwan). 
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suppliers or vendors to rely on. External economies of specialized products or services 
are easily available. This creates^^- room for smaller and more specialized industrial 
establishments. In this case, a specialized subcontracting factory can fmd a niche to 
survive, because, for instance, the problems of access to the final consumer markets 
can be avoided, and one's only specialized technical capability can be fully utilized, 
by pooling specialized production orders from a number of contractors. This is a nice 
reflection of the internal logic of spatially agglomerated production complexes. As 
production is extremely decentralized, the position that new entrants can occupy is not 
limited to these two layers; one can establish a small workshop in one's own house, 
employing a number of neighbors and family hands, thus acting as a small capacity 
subcontracting producer. In other words, the requirements to establish a new 
productive unit are different in various levels; and there is always room to fit with 
one's capabilities and resources (see also Shieh 1991，1992 on Taiwan). 
While there are certainly different positions along the commodity chain in 
which the new entrants can occupy, matching their different resources and capabilities 
with the requirements in a particular structural position, ultimately the establishment 
ofnew productive units is possible ifand only if the products can be sold，no matter to 
the final consumer markets or to some contracting agents. In other words, the 
possession of the requisite resources and the possibility of occupying “suitable，， 
structural positions are just necessary conditions for a new entry; only when there are 
market outlets are opportunities really available and sufficient conditions attained. 
That is，we should place our focus on the "tightness" of the existing commodity 
chains and the possibility ofcreating a new one in case of unsatisfied demands. We 
would talk about the availability ofaccess to the fmal markets first. 
How the problems oftransaction costs in these inter-organizational linkages are solved, or why they 
are not problems in thevery first instance, would be explored inthe next chapter. 
29The inability to separate causes and consequences is most obvious here. 
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Numerous studies have singled out the fluctuation of consumer goods markets 
as the necessary condition for small-sized factories (and other flexible labor forms) to 
I survive (Holmes 1986; Imrie 1986; Piore and Sabel 1984; Rannie 1993). The case in 
I" 
i -
1 Hong Kong is more or less the same (Chiu and Lui 1993, Forthcoming; Chu 1992; Li 
'I 
； 1 9 8 1 ; Lui 1990, 1991; Lui and Chiu 1993，1994; Richards 1981; Sit 1983; Sit and Ng 
J 1980; Yip 1986). On the first hand, buyer-driven commodity production is inherently 
f unstable. Orders from foreign buyers for a particular specified product are not etemal; 
they cease if the specific market is saturated. When product markets are going to be 
saturated, price competition is fierce. Consequently, the burden is shifted from the 
foreign buyers to the domestic producers, that is, down the commodity chain^^ This 
creates room for the newly established factories, because, with a less secure 
！ . 
foundation, they are eager to do any business, no matter how small the profit margin 
is (Economic Intelligence Unit 1962: 101; HongKongManager 1967; Oliphant 1967; 
Sit and Wong 1989). Worst still, the size ofproduction orders varies greatly; it may 
ranges from several hundred dozens (with an money amount under HK$10000) to one 
i or two million dozens. Too small an order may not be attractive enough for a j 
^ relatively established producer, especially when the fulfilhnent of such an order 
requires a changeover ofthe current production line. A reasonable throughput level is 
seen as an important consideration in accepting an order or not (Cf. Best 1990; 
Lazonick 1991). A small-sized factory excels in this regard. Furthermore, style 
changes are frequent, especially in recent years. This requires constant readjustment of 
the existing production capability and consequently creates market niches for new 
firms (Sit and Wong 1989: 154). On the whole, instability of market conditions deters 
the first-tier producers from over-expanding their in-house production capacity. As I 
mentioned above，excess demands would be externalized to subcontractors. This 
j requires the creation of buffers for production smoothing. It also creates room for 
I junior capacity subcontractors. 
30How it is done would be outlined in the next chapter. 
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So how about the semi-finished, specialized service and component markets 
the lower-tier producers are engaged in? My own research findings reveal that the ties 
I between first-tier and second-tier producers (and for that matter, between the tertiary 
\ producers if they exist) are not as stable, obligatory and relational as in the Japanese 
: configuration, nor as fragile, adversarial and shifting as that of the US (Cf. Asanuma 
1992; Dore 1983, 1986; Gerlach 1992; Hart 1992; Imai, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1985; 
Orru 1991b; Orru, Hamilton and Suzuki 1989; Piore 1990; Sako 1992; Sheard 1983; 
Smitka 1991; Tumball 1991; Ueda 1991; Whitley 1992a.). The mode of governance 
here can be seen as situated in the middle of the two polar types. If price, quality, and 
^ delivery time (in a word, "performance") of lower-tier producers do not live up to the 
requirements3i, ^rst-tier producers would have their sources of supplies shifted. In 
other words, there are competitive (though checked) pressures in the specialized 
markets between the lower-tier producers. Newly established producers are then given 
the opportunities to gain access to the positions in an existing domestic commodity 
chain. An existing commodity chain is not water-tight. In addition, there exist the 
possibilities of creating a new one so as to fulfill the unrealized buyers' demands, 
particularly those that the more established producers do not bother to take up. It is 






'^  • 
j A production system should be seen as a complex whole; it is composed of an 
input-output system, a specific mode of governance and its "spatiality". In the above 
paragraphs, we have talked about the constituent units of the typical input-output 
system, and paid special attention on the reason why there are so many small-sized 
factories in Hong Kong. A careful reader may notice that this phenomenon is tightly 
related with the externalized linkages these units have. It is difficult to separate the 
j 
3iwhat is seen as unacceptable is an interesting issue, to which we tum in the next chapter. 
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I causes (the existence of a large pool of small-sized productive units) and the »• 
^ 
I consequences (the elaborate system of externalized linkages), because the domestic 
production system has gathered its own momentum. External linkages and small-sized 
建 factories reinforce each other. We have already talked about the input-output system; 
an analysis of the other component of the domestic commodity chain, namely, the 
； mode of governance, would be left to Chapter Six. But before we tum to this, an 
outline of the domestic configuration of a metal ware buyer-driven GCC is 
appropriate, as the details on governance are mainly based on this case study. 
I ‘ 
I 
i 5.2. The Domestic Configuration of a Buyer-Driven Metal Ware GCC 
I -
Congruent with format of the above discussion, the picture we draw here is 
centered around the first-tier producer, that is, the unit that produces the fmal 
marketable metal ware output. In Section 5.2.1., I would outline the developmental 
history of this first-tier producer, which is followed by a description of its external 
transactions and intemal organization in Section 5.2.2. As we will see shortly, the case 
study here is rather representative of the various organizational aspects ofthe industry 
economy as a whole^l Thus I believe that it has wider applicability in other 
commodity chains in which Hong Kong is engaged. 
5.2.1 A Historical Sketch 
； The first-tier producer in this buyer-driven GCC is a small-sized industrial 
I establishment, manufacturing fabricated metal wares (for example, salt and pepper 
j shakers set) solely for export. It was established in 1969 in a residential building in > 
Quarry Bay (an industrial area on the Hong Kong Island), with only 8 employees at 
_ • • I I I ^ — ^ — ‘ 
32Differences between various commodity chains lie mainly in the technical nature of production and 
oftransactions. Ofcourse, this would affect the mode of governance, for one thing. Yet, the framework 
itselfcan be retained by accounting for these "exogenous" factors. 
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IChapter Five _ I that time. This factory is a partnership; one of the owners is responsible for % 
为 
I production, and the other (Peter, the interviewee) marketing. The construction of / 
？ economic institutions is, as demonstrated by the “new economic sociologists，，，related j^  
, with the social and personal networks the would-be entrepreneurs possess (Aldrich 
T 
and Zimmer 1986; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Granovetter 1985). The case here does 
: support their argument; one of the owners has been employed in the same trade as a 
technician before the establishment of this new factory, and Peter had some 
experience in trading before. The former one received his university education in 
I ‘ 
I China before his illegal immigration into Hong Kong in the mid-1960s. His 
unrecognized education and inability of speaking English were a burden to him. The 
I -
resort to entrepreneurship can then be seen as a favorable mobility strategy. Though 
he did not really know the technical matters very well, the chief social capital he 
“ possessed when establishing this new factory is that he knew a number of "masters" 
(the pivotal persons in the whole production process) in this industry. He invited these 
masters to join this new one by offering better employment terms. That he knew 
where to find these masters was an important asset built up during his employment. 
The situation of Peter is similar; he was employed in a cigarette trading company 
before. Though the products are far from similar, his experience in dealing with a 
wide range ofcustomers and in the trading business was helpful for his new business. 
: Indeed, he was an entrepreneur “by default", as his decision to become his own boss 
I 
！ was consolidated when he was fired by the cigarette trading company. '• 
•! 
I As in other small-sized factories, the initial capital ofthis factory was gathered 
from informal channels, that is，from their own pockets and friends or relatives. No 
attempt has ever been made to gather initial f\mds or long-term industrial finance from 
banks. The reason is simple: without a solid foundation, the bank would not lend 
！ money to the factory, and the factory knows it well. Indeed the owners perceive no 
great need to lend from the bank after the factory has been on the right track. Firstly, 
an efficient flow ofworking capital can be managed by asking credits from lower-tier 
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I producers, for example, raw materials vendors and specialization subcontractors, 
f 
^ Normally, the factory pays these vendors or producers on a monthly basis. By 
creatively adjusting credit periods, production can be carried out and each production 
^ order be completed without heavy financial commitments (Cf. Djao 1981). Secondly, 
no plan for drastic expansion in production capacity has ever been figured out; the 
； factory relies only on reinvested profits to finance limited (lateral) expansion. In other 
words, the factory has adopted a "hand-to-mouth" attitude in doing business. The 
reason is that business is fluctuating and the factory is highly vulnerable to the 
I ‘ 
• changes in foreign demands. For example, in the early 1980s, when the world 
economy experienced a downturn, the factory had difficulties in obtaining adequate 
I _ 
business orders. Furthermore, such fluctuations are compounded by the insertion of a 
layer of trading firms in between, which would dilute a definite volume of orders to 
* different factories. It is thus risky to over-expand its in-house production capability. 
Though it has not attempted to lend from banks, this factory has maintained a rather 
close relationship with a Belgium-based one after the initial years. Bank support here 
relates more with the cultivation of reputation and demonstration of trustworthiness 
than long-term industrial financing. The factory has to maintain a good relationship 
with a bank, because some trading firms and foreign buyers would ask for bank 
certification of good financial condition when dealing with a new factory. 
. f , 
，丨 
This factory has experienced steady growth after the initial years (except in the 
j early 1980s). In 1973, it was relocated to a room in a flatted industrial building (also 
j in Quarry Bay). Both floor space and employment size grew, the latter to around 50 in 
1 • 
the years before it was relocated to Dongguan4n 1987. The factory slowly builds up a 
I pool of stable trading partners, mostly resident buying offices and independent trading 
firms. The number of such "familiar" local trading frnns is around 20. Business 
becomes easier (and more stable) when this pool is in place, and relatedly, when the 
reputation and trustworthiness ofthis factory have been demonstrated and established 
in the eyes of both trading firms and foreign buyers. The situation in the initial years 
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I was totally different. Peter had to resort to “cold calling" to market his products; he 
1 had to bring the product catalog to some unfamiliar trading firms and ask for business. 
I . 
: As he recalls, the situation was very harsh; they would ask for very stringent terms, 
i 
and cash flow was very tight. These are the common difficulties faced by newly 
I 
established small-sized factories, because materials vendors and specialized 
• i ； 
� subcontractors are reluctant to extend credit to these new (and unfamiliar, hence not 
i 
trustworthy enough) factories. The power of the trading frnns was also enormous in 
the early years. They had the ability to fix prices and ask for large commissions. Their 
power slowly erodes as more trading firms are in business and the "knowledge" and 
experience ofthe factories slowly accumulate. Now foreign buyers would specifically 
appoint this factory for production because they are satisfied with previous 
: transactions. When reputation has been built, foreign buyers would even introduce 
their colleagues to this factory, and trading firms (and other production partners) 
would extend preference (for example, priorities in receiving orders as well as credits) 
because of their confidence on this factory. 
In 1987，the factory has moved all its productive processes to China. The 
I 
factory has business transactions with Chinese firais right from the mid-1970s, when 
glass ware components are ordered from suppliers in China. This gave the factory 
some experience in dealing with Chinese firms and their various practices, for 
example, bureaucratic red-tape. Peter confesses that rising rentals and wage rates in 
Hong Kong are the principal pushing factors for such a relocating strategy. The 
pulling factors are, as can be predicted, the preferential terms offered by the local 
state, for example, on pollution control and profit remittance. Other establishments 
also exert an isomorphizing (Cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Vong 1993) pressure 
on this factory, when the long-time subcontracting partners have relocated to China 
too. A spatially closer relationship with its subcontracting partners is helpful in 
smoothing external transactions, as we will see in the next chapter. 
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I have argued in Section 5.1.2 that the difficulties in recruiting labor are 
f limiting the growth possibilities of industrial establishments in Hong Kong. This 
I ,» 
\ factory cannot stay immune from such constraints. From the early 1980s onwards, the 
i 
factory had been experiencing increasing difficulties in attracting laborers, no matter 
f 
in-house or other flexible forms. Peter explains this in terms of the decreasing 
‘attractiveness of industrial employment and especially the poorer working conditions 
i 
(for example, noise and lack of air-conditioning) in his industry. The upper ceiling is 
lifted in China; the size ofthe relocated workshop grew tremendously, with over 300 
I employees now. Labor (especially mingong [migrant labor] from Central Eastem 
I China) is in abundant supply; and it is much easier to recmit workers than in Hong 
I - . . 
Kong. While business volume increases after relocation, the organization of 
， 
production ofthe factory remains basically the same as in Hong Kong, except that a 
1 minor portion of export orders is now received directly from foreign buyers, that is, 
T 
i without the mediation of the local trading firms. This has affected the mode of 
governance between the two actors, v/z., it becomes a little bit more egalitarian. This 
brief history, I believe, is sufficient for my purpose here, and now we can tum to its 
•f 
organization of production. 
^ 5.2.2 Networks of Interdependence 
I 
i ^ 
I We would talk about the source of orders first. The products for this factory 
are solely for exports. Until the late 1980s，all of them are handled by local trading 
firms. As I saidjust above, now a small portion of exports are handled by the factory 
itself, when foreign buyers contact it directly for quotations. Despite this change, the 
factory still has no independent or proactive marketing strategies, except that in the 
early 1980s it has attempted to establish a trading office in New York. Such an j ‘ 
attempt was based on the beliefthat a more direct and active marketing strategy can, 
firstly, guarantee a more stable flow of business. Secondly, by transcending local 
trading firms, profit level can be enhanced, since no commissions have to be paid. 
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Though so good an intention, the attempt failed, mainly because it is uneconomical to 
maintain such an office when the product range and sales volume of one factory are 
not large enough. In other words, limited scale deters the factory from integrating 
forward. Cultural distance, lack of direct marketing experience as well as inefficacy of 
control are also possible reasons for this failure. 
Production orders received from foreign buyers (via local trading firms) can be 
classified into two main types. About a quarter is produced according to the 
specifications laid down by the foreign buyers, that is, what the insiders call 
"appointed production"; the remaining ones are nominally designed by its own. In this 
latter type, foreign buyers would select their desired products from the product catalog 
and/or upon referral from local trading firms. But the initiatives in this second kind 
actually lie elsewhere, as many of its "own" products are imitations or just minor 
modifications of the specifications from previous foreign buyers. It has no design 
department or the like, and “new，，products are developed on an ad hoc basis，for 
example, modifications ofjust one or two parts of an existing product by the skilled 
workers (the masters), and more commonly, imitations. In other words，production is 
buyer-driven rather than initiated from within, that is，as Peter puts it, “no export 
orders, no production，’. It is not only physically so; it is the same in temporal 
dimensions: only after an order has been placed does the production process 
commence, since a very small inventory of finished products is maintained. The 
reasons are mainly the lack of space and the avoidance of capital tie-up. Coupled with 
the constant fluctuations of export orders, this urges the factory to maintain an 
efficient or flexible organization of production. ’ 
In sum, when situating it in the domestic commodity chain，this factory can be 
seen as a typical first-tier producer in my terminology, because, firstly, its products 
are finished ones ready for consumer use, secondly, it is not a subcontractor for other 
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local factories, and finally, part of its production is further subcontracted out, as we 
will see later. -
The export markets it is targeted are mainly the developed world, for example, 
Westem Europe and the United States. In recent years, businesses with buyers from 
the Third World, for example the Middle East, increase relatively. The reason is that 
as competition in the former markets is fierce, other “virgin，，markets has to be found. 
Of course, this depends on the initiatives of local trading firms; but they are likely to 
do so because the profitability of the trading business is conditional on an imperfect 
market (for example, due to information asymmetry). In the eyes of local trading 
firms, the latter buyers are less demanding than those from the developed world. 
These buyers would buy simpler products, and the lengths of such orders are 
relatively longer than those ofthe developed world. No matter where the markets are, 
they are not stable enough to warrant a large-scale, and implicitly, more rigid, 
organization of production. Although there is no conspicuous seasonal fluctuations, 
the volume (and the lengths) of orders placed by the buyers varies very much. It may 
be just several hundred dozens, with a money amount of just under HK$10000; or it 
may include over 10 thousand dozens, occupying the production schedule for over 
two or three months. This is because a specific product market become saturated very 
quickly, especially in recent years. The trend is “smaller quantities but greater 
variety". Unless foreign buyers have confidence that a particular product is a best-
selling one, andy'or they are large-scale importers who control a number of 
(geographical) markets, they would not dare to place an huge order at one time on 
particular factory. Furthermore, it is safer (and also more flexible) for the buyers to 
place a repeat order when the projection is an underestimation. To repeat orders does 
not pose a problem to the buyers, because lead time can be adjusted to just around a 
single month. This fluctuation is more conspicuous in recent years. Competition 
between similar factories is heightened, because more factories (both local and in 
other NICs, for example, Thailand and China) are now in need of business. 





1 Consequently, smaller, "tougher" but msher orders have to be accepted, or no 
萬 
> 
: bus iness at all. This brings the factory an additional imperative to create a more 
flexible organization of production. 
^ 
The whole production process is basically divided into four phases. The first 
phase is presswork. All materials (stainless steel, aluminum or raw iron, mostly from 
Japan) are ordered from local materials vendors. Since raw materials have to be 
imported in bulk (just one kind of material in a whole container), the factory fmds it 
？ unfeasible and uneconomical to take up this portion ofbusiness, as small quantities of 
I 
j a wide variety of materials is needed to produce its near 30 basic items. The inability 
to take up direct materials import is compounded by the lack of space. It is better for 
the vendors to stock for the factory than by its own. Though the factory relies on 
i , 
f external supplies, a reasonable price and service can nonetheless be assured and 
transactional problems solved. It is because the factory is able to check the "market" 
price and to build long-term relationships with a small number of familiar vendors. 
Furthermore, because the quality of materials supplied by different vendors is almost 
constant, they are easily substitutable by each other. Thus, the factory meets no 
difficulty in obtaining the required materials at the right price and the right time 
through the local materials vendors. 
After raw materials are in place, they are then fed (either manually or 
automatically, depending on the forms [rolled or sheeted] of materials supply) by 
male skilled in-house workers into electrical pressing machines. These machines are 
！ relatively simple ones because all that is required is a mechanical press, or in the case 
j of automatic machines, an additional roller. Only in this first phase are machines 
employed. In the initial years, they were bought from second-hand machinery stores 
in Reclamation Street (in an long-established business district in Kowloon). Recently, 
new machines (most are made in Japan) are used; it is not that they are superior than 
second-hand ones in technical terms, but that new machines are more reliable and 
I 




\ more durable. With a stronger financial condition, the factory finds it affordable to 
I 
•； order new ones from local machinery suppliers. � 
The most important step in this first phase is the installation of specific molds 
I 
into these pressing machines. The molds are made by the masters in the factory, and 
these masters are also responsible for their design and adjustment. In recent years, 
external mold designers are occasionally employed to design some complicated and 
sophisticated ones; but the production of these molds still lies inside the factory. The 
masters are the pivotal persons in the whole production process, since they know "the 
： tricks of minor adjustment". Consequently, a rather close (and paternalistic) 
relationship between the owner-managers and these masters is built, which is 
supported by better employment terms and common gendered discourse^^ (Cf. Lee 
^ 1993； Ward 1972). After the products are pressed into proper shape, they would be 
sent to the electro-plating factories, that is，specialization subcontractors. Depending 
on product specifications, either chromium or silver can be plated on the metals. The 
factory has maintained regular business transactions with only a small number of 
electro-plating factories: one for chromium and another for silver. In other words， 
though this producer resorts to external specialized services, transactions in between 
are more organized than an anonymous market. The rationale of such an arrangement 
is that, by doing regular business with a small number of familiar subcontractors, the 
factory can ensure better production quality and a more "cooperative" relationship. A 
cooperative relationship is extremely important in the ftilfilhnent of rush and small-
batch orders, as I would demonstrate in the next chapter. 
33lt is interesting to note that conversations between the two are full of foul languages (obviously 
gendered ones) which are absent in those with the female workers (coincidentally the less skilled 
ones) And the'use of such languages and the frequent resort to male-oriented topics (for example, 
！ football and to a lesser extent, beauty pageants) are also common in the tradmg busmess. They are 
I important means to demonstrate "brotherhood", "easy-goingness" and "trustworthmess" in this male_ 
I dominated trade. The demonstration of such "qualities" is helpful in smoothing business transactions. 
I 
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I The electro-plated semi-finished products would then enter the second stage of 
*~ 
)p roduc t ion . Here glass wares from external suppliers would be assembled with the 
*， 
electro-plated metals, with the help of some indigenously devised hand tools. As I 
have mentioned above, glass wares are ordered from factories in China. Before 1973， 
glass wares were purchased from factories in Hong Kong. When the origins rules had 
been relaxed, the factory decided to resort to Chinese suppliers afterwards. Peter 
argues that glass ware production in Hong Kong is not as good as in China, because it 
requires a larger factory space and good quality raw materials. China excels in these 
j regards. These suppliers were contacted in the Trade Fairs in Canton, or they were 
introduced by other factories. After several trial businesses, a stable pool of glass 
i 
I . 
wares suppliers was established. The rationale is similar with the case of electro-
plating, because quality and cooperation can be assured. However, as we will see in 
I the next chapter, there are a number of qualitative differences between its 
relationships with Hong Kong electro-platers and those with Chinese glass ware 
producers. 
Female in-house workers are responsible for this assembly stage. 
Occasionally, the factory would employ outworkers (mostly female ones living in 
public housing estates) and part-timers (mostly student workers) in this stage when 
production is in a rush or the order large. Nonetheless, the factory does not rely on 
capacity subcontracting to solve these production overloads. Quality control is a big 
problem; if anything goes wrong, it would affect the reputation of the factory. Of 
； course, money would also be lost when the buyers have to claim on it. Furthermore, 
1 local trading firms would not encourage further subcontracting, as.this would 
1 complicate the organization of production and hence quality may be affected. In the 
case of appointed production, further capacity subcontracting is strictly prohibited, 
because product specifications would be easily dissipated and the relationships 
between the trading firms and the buyers disrupted. Consequently, the factory would 
not accept too large an order; only when an order can be accomplished on its own is it 
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accepted. Control on its in-house workers is relatively easier than across 
organizations^^. This factory has experienced great difficulties in recruiting workers in 
the 1980s, as I have explained in Section 5.1.1. As a result, the in-house workforce is 
I aging (because it is difficult to recruit new and younger workers); only old women 
I • 
: w o r k e r s and a small number of skilled men remained in this factory just before « 
I relocation. The limited availability of labor has placed an upper limit on the size of 
, o r d e r s that can be accepted. Thus even when a large order is available, the factory 
i would fmd it impossible to take that. This kind of scenario was very common in the 
mid-1980s. 
When these two kinds of inputs are merged together, it goes to the third stage, 
packaging. Similarly, the factory buys their cartoon boxes from external printing 
！ factories. Again, the factory maintains just two printing factories as their frequent 
I business partners, with a similar rationale as in the case of electro-plating. The use of 
labor is also similar with the previous stage. After packaging，production enters the 
fourth phase, quality control It is just a nominal phase, because defected products are 
detected and discarded during the phases of assembling and packaging. No specialized 
quality controller is employed. Nonetheless, quality control would be exercised by 
other parties. Here the trading firms may send one representative to the factory for 
？ 
f product inspection, and occasionally, upon buyers' request, the trading firms would 
j bring them to inspect the products and the whole production process. Otherwise, the 
j trading firms are seldom involved in production. Such inspection is less frequent in 
1 
j recent years, when local trading firms have already placed trust on the product quality 
ofthis factory (see Figure 5.6). After this stage, production is nominally completed, 
and finished products are ready for freight. Normally, the factory can receive money 
34jhe case of specialization subcontracting is not comparable with that of capacity subcontracting. 
Since the scope of this factory is limited (because electro-plating and glass ware production are 
processes totally different from the technical capabilities it possesses), it has to resort to these 
specialized subcontractors. Of course, problems of control and coordination arise and have to be 
tackled. 
. - _^ _^___^ __^ _^ ^^ ^——.^ ^—^^ _^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
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I from the trading firms two weeks after shipment; but the date of payment may vary. 
! 
The factory would accept a late payment from a trading firm, and a trading firm would 
pay the factory a little bit earlier. This is only possible when trust between the two 
parties are in place. Production for a specific order here ends, unless the foreign buyer 
> 
lays a claim on the factory in case of defected products. In this case, negotiation with 
the trading firms and buyers is required to settle the dispute. 
5.3 A Summing-Up 
i 
t 
j In this chapter, we have talked about the morphology of industrial organization 
in Hong Kong, and explained its origins by focusing on the multiplication of small-
sized factories. Yet, a production system is composed more than an input-output 
， system; the mode of governance and its spatial manifestations are also important 
factors in accounting for its operation and dynamism. Based on the empirical 
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Figure 5.1 the Configuration ofaTypicaI Buyer-Driven GCC 
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Figure 5.6 The Domestic Organization ofProduction 
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Chapter 6 Industrial Governance and the Social Construction ofTrust 
• •«1 
！ 
I have already demonstrated that trust is important in the governance of 
I relationship between local trading firms and domestic producers in Chapter Four. That 
i industrial activities among domestic producers are regulated by trust, however, is not 
•； 
;l just limited to those between the above said two parties. Here I would spell out the 
i same imperative in the coordination between different producers in the whole 
\ domestic production system in Hong Kong. In Section 6.1，I would concentrate on the 
relationships between the first-tier metal ware producer on the one hand, and the 
: , 
i second-tier electro-plating and glass ware subcontractors, as well as the raw materials 
vendors, on the other!, while the presence of trust is indispensable in any complex 
I society, I argue that this imperative is much strengthened in a buyer-driven 
commodity chain. To promote quick response, a competitive price, and after all, 
flexibility, trust is important in the governance of the decentralized production 
I I 
system. The mode of insertion into the world-economy, in other words, affects not 
only the configuration ofthe input-output system, hut also the mode ofgovernance. \ 
. I 
However, while trust is surely important in governing a decentralized production ！ 
；system, the power of the upper producers in the commodity chain cannot be 
i 
neglected. Trust and power are, firstly, complementary social control mechanisms; 
they are both crucial means to ensure expected action. Power (specifically, the power 
to have production partners shifted) is，furthermore, a basis of trust; this credible 
threat of"exit" would signal to the other transacting party that trust should be actively 
maintained or otherwise it would break. By this token, I argue that the construction 
I 
and operations of trust are embedded in the power relations within the commodity 
chain. 
lAs we have seen in Figure 5.6, the metal ware factory also requires extemal services from printing 
factories and mold designers. However, since these services are less frequently utilized and that the 
logics of integration and regulation are very similar, I just focus on these three kinds of production 
partners here. 
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In Section 6.2, we would further elaborate the processes of the construction 
and maintenance of this governance structure. While some economists may argue that 
exactly because this governance structure is more efficient and that consequently it 
would be constructed "automatically" in an evolutionary sense (Cf. Williamson and 
Ouchi 1981), I contend that this sort of argument is incomplete without an analysis on 
the processes of social construction^. On the one hand, "governance by distrust" (for 
example, adversarial buyer-supplier relationships or arms'-length spot exchanges) can 
also be seen as a stable, though perhaps inferior, equilibrium (Cf. Lorenz 1988, 1992, 
1993). Without the requisite social structure facilitating the building of trust, buyer-
supplier relationships would be bound in a market-like fashion, with both transacting 
parties detached from each other and (attempting to be) armed with every available 
means to guard against opportunism. This is a stable equilibrium in the sense that 
when both parties do not bestow trust on each other, it becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, and that such a mode of governance would reproduce itself indefinitely. 
The mere possibility of a collectively superior outcome does not automatically nor 
necessarily bring it into real existence^. In other words, there is no compelling reason 
to presume the ready existence of a superior governance structure. What we need in a 
sound explanation is the causal processes. On the other hand, trust cannot be placed 
blindly; its cultivation and maintenance require continuous investment and active 
maintenance. The gist is that trust serves to minimize risks, but at the same time it in 
itself creates additional, and thus larger, risk. As Luhmann (1979: 24) puts it clearly, 
"[t]rust …always bears upon a critical alternative, in which the harm resulting from a 
breach of trust may be greater than the benefit to be gained from the trust proving 
2An analysis ofthe social processes ofconstruction of trust is indispensable. As a careful reader may 
notice just a moment later, my argument proceeds by first highlighting the "functions" of trust in 
governing relationships among the domestic producers. While the logic here is apparently identical 
with that o f the economists, I argue instead that trust may not be successfully cultivated (even when 
trust has its own flinctions and utilities to each individual actor), the possibility of which depends on 
the social relationships in which the actors are embedded (Cf. Granovetter 1992). By this I can avoid 
illegitimate functionalism. 
3jhe situation is similar to the well-researched Prisoner's Dilemma: while the payoffs when both 
parties cooperate are greater than otherwise, the individual party would fmd it rational (according to its 
own self interests) to defect, ifthey do not know whether the other would cooperate or not. 
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warranted" (see also Granovetter 1985: 491). Thus when actors have to bestow trust, 
they have to do it in an extremely careful and gradual fashion. The reliance on 
reputation, the resort to peer advice and "hands-on" experience, or, in a word, 
embedding economic transactions in social relations, are important “tactics” to 
minimize the risk (by closing the gap between rationality and uncertainties^) in the 
process of cultivation of a trusting relationship. 
6.1 Trust, Cooperation and Power in a Decentralized Production System 
Trust should be taken as a fact of life. Uncertainties about the future (and the 
need to reduce them), the presence of risks and complexities (and their minimization 
and reduction), as well as the necessity to rely on “agents，，aie some ofthe causes in 
the cultivation of trusting relationships between social actors (Barber 1983; 
Granovetter 1985; Lewis and Weigert 1985a, 1985b; Luhmann 1979; Shapiro 1987; 
Zucker 1986). Only by placing personal and (if the former is unfeasible) impersonal 
trust on other social actors, be it individuals or more abstract institutions, can our 
ontological security be maintained, human interaction predicted and social order 
- ach i eved . It is beyond doubt that trust is indispensable in both our "everyday 
encounters" and in the maintenance of the wider social order. However, such a 
general imperative has to be specified in its context. This specification is necessary, 
because trust should be seen as just one of the social control mechanisms available. 
Formal (for example, power, legal sanctions, intemal checks and balances, external 
auditing) and infomal measures ("public opinion" and surveillance, peer pressures as 
well as ostracism) are also important means to ensure expected actions and to 
minimize risks amid uncertainties (Barber 1983; Shapiro 1987). The exact "mix" of 
these measures can only be determined empirically in its context. As we would see 
4As Lewis and Weigert (1985b: 969，emphasis in original) explain, "to trust is to live as //certain 
rationally possible futures will not occur". In other words, trust begins when rationality ends. By 
collecting information about the trustee, the social actor who is to bestow trust can minimize the risk 
involved in the cognitive (and emotional) leap. 




just a moment later, the fluctuating market conditions producers in the domestic node 
ofbuyer-driven commodity chains face provide a good case in this regard. 
6.1.1. Market Fluctuations in Buyer-Driven Commodity Production 
In Chapter Four, I argue that trust is required in coordinating the activities 
between local trading firms and first-tier producers. The reason is basically threefold. 
Firstly, contract is necessarily incomplete (due to bounded rationality), or made 
incomplete deliberately (because of increased flexibility in accounting for future 
contingencies). No matter whether an incomplete contract is a matter of exigencies or 
not, its efficacy and enforcement require "non-contractual relations" (Cf. Macaulay 
1963). Trust plays a role here, because, for one thing, it "introjects" (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993) a sense of (pre-given) moral obligation into both parties, even 
when more favorable gains are available by behaving opportunistically. For another, 
trust is only possible in the context of an on-going relationship, which may be of 
value to each transacting party. The will and interests to keep this kind of relationship 
alive may reduce the tendency of opportunism. Opportunism may not be recognized 
as a possible outcome. Without being aware of the threats of opportunism, then, an 
incomplete contract is more than enough (Cf. the notion of"cognitive embeddedness" 
in Zukin and DiMaggio 1990). Secondly, a relationship governed by trust enables 
domestic producers to respond quickly and promptly to the demands of foreign 
, buyers. Only when producers believe or expect that local trading firms would 
reciprocate do the former cooperate with the latter. Cooperation between the two is 
necessary, and I have shown this point in connection with the attempt to flilfill a rush 
order and new product development by first-tier producers. Thirdly, such a 
relationship is more efficient than that based on ‘‘distmst”5. If opportunism is not a 
real expected option (as defined and believed by the transacting actors involved), 
5piease be reminded that this factor alone is not a sufficient explanation of the presence of trust or the 
construction of a specific governance structure. 
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transaction costs (for example, that of drafting a contract as complete as rationality 
allows, and that of resorting to other control measures) can be saved. These savings 
are significant, since a large number of business transactions are carried out everyday. 
When opportunism is not recognized as a real possibility, the transacting parties can 
stay aloof from the costs in attempting to account for all future contingencies. When 
such contingencies eventually arise, each party is believed by the other that it will try 
to resolve them in an open and fair manner. The transacting parties would then feel 
secured with such a belief, and act as z/such opportunism would not materialize. It is 
thus unmistakable that one of the crucial governance mechanisms between local 
trading firms and first-tier producers is that of trust. In addition to the relationship 
between local trading firms and first-tier producers, I argue that those among the 
lower-tier ones are also subject to the same imperative. My discussion here would 
revolve around the relationships between the first-tier metal ware producer and the 
specialization subcontractors, as well as those with the raw materials vendors. 
Why is trust important in creating dynamic and competitive buyer-supplier 
relationships, and by extension, better corporate and national economic performance? 
—Sako (1992) has made a good case here, arguing that enhanced "organizational 
efficiency" is a result ofthe closeness ofthese relationships. Based on a comparative 
analysis of the social organization of production in Japan and Britain, Sako (1992: 
140) fmds that the contractual relationships between Japanese suppliers and customers 
(or in my terms, between second- and first-tier producers) are generally more 
“obligational，，than those between their British counterparts. The reason behind this 
trading arrangement and its resultant efficiency is that a more stable transactional 
pattern governed by trust would encourage product and process innovation (through 
“Value Analysis" and “Value Engineering"), continuous downward price revision 
(through the installation of an appropriate incentive structure, for example, the 
； collection of productivity gains solely by the producers within a definite period)，and 
！ prompt delivery as well as quality production (because of intense communications， 
I 
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independent initiatives and open commitment) (see also Smitka 1991: 142-51). These 
advantages are crucial competitive bases, since the first-tier producers (in the 
consumer electronics industry) are facing cut-throat competition in their final 
consumer markets and that product life-cycle is much shorter in recent years. 
That the relationships between Japanese customers and suppliers are more 
obligational (or less adversarial) is reflected in the more stable trading patterns 
between the two, which are buttressed by the presence of three types of trust. Trust, 
first of all, plays a generic function here, as it reduces risks and uncertainties in the 
context of imperfect information and bounded rationality (Barber 1983: 8-14; 
Luhmann 1979: 4; Sako 1992: 13-5). The presence of"contractual trust", specifically, 
reduces transaction costs (here that of drafting a costly complete contract), because 
both parties would expect the other to keep its own promises, often implicit ones. This 
is crucial especially when "contract" often takes the form of oral agreement and that 
prototype production, which is based on just a tacit understanding or “implicit 
statement of intention" between both parties, can commence at an earlier time before 
the signing of a brief contract (see Asanuma 1992). By commencing production of 
parts before the finalization of the product specifications, new models can be 
introduced more frequently. This is often seen as the key to success of the Japanese 
consumer goods industries. Inventory level in the celebrated JIT system can also be 
lowered, if the customer has placed “competence trust" on the suppliers, since the 
latter are believed to have achieved a good technical capability and tight quality 
control on their own initiatives. The practice of “ship-to-stock” can save time and 
inspection costs by the first-tier producers. It also facilitates more rapid responses to 
consumer needs. 
While the extent of presence of these two kinds of trust has been 
I 
j underestimated in other more “individualistic” societies (Macaulay 1963), as Dore 
I (1983) has argued, the peculiarity ofthe Japanese system lies more in the presence of 
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"goodwill" among producers. "Goodwill trust", the third type in Sako's (1992) 
framework, implies the existence of "fiduciary obligation" between actors (Barber 
1983). With this kind of trust in place, each transacting party would act on the belief 
that the other party would place the interests of the relationship as such above 
individual interests. The basic principle in this "moralized obligational contracting” 
(Dore 1983) is that the gains in good times as well as the losses in bad times are 
believed to be shared fairly (though not absolutely equally) by both parties. Its 
f possibility is premised on the fact that both parties have the same open commitment 
to the continuing ofthe relationship in between (which is of value to both parties) and 
convergent mutual expectations about informal obligations. As Sako (1992: 39) puts 
it: 
i [S]omeone who is worthy of "goodwill trust" is dependable and can be endowed 
with high discretion, as he can be trusted to take initiative while refraining from 
unfair advantage taking. 
It is the presence of this goodwill trust that encourages "bottom-up" 
innovation and promotes quality as well as price competitiveness. By holding the 
belief that the other party would do its best to keep the relationship alive, the 
transacting party can bear the risks in investing in transaction-specific assets (for 
example, customized production capability and R & D expenditure), which are 
indispensable in product and process innovations as well as mutual adjustment in a 
turbulent environment. In Chapter Three, I have also singled out the presence of this 
kind oftrust, obligation as well as its resultant cooperation between specialized firms 
as the principal factors behind the recent success stories of the new industrial districts. 
In brief, the competitiveness of Japanese consumer electronics industry (and other 
new industrial spaces) is intimately related with these trust-regulated buyer-supplier 
relationships (see also Storper and Scott 1989: 30-1). One can easily realize the appeal 
of this system: it serves as a practical model to be followed by other industrial 
I 
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economies, such as the transplantation (and mutation) of "preferred supplier policy" 
in British industries (Cf. Blyton and Morris 1991; Milne 1991a，1991b) As we will 
see shortly, the relationship between the first- and second-tier producers in Hong 
Kong is governed in a similar fashion. 
In the previous chapter, I have mentioned that the metal ware factory that I 
have studied has to resort to the specialized service and production from electro-
plating and glass ware factories. The reason is the familiar one of limited scope. 
While external linkages are a necessity, the most peculiar thing is that the metal ware 
factory has maintained regular business transactions with a small number of these 
production partners. For instance, it has stable specialization subcontracting 
arrangements with only two electro-plating factories, and with one major glass ware 
producer and a minor one. In addition, the metal ware factory does not have its 
production partners shifted very frequently. If these production partners are 
technically possible to offer the required services, the factory would, as Peter 
describes it in a Chinese idiom, "rather do business with the familiar ones than with a 
stranger" {zuosheng huru zuoshu). Three interesting questions follow: what are the 
internal strengths of this stable trading pattem? How can the metal ware factory make 
such a necessity to rely on external services into a virtue? Granted that such a kind of 
relationships has its own merits, how can it be created and maintained? To answer 
these questions, we can begin from the market conditions the first-tier metal ware 
factory faces, as we did in Chapter Four. 
The metal ware factory has to depend on local trading fmns in organizing its 
outputs. However, the trading firms, on their own, cannot guarantee a stable flow of 
orders to the metal ware factory. The basic reason is that local trading firms cannot 
control their own sources of orders (as the defining feature of a buyer-driven 
j commodity chain): only when a buyer comes to their offices (for the independent 










buying offices) do local trading firms have the possibility to appoint first-tier 
producers to production. Thus to achieve a more stable flow of orders, the factory has 
to maintain good relationships with a number of trading firms, since this would enable 
the factory to gain priorities in accepting an order, especially when a number of other 
factories can deliver the same products at almost equivalent price and delivery date. 
To maintain stable and on-going relationships with the local trading firms is the 
principal way to maintain a smooth flow ofbusiness for this metal ware factory. 
However, a good relationship with local trading firms is not a total guarantee 
in this regard. Firstly, a good relationship may erode, when the factory fails to keep its 
promises for a number of instances. It may, for example, fail to finish production at 
the pre-agreed price. An upward price revision may not be necessarily the fault ofthe 
producers: when the raw materials prices increase, say due to currency fluctuations, 
the factory would be subjected to upward price pressures. However, such revisions 
would certainly create a bad image in the eyes of local trading firms. They may be 
convinced by this evidence that the factory is not a well-managed one, that it has 
failed to account for these possibilities before the reception of order, or that it has not 
created a good relationship with its own suppliers. Worst still, if upward revision is 
requested for a number oftimes, it may weaken the trust placed by the trading firms 
on this supplier, because post-contractual revision may be interpreted as opportunism. 
A huge volume ofcontrary evidence would lead the trustor to rethink its relationship 
with the trustee, to query whether its trust on its partner is wrongly placed. Such 
rethinking of the relationship signals the weakening of trust (and by extension, the 
existing relationship), since the trading firm would now attempt to protect itself, for 
example, by specifying penalties for mal-performance. In short, trust will be replaced 
by distrust. The same situation is also present when the factory requests a postponed 
delivery. Similarly, it may not be necessarily the fault of the producers; it may be the 
resultant of production problems on the part of specialized subcontractors (that is， 




ripples in the domestic input-output system). But to the trading firms, this implies that 
the factory is poor in managing the relationships with its own production partners. 
On the whole, if local trading firms allow to these kinds of scenarios to 
continue and still assign a preferred status to the factory, they would be subjected to 
pressures from both buyers and other factories, because it means that a good rapport 
{ganqing) is overriding other considerations. This is a practice that is unacceptable to 
both parties. Thus local trading firms would not hesitate to "promote" lhe less 
frequent suppliers to a more preferred status by muscling their power, if the original 
production partner fails to live up to the standards imposed by the buyers for several 
times6. It thus follows that the factory must prove its worth so as to remain 
competitive, and to keep the on-going relationships with the trading firms alive. One 
ofthe crucial ways is to manage its own production linkages welP. 
To guarantee an adequate flow of business, the factory must also possess the 
requisite technical capability, as required by the production of products requested by 
the buyers. The larger the product range it has and the better its technical capability is, 
the more likely it can obtain adequate orders. The reason is simple: even when it has 
maintained a good relationship with a particular trading firm, the trading firm has no 
reason to appoint this factory to the production of alien products. Thus before any 
further negotiations on price and delivery, the trading firms must select those factories 
which are technically possible to fulfill that order. The trading frnns，by "immersing" 
i 6 jhe number of failures of the factory to keep its promises that lead to the erosion of the relationship 
cannot be determined a priori. It depends principally on the strength of the relationship akeady in 
i Place because the presence of trust would tolerate a margin of contrary evidence. Of course, it does 
not mean that there are no limits of this trusting relationship: a large volume of contrary evidence 
cannot but drive the trustor to raise doubt on the trustworthiness of the trustee and on whether its trust 
is misplaced In tum where the limits lie is conditional on the extent of dependence of the trustor on 
the trustee Obviously, this is related with the availability of alternative transacting partners. Generally, 
the local trading firms would tolerate a smaller volume of contrary evidence than the first-tier 
I producers, simply because the power ofthe former is greater and, relatedly, that producers are engaged 
I in a competitive market. 
7it thus echoes with my previous argument that our analysis should be extended beyond the dyadic 
I level. 
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in the export trade for a time, can make their own estimation, the estimation that 
which factories can probably produce the required products. As I have mentioned in 
Chapter Four, only a few factories (often two or three) would be shortlisted by the 
trading firms and granted farther considerations for this order. To augment its own 
technical capability is an imperative for the metal ware factory; however, it is not 
under the factory's domain of control: when external services are required in the 
production of a marketable commodity, the metal ware factory has to ensure that its 
production partners are technically capable to deliver the goods. ‘ 
After a factory is allowed to negotiate with the trading firm on further 
production details, the factory has to make their own estimations. Since further 
capacity subcontracting is not practised by the metal ware factory, the factory has to 
estimate whether it can adjust the current production schedule, so that this specific 
order can be "inserted" into the production line. It is improbable (and unwise) to “eat，， 
{geng) a production order, which on all counts is larger than the factory is able to 
fmish on the agreed delivery date. To check its own production capability before the 
reception of an order is a basic principle in doing business. Accepting an order so 
•1 
^ large that it cannot finish on the pre-agreed date is a serious breach of business ethics, 
particularly ifthe factory knows clearly about this but still deceives the trading firms 
so as to obtain such an order. To do so will bring fatal consequences to the reputation 
of, and by extension, future business opportunities for，this factory. Thus to ensure the 
keeping of promises, the factory has to first check its current stocks of its finished 
products before the reception of the order. If the factory has already produced the 
same products in its stocks, it is easier to deliver the rest in a shorter notice. However, 
limited space and capital deter the factory from maintaining a high level ofstocks，no 
matter offinished or semi-finished products, or raw materials. It is thus very rare that 
what the buyers want have already been produced at the exact specifications and at 
the right price. We can term this as “just-in-time production by default" (see also 
Vong 1993). 
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To practise this variant of the JIT system, the factory has to check the supply 
of raw materials, and to negotiate with the specialization subcontractors concerned. 
Negotiation with its production partners are indispensable, since the electro-plating 
factories themselves have to adjust their own production schedules so as to deliver 
their services to the metal ware factory. The materials vendors are also bounded by 
their own levels of stocks and the tightness of the materials market. Only when 
cooperation from other production partners is secured can an order of this- kind be 
accepted. 
While checking for the availability of cooperation from its production 
partners, the factory simultaneously has to negotiate a mutually acceptable price and 
the related details (for example, delivery date) with the buyer via the trading firais8. 
The basic criterion utilized by the trading firms (after shortlisting) is price 
competitiveness. While the buyers' demands include much more than price, price in 
itself is the most conspicuous factor. The trading firms have to demonstrate, to both 
the buyers and other factories alike, their own "integrity" when selecting a supplier. 
Price is the best indicator of faimess, because of its transparency and "quantifiability". 
Of course, a small price margin (around 1-2%) can be compensated by the existence 
of a good relationship, especially when the factory has the will and potential to ftoher 
develop the relationship with the concerned trading fmn. In addition，a slightly higher 
price can be accompanied by better services, for example, quicker delivery, which, 
I 
when combined, can out-compete the other factones. 
8The two procedures are simultaneous in the sense that the expenditure of efforts in soliciting 
cooperation from these subcontractors is conditional on the profitability of the orders concemed For 
e x i l e , when the buyer has offered a very profitable order but at a shorter delivery notice = f a c t = 
will t ^ harder to persuade the other production partners and request the requisite cooperation. Ifthe 
Z x Z a r . factorywants to accept a huge-volume order at a slightlylower pnceitwouldrequest the 
rubcontractors to charge a little bit lower, so that the order can be jomtly accomplished. The converse 
： s r o " f the factory believes that the order is a "pig's skull" i z h — g u ) , it would not press so 
i L d o n its junior production partners. The gist is that the factory would incur an obligation ifthe other 
S = ^ ! ) ^ a r t n S have granted preference or cooperation before. Only when the gams are greater 
i than the obligation incurred would the factory request unfailingly on its production partners. 
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However, when the price difference is large (around 3%, ceteris paribus), the 
trading firm cannot but appoint other factories to this order. There are two reasons 
behind this. Firstly, the trading firm is subjected to the pressures from the buyers. If 
the buyers can get a more favorable price (and perhaps better service) from other 
trading firms, they would go to them instead. It is a very serious threat to the survival 
of local trading firms, especially to the independent ones, since it is very likely that 
the buyers would ask for price quotations for a number of trading firms at the same 
time. The merchandisers of the resident buying offices are better endowed in this 
regard (because the buyer could not “exit”)； but they still have to justify their sourcing 
decisions to their superiors. Secondly, when other factories know that this trading 
frnn has offered unfair advantages to one particular factory, its own reputation would 
be affected. To appoint an incompetent factory to production is believed to be an 
unfair business practice. A good rapport cannot substitute good performance; 
otherwise it means nepotism or even bribery. If it is really the case, the reputation of a 
trading firm would be damaged and future business opportunities lost. I have 
explained the reluctance of local trading firms to establish their own production 
capability or to extend an undue preference to one particular supplier in Section 4.3 in 
similar terms. Thus the metal ware factory has to offer a competitive price to obtain 
orders. In sum, to maintain a stable flow of orders, the metal ware factory has to 
manage its own subcontracting linkages very well, so that its relationship with the 
trading firm can be maintained and, relatedly, that it can remain competitive. 
' 6 . 1 . 2 . Ensuring Cooperation across Organizational Boundaries 
1 i 
How can the metal ware factory remain competitive? Price, speed and 
flexibility are important means to gain an adequate flow of orders, as I have noted 
throughout the previous discussion. We would talk about the problem of delivery 
I f^rst. The metal ware factory does not capacity-subcontract its orders to other junior 
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partners. Quality control is a real problem; and the leakage of production 
specifications is strictly prohibited in appointed production. Thus to accomplish a 
rush order, the factory can attempt internal speed-up and employment of other flexible 
labor force. However, before the factory was relocated to China in 1987，labor supply 
was very tight and wage rates were forced up tremendously. The factory management 
found it hard to extend working hours (in-house workers are unwilling to do so when 
a good wage is already obtained); in addition, tight government restrictions and 
inspection deterred the factory from asking for illegal overtimes. A production 
bottleneck was erected in the stages of assembly and packaging as a result, for these 
stages require the largest amount ofmanual labor. As I have explained in the previous 
chapter, this situation had led the factory to forego an available order (even when it 
offers very competitive terms), which indirectly contributed to the decision about 
relocation. While internal labor flexibility is not practical, the use of other flexible 
labor force is also constrained. First ofall，the extent of the utilization of outworkers 
is limited by the technical nature of production. For this kind of fabricated metal 
products, only the processes of assembly and packaging can be subcontracted out 
technically. However, the items possible for outworking are quite bulky and fragile, 
especially when glass ware components are to be assembled. Increased flexibility is 
then outweighed by quality control problems. Relatedly, these processes are very 
noisy and quite unsuitable for homeworking. Outworkers would prefer "cleaner" work 
(for example, stitching) than this kind ofjobs. Thirdly, it was also very difficult to 
recruit outworkers and part-timers, when more favorable employment opportunities 
were available, for example, in the service sector. Internal speed-up and flexible labor 
employment can be ruled out as a feasible option^. 
9The metal ware factory is atypical with respect to other small-sized factories in Hong Kong, in that it 
does not practise capacity subcontracting. However, this factory can be interpreted as a hmiting case 
here When flexible labor strategies are unfeasible and when production overloads cannot be solved by 
resorting to capacity subcontractors, the factory has no choice but to organize the inter-firm lmkages as 
flexible as possible, so that it can remain successftil and competitive in a buyer-driven commodity 
chain. 
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As I have mentioned above, the factory does not maintain a high level of 
finished stocks (because of space limits and avoidance of capital tie-up). It is quite 
unlikely that the products demanded by the buyers have already been produced and 
stocked (the so-called "just-in-case" system), which can be directly shipped to the 
buyers. Only when an order has been received does production commence, as the 
notion “no orders, no production" implies. Thus whether to accept a specific order 
should be a decision with careful consideration and accurate estimation. The metal 
ware factory has, first of all, to check its current production line，as I have noted in 
passing in the above paragraphs. If the current line is producing the same products as 
1 with the new order, it is easier to “insert” an extra volume. However, if a changeover 
of production line is required, the factory has to estimate whether the current 
production priorities can be adjusted, that is, whether the execution of existing orders 
can be postponed. Though a little margin of late delivery is allowed, it is near 
impossible to re-organize the production schedule abruptly. The reason is that 
competitive pressures have already forced the factory to offer the shortest delivery 
time so as to obtain the existing orders. Thus it is very difficult (if the factory wants to 
keep its promises to the trading firms and to maintain a good relationship with them) 
to delay the original ones for a week or two, as the factory has already promised to 
deliver the goods as quickly as possible. 
While the factory has accepted all orders by offering a delivery period as short 
as possible, the trading firms would sometimes ask for an earlier delivery date after 
:i the placement of orders (if unforeseen, but irresistible, contingencies arise), a kind of 
S ‘ situations exacerbating the tightness of the original production schedule. It is difficult j 
for the metal ware factory to resist such claims, firstly because these requests may be 
based on genuine difficulties, and that secondly, the local trading firms have that 
market power to force the metal ware factory to accept these post-contractual 
revisions. Peter concludes his own situation nicely, 
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...we have to rush. Especially when we have several orders simultaneously. We 
cannot initiate our production earlier than we already did. ... We have to make it 
quick, to ask the electro-plating partners to finish their own processes within one or 
two days. This is always the case when we have many orders at hand. This makes 
you rush. There're other occasions that make you rush. For example, the original 
shipment date was scheduled at 17th. But suddenly it's changed to 15th. It's always 
outside our control. In this case, the trading firms would ask you to deliver several 
days earlier, say on 14th. This would make you rush.…When the buyer forgets to 
check her stock, and when the trading frnn forgets to source the product, they would 
request us to deliver the goods at an earlier date. We have to rush. 
i 
In this sense, then, all orders are rush orders. The metal ware factory has to 
manage its subcontracting relationships well, so that, if required, mutual adjustment 
can be made possible. To accomplish these, the metal ware factory has no choice but 
to solicit cooperation from both the specialization subcontractors and materials 
vendors. We would talk about the electro-plating factories first. 
6.1.2.1. Hong Kong Electro-Plating Subcontractors 
After the metal ware factory has finished materials pressing, the semi-fmished 
products have to be sent to the electro-plating subcontractors. Normally, the electro-
plating process would take about a week's time. However, when circumstances dictate 
the factory to deliver their products faster than in normal times (as is always the case), 
！ the metal ware factory has to ask for quicker delivery from the electro-plating 
丨 subcontractors, as the quotation above has shown us. The factory would ask the 
’ electro-platers to park a van outside the factory gate, so that once the materials have 
been pressed into shape, they can be immediately sent to the electro-plating partners. 
The factory would also ask the electro-platers to finish their processes as fast as they 
could, and to send the semi-fmished products back immediately. The metal ware 
factory would "tell them frankly about the situation" {tan kai laijiang): only when the 
subcontractors have realized and recognized the urgency of the orders do they 
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cooperate. Actually, before the reception of this rush order, the factory would notify 
the electro-plating factories about this and requests their cooperation in advance. This 
is important, since this can spare the electro-plating factories some time to adjust their 
own production schedules and get prepared for this rush order. Openness of both 
parties is crucial, since only by disclosing the relevant information to the other party 
do they jointly reach a realistic assessment of the common situation. The metal ware 
factory has to know whether the subcontractors can adjust their own production 
schedule, and the subcontractors have to know whether such adjustments are really 
required. More fundamentally, an advance notification would signal to the electro-
plating subcontractors that the factory is a "considerate" one. Such signals are 
important ingredients in the maintenance of trust and an on-going relationship. 
I 
All negotiations on these matters aie carried out over the telephone. A 
reported speech, by definition, is an interpretive (and filtered) reality. Possibilities 
exist that one transacting party can deceive the other, particularly when the latter 
cannot examine the “real” situation by its own senses. What the factory wants is just 
“a man's words" (Cf. Macaulay 1963). Obviously, the effectiveness ofthese indirect 
communications is hinged on the presence of both contractual and goodwill trust. A 
merchandiser summarizes aptly what he means by a “good relationship", 
；!• 
i 
We know each other's approach of doing business. For example, we pick up the 
i phone, and ask the supplier to do something. The supplier would know your 
^ demands, even if you don't state them explicitly. It knows what we have in my 
j minds. We have a trust here; we know each other's approach of doing business. We 
j trust that we alt do business in a good manner. This is very important. (David) 
I i 
The two parties would not draft a written document, and they would not 
bother to check the truth of such claims: if one says yes, the other would believe that 
to be true, without ftoher questions. Personal connections are thus very important in 
! 
this regard. One of the owners of the metal ware factory, the one who is responsible 
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\ for production, knows the bosses of the subcontractors very well. An emotional bond 
‘ d e v e l o p s when each gains familiarity with the other. A breach of trust or the 
breakdown of a long-term relationship would create emotional strain in both the 
‘ t r u s t o r and trustee. Personal familiarity is, furthermore, based on past dealings, which 
indirectly minimize the risks involved in trust-placing. The trustor would 
"extrapolate" the trustee's performance in the past to the future, so that it can 
minimize its risks and act in the present. The cultivation of familiarity is not limited to 
I these specific economic exchanges, however; it can be accumulated in occasions other 
than business transactions. Since personal trust is partly a moral quality (for example, 
whether a person is likely to keep its promises), information about the trustee's 
behavior in diffuse situations (for example, whether the trustee is engaged in 
, e x c e s s i v e gambling [Cf. Silin 1972]) is useful. This enables the transacting parties to 
"overdraw" (Luhmann 1979) the currently available information to other spheres. In 
brief, by juxtapositioning economic transactions onto personal relationships, the 
transacting parties can gain a better understanding of the other; and that by gaining 
familiarity and mutual understanding, a trusting relationship can be more easily built. 
We would retum to these tactics in the building of trust in more details in Section 6.2. 
Thus when cooperation from the electro-plating subcontractors is required, our 
factory owner will directly phone the bosses to ask for helpio. When the order is in a 
rush, he would just tell the subcontractors' bosses to finish it as fast as they are able 
to. Surprisingly, no exact delivery date is stipulated. More often than not, the issue of 
； price would never be mentioned. It is, on the first hand, inappropriate to "hard-
bargain" a price and delivery date, when cooperation from the subcontractors is 
required. It is because what the factory is requesting from the subcontractors is a 
“personal sentiment" or "discretion" (renqing). It is, on the other hand, unnecessary to 
do so, because there are implicit understandings that both parties would try their best 
lOproducers would prefer the word "help" {bangshou), because it reflects the informal and reciprocal 
nature of the relationships in between. 
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and take no unfair advantages when the other is in need. The metal ware factory, 
nonetheless, may accept (without questioning whether its tiust is misplaced) a 
slightly-higher-than-usual price when rush delivery is required, since this is defined 
by the factory as a fair practice, as it knows that the electro-platers may have to pay 
higher wages for overtimes. The factory would not bother in price and delivery 
negotiations altogether; having previous business transactions with this subcontractor 
before and satisfied with its past performance, the factory knows clearly that it would 
offer the most reasonable price as possible, and finish a rush order as fast as -it is able 
to do. In a word, trust is evident between the two domestic producers. Otherwise, in 
the very first instance, regular business transactions cannot be maintained and 
cooperation would not be requested from this subcontractor. 
To realize the potentials of this cooperative relationship, the electro-plating 
factories should believe this kind of requests as authentic. This is premised on the fact 
that the metal ware would ask for quick delivery only when circumstances force it to 
do so. Otherwise, if the metal ware factory asks for very quick delivery in every 
transaction (that is, an abuse of power), a smooth flow of business on the part of 
electro-plating factories cannot be maintained. Mutual goodwill or trust is the 
defming feature here. Exactly because of the possibility of opportunism, the electro-
plating factories would be very careful when an on-going relationship is to be built. 
Similarly, only when the relevant evidence is available does it possess the will to keep 
the relationship going and cooperation granted, or that it would bestow trust on the 
metal ware factory. Trust is double-barreled: if the electro-plating factories ask for 
丨  
delayed delivety, for example, when their own production schedules are very tight, 
the metal ware factory would accept this when they are able to. Only by offering 
reciprocity to each other, and by holding the belief that the other party would actually 
reciprocate afterwards and in more or less equivalent terms (Cf. Gouldner 1960), can 
an on-going relationship be maintained and “mutual adjustment" {huxiang qianjiu) be 
possible. 
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� When the factory finds any problem (for example, sub-standard product 
quality), it would tell the electro-platers to redress them. Whether and how these 
production problems would be solved is related with the presence of trust. Electro-
plating is a delicate technical process whose product quality is often beyond the 
control of producers and unrelated with workmanship. For instance, when the weather 
is not good or when humidity is high, the electro-plate would not shine very well. The 
metal ware factory knows this, and would tolerate a small margin of differences ifthe 
defects are believed to be the results of Act of God. However, if the factory fmds the 
product defects as redressable, for example, because of insufficient addition of the 
electro-plating metals into the electrolyte, the factory would just “bully” the electro-
！ plating factories, to ask them to improve their quality. The gist is that the metal ware « 
factory itself is subject to the pressures of the trading firms, that its fmal products can 
live up to the standard as required by the buyers. The factory would not hesitate to 
press the electro-platers to keep and improve its production quality, that is, to pass 
down the pressures along the domestic commodity chain. The metal ware factory 
would ask the electro-platers to improve its product quality in an extremely frank 
manner, often-accompanied by foul languages". Trust is important here, because the 
metal ware factory only knows the superficial details of the electro-plating process. It 
can distinguish good products from bad ones; but it is quite difficult to determine 
whether the bad ones are the consequences of poor workmanship or not. In other 
words the metal ware factory has no means to verify whether the electro-platers are 
! ’ 
j behaving opportunistically: consequently, the metal ware factory has to believe in 
what the electro-platers say, that is，to place trust on the electro-platers. That 
information asymmetry creates an imperative to trust is common in both the 
relationships between the first-tier producers and the second-tier ones, as well as those 
llThe use of foul languages here is as common as in the interactions with the local trading firms. By 
communicating in foul languages, the transacting partners can demonstrate "brotherhood" and "easy-
going-ness", which imply authenticity and openness in tackling unforeseen contingencies. 
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between the former and the local trading firms, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 
Four. Thus to reduce risks and minimize losses in this context of information 
impactedness, the metal ware factory has to place both "competence" and “goodwill，， 
trust on the electro-plating subcontractors. 
Since all negotiations are carried out on the phone and just implicit requests 
are voiced, the contract between the two parties is very incomplete. Indeed, to call this 
as an incomplete contract would stretch the term a little bit too far: all agreements are 
in oral form; and the agreement is too brief to serve as a basis to tackle future 
contingencies and disputes. In short, ‘‘a man's words" are all that involved. It follows 
that this kind of transactions is only possible when the electro-plating factories are 
trustworthy ones, or, equivalently, long-time production partners. First of all, only a 
long-time partner would attempt a rush order. While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to further elaborate the organization of production of the second-tier producer, 
suffice it to say that a tight schedule is always the rule, because, for one thing, the 
second-tier subcontractors are extending credits to their upper counterparts. When a 
factory requests the electro-plating factories to lend a helping hand, the factory would 
be indebted and obligated to its production partners, since the latter have to spend an 
effort to fulfill its promises. Unless the metal ware factory has the will and 
expectation that an on-going relationship is advantageous does it pull the distance in 
between closer. Secondly, cooperation is only possible with the presence of trust. In 
this case, both parties must have the expectation that the other one can live up to the 
, promises as “stipulated” in the oral agreement, and that all promises and requests are 
believed to be authentic. There are implicit mutual understandings that both parties 
would try their best to satisfy the other's demands and requests, particularly when the 
other is in need. In sum, quick delivery is boosted by the installation oftrust into the 
relationships between the metal ware factory and the electro-plating subcontractors. 
i i 
i 
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That quick delivery is possible is also facilitated by a closer spatial distance 
between the two parties and by a good transportation infrastructure (see also Sit 
I 1983). As I have mentioned just above, the factory would ask the electro-platers to � 
I park a van outside its factory gate when quick exchanges of goods are required. To 
: s i t u a t e in a closer physical distance with subcontractors would certainly be an 
免 • 
, a d v a n t a g e . The importance of space in shortening time is also reflected in the 
； isomorphizing pressures in relocation. While the metal ware factory decided to ^ 
? 
relocate to China mainly because of shortage of labor and rising wage rates-, that the 
electro-plating factories that the metal ware factory has regular business contacts have 
ab:eady relocated (also in Dongguan) is also exerting a pressure on the metal ware 
i factory (see also Vong 1993). Time and space are intertwined together here. 
Furthermore, as we will see later, being physically proximate to each other would tie 
the transacting parties more closer socially; and being socially closer to each other 
would facilitate the building of trust in the relationships. 
• 5 
I ，' 
j 6.1.2.2. Hong Kong Raw Materials Vendors 
I When attempting a rush order, the metal ware factory has to solicit 
j cooperation from the other production partners, in addition to the electro-plating 
I subcontractors. Since the logic is quite similar, the account here would be a little bit 
I brief. We would talk about the materials vendors first. The starting point here is that 
j the metal ware factory does not (or more accurately, cannot) maintain a large stock of 
raw materials, as this requires a lot ofprecious space and that the factory needs a wide 
variety of materials to produce its wide range of products. Though precious storage 
space is, the factory would nonetheless stock a small volume of materials, especially 
those for best-selling products. By this the factory can reduce its own risksi2. 
l2How laree the stock would be is related with the nature ofthe relationship between the factory and 
the materiL vendors. If help from the vendors (for example, quick delivery of materials) is always 
available (a situation made possible by the presence oftmst), the factorywould fmditunnecessary to 
maintain a high level of inventory. Otherwise, the factory would try to minimize its risks by stocking a 
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Normally, the size of the stock is adequate for a week's use. The factory would 
| r e p l e n i s h the stock when the materials are going to be used up. However, when the 
登 order received is very large that the existing stock is inadequate, that a rush order is 
I accepted, or that the factory has made a wrong estimation, it has to ask the materials 
J. 
i vendors for help. Similarly, the factory would notify the vendors about such orders 
參 well before the reception of order, so that the factory has the realistic estimation 
；w h e t h e r its promises to the trading firms can be fulfilled. Likewise, the owner of the 
:•" 
factory responsible for production would just phone the bosses of his production 
partners, to ask them whether the required materials are ready, and if so, when they 
can be transferred to the production plant. He would just phone the familiar ones, 
；： ----
I because, as can be predicted, a familiar materials vendor is presumed to be more 
» 
willing to help and not to take unfair advantages when the factory is in need. Since 
help is only requested from familiar materials vendors, and by extension, trustworthy 
ones with stable business relationships or partnership, the factory can expect that the 
others would satisfy its own requirements and fulfill the promises without negotiating 
and settling a complete contract. The factory has no need to check the price, the 
quality of materials and the like with the materials vendors, because the three types of 
trust identified by Sako (1992) are already in place. 
To maintain a long-term relationship with a small number of familiar vendors 
would also receive additional advantages. For example, when a new shipment of 
materials has arrived, the materials vendors would ask the factory whether it needs 
this kind of materials; and if so, the vendors can charge the factory a lower price and 
that the materials c ^ be directly transferred to the factory without stocking in the 
materials vendors' own godown (that is，a variant of "ship-to-stock" practice). The 
vendors can thus save its own storage space and avoid the problems of unrealized 
larger amount of materials, so that when its production partner fails to help, its production would not 
be interrupted. As we will see shortly, this is exactly the case in glass ware subcontracting with 
Chinese producers. 
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I sales. The factory, on the other hand, can ensure the timely replenishment of its own 
I stocks of raw materials, and obtain its required materials at a lower price in this way. 
I !* 
[ By doing businesses together for a long time, the materials vendors also know the 
I 
I needs of the factory more clearly. They know which kinds of materials are used 
frequently, and the price range preferred as well as quality required. When the 
I vendors order materials from foreign materials producers, they can include the needs 
‘ oftheir own production partners into consideration. In this sense, transaction-specific 
I assets would be accumulated on the part of materials vendors, which are helpful for 
the factories. The factory, on the opposite side, knows the method of payment 
preferred by the materials vendors, for example. Each party knows the other's 
“approach，’i3 of doing business, by which the efforts and "the number of words” 
{chunshe) to negotiate and settle a mutually acceptable terms of trade can be saved. It 
follows that both parties would prefer an on-going relationship to a more spot-like 
one. 
j Capital flows are also smoothed when a stable relationship is built in between. 
For the materials vendors, it guarantees a stable intake of customers' orders; for the 
factory, it can smooth its own flow ofcapital, because, if it is unable to pay its credits 
j on time, the familiar materials vendors would have the requisite trust to collect their 
money a little bit later. This is in stark contrast with the situation in the factory's 
initial years of establishment: when trust (or demonstrated trustworthiness) was not 
enough (partly because of the lack of recognized reputation), the metal ware factory 
had to bring a cheque to the materials vendors when it wanted to buy materials; and 
only afterthe account was settled would the vendors transfer the necessary materials 
to the factory. 
I 
l3The word “approach” here denotes more than the objective transactional arrangements. "How-to-do-
business" {dianzuo shengyi) includes the notion of observance of general business ethics and the 
integrity in doing business. 
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Furthermore, the factory can gain a price discount when dealing with a 
familiar materials vendor, because the vendor places a value on such a long-term 
. trading relationship. Such price advantages are generally not available from the 
I "outsiders". Peter has summarized the advantages of dealing with familiar materials 
vendors very well, 
» i 
We seldom resort to other materials vendors [except the familiar ones]. Because the 
familiar ones, the ones that are our long-time partners, would not ask for a higher 
I price. ... I fyou buy from Firm A today, then Firm B tomorrow, and then Firm C the 
day after, people would think that you are not sincere enough. Ifthey think that you 
are not sincere, they would offer an "outside price" {chumian dejia). If you are their 
long-time partners, it means that you would always buy your materials from them. 
j Your credit record is good enough. They do not want you to leave. They would not 
) i 
‘ want to lose this customer. 
I  « 
While trust is surely engendering certain advantages to the factory, a point of 
qualification should be mentioned here, as it can serve to clarify the logic and limits 
oftrust. As I have noted above, the factory would not check the price offered by the 
materials vendors normally, simply because they are trustworthy and believed to offer 
a "reasonable" price. However, when the order is large, the factory would suffer a 
I great loss if a higher price is charged by the vendors. It does not mean that a higher 
I price charged by a materials vendor necessarily springs from opportunism (of course， 
！ that possibility exists), but that the materials bought by the vendors may be at a higher 
price than their competitors. Trust of course can minimize the possibilities of such 
happenings, because only when a “reasonable” price was offered in several past 
dealings did the factor}^ attempt to build a long-term relationship with that vendor. In 
other words, the factory would only choose a competitive vendor as its own 
production partner. But when high stakes are involved, the factory would be more 
careful, and consequently trust on one vendor is not enough. The factory would ask 
for price quotations from a small number (about two or three) of familiar trading 
firms, so that a more favorable price can be secured. This, on the first hand, introduces 
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| t r a c e s of market competition into the relationships, which can serve as a discipline to 
the current production partners^^. On the other, a favorable price can be secured. 
I Nevertheless, in this case too, trust is still important, because only familiar ones 
1 
I would offer the lowest possible price. To check the market price does not imply the ？ 
, b r e a k d o w n of trust; but that it strengthens the trust already in place and that it serves 
1 to reduce the risk when the possible losses associated are seen as unbearable to the 
‘ trustor. ^ 
6.1.2.3. Chinese Glass Ware Subcontractors 
There are both similarities and differences in the case of glass ware 
subcontracting with respect to other external linkages. The quality of glass ware 
products, like that of electro-plating, is sometimes unrelated with workmanship. 
When the weather is not good, say in rainy days, the transparency ofthe glass wares 
I would be affected. While the transparency of the products is easy to determine, the 
transparency ofthe situation is another matter. Product defects can be the result ofthe 
use of sub-standard materials, for example, recycled glass. Exactly because of this 
information asymmetry and the situation in opaqueness, the need of authenticity is 
very important. To place both competent and goodwill trust is thus indispensable in 
this regard. 
While trust is important to the maintenance of quality, it is more difficult to 
rely merely on trust to ensure quick delivery of glass ware components, as in the case 
of electrJ-plating subcontracting. The glass ware factory, firstly, are genuinely 
Chinese producers. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter，glass wares 
14 Interestingly ifthe factory has decided to resort to other materials vendors, itwould notify theother 
v e i l r r ^ h i s , that it does so only because they do not offer a very competitive pnce. It would also 
L s u r e he v l o r s that ifthey offer a good price in the ftiture, the factory would buy from them agam^ 
^ e relationships between the factory and vendors, in other words, are characterized by openness and 
authenticity. 
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produced in China are more superior in quality than those produced in factories in 
Hong Kong. The basic reason lies in the availability of good-quality raw materials and 
the large scale of glass ware production, which are both absent for the Hong Kong 
producers. A spatially larger distance (the glass ware producers are situated in Wuhan, 
in Northeastern China) deters the factory from practicing an JIT system for these glass 
ware components. It is difficult for the Chinese producers to deliver the goods within 
a period necessary for such a system. Even though the glass ware components are 
delivered by rail, it takes about two weeks' time for the glass wares to reach the 
factory. Consequently, the metal ware factory would maintain a relatively larger stock 
of these components than the electro-plated semi-finished products. 
That a larger stock is maintained in this case is also related with the strength of 
^ 
i the relationships between the factory and the Chinese glass ware subcontractors. 
Though trust is required to ensure quality production, it is more difficult for the 
factory to build such a relationship in the first instance. Frequent interaction with 
these factory bosses (if there is really one, because these Chinese factories are state-
owned enterprises) is not possible, when the two parties are separated in a large 
spatial distance. Without the possibility to inspect the glass ware producers frequently 
and to gain a better understanding of their management and operation, as well as the 
more basic one of business ethics, the factory would incur a greater risk when trust is 
to be placed. Secondly, the social distance between the two is also an obstacle in this 
i process of trust-building. For example, without the possibility ofjoint participation in 
I informal occasions, the metal ware factory cannot determine (with a high level of 
I 
j confidence) the personal "integrity" of its prospective business partners, and thus it is 
I only able to overdraw a limited volume of information in the building of trust. Direct 
personal relations are important; but indirect ones are also crucial in determining the 
j trustworthiness of the would-be trustee. Peer advice is always sought for when the 
factory is to place trust. However, such peer advice on the trustworthiness of these 
Chinese would-be trustees is generally scant. Put it slightly differently, when both 
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}； direct and indirect personal networks are weak or absent, it is more difficult to 
)determine the trustworthiness of the prospective partners, and consequently to build a 
t trusting relationship. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, these glass ware 
subcontractors were recruited into the production network of the metal ware factory 
through the Canton trade fairs, that is，a high-risk channel. It is very risky to depend 
on these institutions to build trust, as the selection process of participants is very loose 
(Cf. Shapiro 1987). Relatedly, when the subcontractors are situated in another social 
world, the factory has a smaller range of sanctions at its disposal (for example, 
ostracism), those crucial means to ensure expected performance. In addition, to place 
a high level of trust on a state-owned enterprise in China is very risky. Without 
knowing which person in the factory can shoulder the responsibility if anything goes 
wrong, and that post-contractual problems are very likely because ofthe institutional 
settings (for example, bureaucratic red-tape. Cf. Shapiro 1987)，the factory would not 
dare to put itself in a risky situation by positioning itself in a high-trust relationship. 
In sum, it is very difficult to place trust on a Chinese producer, and that the trust 
already in place is also weaker, as reflected by the factory's attempt to minimize its 
loss (that is, by maintaining a larger stock) when trust is likely to be betrayed. 
As I have shown in the previous paragraphs, trust is important in enabling the 
first-tier metal ware producer to deliver its producers at a higher speed. However, 
quick delivery is not sufficient for the domestic producers to remain competitive in a 
buyer-driven commodity chain; price is also an important consideration when a 
；foreign buyer places an order. I argue that to achieve a competitive price, trust in a 
long-term relationship is alsovery crucial. 
In addition to quicker delivery, the factory has also to settle a competitive 
price to achieve orders, or to maintain a smooth flow of business. In this sense, the 
I factory has to request its production partners to cooperate, to set a price low enough 
i that an order placed by the buyers conjointly be fetched and Mfilled. This is only 
i 
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possible when the two parties are bound together in a long-term relationship, a 
� re la t ionsh ip that is buttressed by trust. For the lower-tier producers, that they would 
offer help to the metal ware factory is first of all related with the importance of a long-
, term relationship to these producers. 
By maintaining an on-going relationship with a factory, the electro-platers and 
materials vendors would gain several advantages, which would not be available in the 
situation of market-like transactions. Firstly, they can achieve a more stable flow of 
I 
business. To have an on-going relationship is equivalent to the saying that there are 
j regular business transactions between the two partners. Secondly, these second-tier 
producers can smooth their own production schedule. For example, with a stable 
relationship in place, the electro-plating subcontractors can solicit adjustment from 
I 
: the metal ware factory, because there exists norms of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960). I 
have mentioned that the metal ware factory can secure quicker delivery only when it 
would accept delayed delivery, when the electro-platers fmd it imperative to do so. By 
the same token, ifthe electro-plater has offered a lower-than-usual price to the factory 
before, the factory would accept a slightly higher price in the fliture if the electro-
plater is forced to do so by exigencies. "Mutual adjustment" (huxiang qianjiu) is the 
defming feature here. Thirdly, cash flows can be also facilitated. It is not uncommon 
for a transacting party to ask for delayed payment from another. For example, when 
the electro-plater meets financial difficulties when other first-tier producers fail to pay 
their credits, it must ask the metal ware factory to collect money at a later date. This is 
only possible when an on-going relationship is already in place and that the requisite 
i trust has already been bestowed. In sum, a long-term relationship with a particular 
first-tier producers is a value to the second-tier producers (and of course to the first-
tier ones too). 
To have a long-term relationship and to realize the above-mentioned 
advantages, trust is very important. Indeed, a long-term relationship is premised on 
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the presence of trust. The metal ware factory would bestow "goodwill" trust on the 
� l o n g - t e r m suppliers, so that when it is in need, it can have that expectation that the 
various suppliers would not take unfair advantages. This is the basic rationale that the 
“ factory is to place trust. To place goodwill trust on its suppliers also means that the 
factory would believe that the trustees, that is, the suppliers, would take independent 
；initiatives and try their best in fulfilling the demands requested by the trustor. Only 
when the materials vendors and electro-plating subcontractors would offer the lowest 
possible price can the relationship be maintained. The factory has also to place 
I 
contractual and competence trust on its production partners when incomplete 
'I contracts and information impactedness are the rules. Even when the metal ware 
factory has to request a lower price from the production partners, it would not specify 
the exact magnitude, since it is unnecessary and inappropriate to do so. The kemel is 
that it is an act of offense to the trustee when the trustor taDcs "too much" on price, 
because it is a signal of distrust. From an opposite angle, the second-tier producers 
have also to place trust on the factory tooi5. The same factors are operative here, 
because, for instance, an incomplete contract would expose each individual party to 
opportunism of the other. 
It follows from these two points that the second-tier producers would possess 
the will to maintain an on-going relationship with the first-tier ones, most notably by 
cultivating trust in between. However, trust alone is not enough. Trust, and by 
extension, an on-going relationship, would be eroded, when alternative suppliers have 
！ to be resorted to by the factory. This would happen when the "performance" of its 
I original partners cannot live up to standard. Like the case between the local trading 
firms and the first-tier producers, to offer a good price and service is the most crucial 
means for the second-tier producers to demonstrate good performance. I have 
mentioned in the above paragraphs that a familiar materials vendor would offer a 
i5it does not mean that the “ a m ^ t s ” oftrust placed are equivalent. As we will see shortly, the lower-
tier producers would trust more on the upper-tier ones than the other way round. 
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lower-than-market price to the metal ware factory so as to keep the on-going 
relationship alive. This is crucial, because the metal ware factory would have its 
source of materials shifted when the price offered is higher than other (familiar) ones. 
To get a “reasonable’ price from the materials vendors is perhaps a basis motive to 
engage in a long-term relationship. The case of electro-plating is also identical. As 
Peter describes a typical situation, 
We must maintain a partnership with a familiar electro-plating factory. For example, 
when we have received a large order. But the price is a little lower than normal. We 
may still accept such an order, because the amount of business is very large. At least 
we can eam a smaller profit margin. So we must ask the electro-plating factories, the 
ones which are our partner for a long time. To see whether they can charge 3 or 4% 
lower each piece. We must also ask the printing factory, to tell them we have such a 
large order, whether they can charge 10 or 20 cents less each carton box. Each one 
adjusts a little bit, so that we can jointly accomplish this order. We would only ask 
the familiar ones, the long-time partners, whether we can adjust a little bit. We have a 
smaller profit margin for this order, and we can jointly make it. Thus we can have 
more businesses in the future. 
Thus, to keep the on-going relationship alive, the electro-platers should try 
their best to offer the lowest possible price to the metal ware factory. Otherwise, the 
factory cannot but attempt to cultivate a new relationship with another supplier. 
Though the factory can have its production partners shifted, it is very costly to 
do so. The reason is that a long-time production partner would accumulate 
transaction-specific assets after several business transactions. For example, the 
： ‘ m a t e r i a l s vendors know the quality preferred and the kind of materials frequently used 
by the metal ware factory. As I have mentioned above, the vendors would give 
priorities to the factory when a new shipment of materials has arrived. From an 
opposite angle, the materials vendors would gain additional advantages when a long_ 
term relationship with a customer is in place, as I have noted just above. Thus to 
i 1 
I 
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：actualize these advantages, the two parties would prefer a stable trading relationship 
1 ： t o a market-like adversarial one. 
-； 
However, too stable a relationship would be rigidified in due course, if no 
I 
competitive pressures is introduced in the relationship. Each transacting party would 
like to strike a delicate balance between inter-dependence and over-dependence. 
Over-dependence on its own production partners may bring a disaster for the survival 
of the metal ware factory. For example, when an electro-plating subcontractor is 
: guaranteed a stable flow of orders and has accumulated transaction-specific assets, 
I there are incentives for it to shirk, to neglect product quality and price 
i -
competitiveness. The gist is that the metal ware factory has already been locked into 
such a relationship. The metal ware factory, of course, can minimize the probability of 
^ such happenings by cultivating trust, and carry out business transactions pretending 
that such happenings are not likely to occur. Furthermore, a long-term relationship is 
a value to both parties, a fact that would reduce the tendency of opportunism. 
However, for the metal ware factory, to rely on trust in this relationship of over-
dependence is not enough. Competitive pressures have to be introduced, so that the 
will on the part of the lower-tier producers to take independent initiatives can be 
r strengthened. In other words, a mere reliance on the will of the lower-tier producers to 
i cooperate is not sufficient. Competition is necessary to boost cooperation, that is，to 
！ achieve the best of both worlds. This leads us to an analysis of the distribution of 
I power in this decentralized production system. As we can see just a moment later, 
i power is both a substitute and basis of trust, 
i 
6.1.3. Power as a Credible Threat 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the industrial structure in Hong Kong is 
stratified by different-sized producers, with the smaller ones being at the bottom of 
the chain. The reason is that the smaller-sized industrial establishments, being more 
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I deficient in social and money resources than the larger-sized ones, are obliged to 
I occupy such positions. To become a first-tier producer requires more initial capital 
I . . 
I and more elaborate connections with different kind of lower-tier producers, which can 
蔡 
t only be accumulated after a period of time and are thus more difficult to attain for a 
I 
J new entrant. It follows that the entry barriers for the smaller size categories must be 
奏 lower than those for the upper ties. It is easier for a would-be entrepreneur to establish 
%-
考 a small workshop and to act as a capacity or specialization subcontractor for a first-
‘ t i e r producer, than to establish a larger one with direct connections with the world-
economy. With such lower levels of entry barriers, and the resultant "bulging" ofthe 
bottom layers of the industrial structure (see Figure 2.2), market competition among 
the smaller-sized producers is more tight than that among their bigger (and upper) 
I 
I counterparts. Furthermore, the upper-tier producers can control the market outlets of 
the lower-tier ones; in other words, the latter are more dependent on the former. We 
can see these as the structural bases of the uneven distribution of power in the 
domestic node. Before we go to its implication on the governance mechanisms 
i (specifically, how the construction and operation of tmst are embedded in power 
‘ r e l a t i o n s ) , we would first talk about the different facets of the manifestations of this 
'•% 
power asymmetry, and when appropriate, their temporal changes. 
. “ “ 
We first tum to the quantitative side, the distribution of surplus (Cf. 
Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994). In Figure 6.1, the profit indices of trading over 
manufacturing sectors are plottedi6. The indices are decreasing over the yearsi7. The 
l6The index is calculated according to the following formulae: Gross surplus=Value added-
Compensation of employees; Profit Ratio=Gross surplus/Total sales; Profit mdex=Profit ratio of the 
= = : • f i t ratioofthe manufacturing sector. Two sets ofsuch values are plotted m the figure, 
one is' a sector-wide measure, and the other is a proxy about the tradmg and manufacmrrng of 
fabricated metal products. Unfortunately, the statistics for the trading sector are less detailed than those 
S T e t a r f r c t L g sector. The corresponding category in the f o ^ is "Consumer Durables and 
Other fonsu^er Goods", which includes more than the trading of “fabricated metal products", our 
‘ Th„o the fiaure should be interpreted with caution. The data come from various issues 
r = r ^ = = / = ^ _ M - 如 - o f 編 滅 R.ail & Impor,E.port Trades, 
Restaurants & Hotels. Both are government publications. . 
17 There is at fu"St glance, an anomaly here. The index is smaller that one, that is，the profit ratio of 
^ J i n g is i'ower that of manufacturing. This is apparently a fact that runs contrary to our argument. 
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II gist is that when competitive pressures are tight, domestic producers must offer better 
r;i terms (and appropriate fewer surplus) to obtain orders. In tum, whether a market is 
tight is related with the number of "players" in the market. This argument applies not 
only to the domestic producers narrowly defined, but also to the local trading firms. 
We first talk about the "grand" division between the two sectors. 
In Figure 6.2，the number of establishments of both the trading and 
manufacturing sectors is plotted. While the number of establishments in the 
manufacturing sector remains almost constant, the number of local trading firms 
grows at a very fast rate. For the whole import and export sector, the number of 
establishments grows from 13621 in 1979 to 82468 in 1991, that is, a six-fold 
increase. For the import and export industry, "Consumer Durables and Other 
Consumer Goods”，the corresponding figures are 3928 and 31028, an astonishing 
790% increase. Why does the number of trading firms grow tremendously in these 
years? How is this trend beneficial to the domestic producers? Peter has answered 
these two questions in great detail, 
Because there are generations after generations coming out from the local trading 
firms, the number of these firms grows tremendously. The trend is this: a large firm 
that is in the trading business for a long time. Among the employees in this firm, 
some are doing much better than others. They have gained the requisite experience 
and connections with the buyers. They "come out" {chulai) to establish their own 
trading firms, often smaller-sized ones. They fetch the buyers from their parent 
companies. ... Perhaps the parent company charges a 10% commission. The new one 
only charges 8%. More and more trading firms emerge, and competition is fierce. 
There are cases nowadays that a new trading fmn is just made up of one or two 
‘desks. These new trading firms have smaller overheads, and they can charge 5% or 
lower. Or just 2%. When there are more and more trading firms emerging, they have 
However when we have realized that the trading business is far less capital-intensive than the 
manufacturing sector (in other words, the trading sector requires less amount of capital to generate an 
= o S T t h a n the manufacturing sector), we can argue that the lower profit ratio of the fonner is an 
u n l r e s ^ l t i o n of its relative surplus appropriation. It is difficult to draw a cross-sectoral comparison 
here. 
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to fmd the factories, not the other way around. The balance is shifted.... Even though I 
the trading firms have contacted the buyers and obtained orders, ifthey cannot fmd a 
. factory, it is useless indeed. ... It would certainly be better for the factories if many 
trading firms are competing among themselves. We have a larger range of choices.... 
In the past, the trading firms would request a remittance, as the operating charges for 
^ the trading firms. They ask 2% or more. But we can now receive 100%, when more 
trading firms are doing businesses. And we can receive our money right after 
delivery. These are the advantages for us, when more trading firms are competing 
with each other.... They could no longer chock us to death. 
The "centripetal" forces and the intemal dynamics of a decentralized 
production system that I have identified in the previous chapter are in full swing here. 
That the profit indices are decreasing temporally is thus congruent with the trend of 
the growth in the number of trading firms^s. As we will see later, the decreasing 
: p o w e r of the local trading firms would affect qualitatively how the industrial structure 
is governed. 
We have talked about the division between the two sectors; we now tum to the 
distribution of surplus within the manufacturing sector. In Figures 6.3 and 6.4, two 
sets ofprofit indices are listed: one about all manufacturing industries, and the other 
about the manufacturing industry o f fabricated metal p r o d u c t s i 9 . The first thing t o 
note is that a division of surplus distribution exists on the 50-person fault line. 
Industrial establishments with over 50 persons engaged outrun the industry- or sector-
wide average in terms of surplus per unit output. This is indeed an underestimation of 
l8xhat the power oflocal trading firms slowly erodes (reflected by the decreasing profit indices) is also 
related with the growth of "capability" of the first-tier producers. The rise of education level, the 
development oftelecommunications technologies, and accumulated experience in the export trade are 
also some of the important factors to check the power of the trading firms. In Chapter Four, I have 
mentioned that though the metal ware factory would not fetch the buyers on its own mitiatives it really 
has the choice to do so now. A threat to transcend the local trading fmn is sufficient to deter the latter 
from offering very stringent terms. And that the buyers can contact the suppliers directly (for example, 
with the help o fTDC) can also check the power ofthe local trading fmns. We can thus argue that there 
is an equalizing trend in a decentralized production system. 
l97he indices are calculated according to the following formula: Profit mdex of the size 
category=Profit ratio of that size categoryA>rofit ratio of the whole industry group. The values are 
calculated from the unpublished data ofvarious issues ofSurvey ofIndustrial Production, Unpublished 
Table 2.1A, Sections C, D and E. 






the differences in surplus levels of different size categories, as the larger producers are 
generally more capital (fixed and variable) intensive than their smaller counterparts^^. 
The values for other size categories are less clearly patterned; but on the whole, the 
I smallest ones are the least profitable among others. In sum, the distribution of surplus 
is an accurate reflection of the power asymmetry among domestic producers, as we 
can predict. 
Power not only manifests itself in the distribution of surplus; the various 
f 
contractual arrangements also reflect such an uneven distribution of power. The most 
notable ones are the secularity and magnitude of credit extension. The lower-tier 
producers extend credits to their upper counterparts, and the first-tier ones in tum 
extend credits to the local trading firais. An unequal distribution of power extends 
beyond national boundaries too, in that the independent trading frnns extend credits to 
the foreign buyers. To extend credits to the buyers (of all layers alike) is to put the 
creditor at risks, the magnitude ofwhich is related with the length of credit period and 
the amount of credit (and of course, the creditworthiness of the creditee). The 
possession of power enables the holder of such power to shift the risks involved, by 
asking credits from the lower-tier producers. Extending credit not only incurs the risks 
of default; in addition, it makes the creditor to invest more working capital to carry 
out business. It is thus not surprising that, as Peter in the above quotation recalls, 
when the number of local trading firms grows and their power erodes, they would pay 
faster to the producers than before. 
t 
When the power of the local trading firms slowly erodes, the first-tier 
producers can go one step further, that they may not extend Ml credits, particularly to 
2 0 G o v e m m e n t - p u b l i s h e d statistics do not enable one to include capital intensity into the calc^ation of 
su^^u^evel ^ a t I have already done is perhaps the best out of the available data. The same 
quTlfication also applies to the trading sector. Capital intensity of thetradmg sector is very low, 
^ a t i v e r t h e manufacturing industries. To maintain a small trading office does not requ,re a large 
amount off ixed and variable capital. 
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a small and weak trading firm. For instance, the metal ware factory may ask for an 
amount of deposit (say 30% of the sales) or request a local L.C., before production 
I commences. Of course, the factory would only do these when incomplete trust is 
i placed. But that the factory is able to do so cannot but be related with the erosion of 
the power of the local trading firms. A less powerful trading firm has to submit to 
1 such requests, since it has to compete with other more established trading firms to 
obtain good suppliers. The balance is shifted, as Peter concludes nicely. 
Unquestionably then, the magnitude of power asymmetry has reduced; nonetheless, 
I 
the direction is still the same as predicted. 
Of course, there are exceptions in this regard; but these are indeed the ones 
that prove the rule. As I have noted in the above paragraphs, when the metal ware 
I 
j factory was in its early years of establishment, the materials vendors would transfer 
‘ t h e required materials to it only when money was received. That is, the vendors did 
not extend credits to such a newly established first-tier producer. We can safely argue 
that a newly established producer is weak in power (vis-a-vis the materials vendors), 
because it does not have those tight connections with a number of familiar materials 
vendors, and thus it is unable to play one vendor against another. Furthermore, since 
the "foundation" of such a new establishment is not very sound, it cannot secure its 
own sources of orders. This weakens further its power to defme the terms of trade. Put 
it in another angle, the nascent metal ware factory was more dependent on the vendors 
than the other way round. This negative case proves the rule, because power springs 
(partly) from the level of dependence (Cf. Emerson 1962). 
Another limiting case is also useful to clarify the power asymmetry among the 
domestic producers: a newly established electro-plating factory must offer very 
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Sometimes new electro-plating factories would come to our office and ask for 
business. They must offer an extremely low price so as to capture some businesses. 
They would also accept a longer credit period. 
This is a limiting case in that after an electro-plating factory has secured its 
own foundation and has built a stable relationship with a number of first-tier 
producers, the dependence ofthe former on the latter would be lessened. To describe 
this as an inter-dependent relationship is more accurate, since, as I have noted above, 
being locked into such a relationship, the factory must solicit cooperation from its 
lower-tier partners. This is premised on the notion of reciprocity; and by definition, a 
reciprocal exchange requires the limited use of arbitrary power by the metal ware 
factory. Generally speaking, however, the lower-tier producers are more dependent on 
the upper-tier ones, because it is the latter ones which have the social resources to 
organize the former's industrial outputs. Power, in sum, would affect the "direction" 
as well as the "magnitude" of credit extension. 
Another contractual setup that manifests the unequal distribution of power is 
about the shouldering of burdens associated with a buyer-driven commodity chain. 
Though the presence of goodwill trust is premised on a ‘‘fair” sharing of gains (losses) 
in good (bad) times, the definition of faimess is power-laden nonetheless (see also 
Dore 1983: 465). For example, when buyers want to lay a claim on the suppliers after 
the reception of the shipped products, they would press the local trading firms to 
address such claims. It is a legitimate practice, even though there are possibilities that 
the buyer lays an u n r e a s o n a b l e claim (for example, to minimize her losses because of 
unrealized sales). Information symmetry deprives the local producers the ability to 
verify the truthfulness of such claims. The local trading firms have to accept such 
claims too, because the local trading firms, among themselves, are engaging in fierce 
competition for foreign buyers' orders. It is easier for the buyers to fmd a local trading 
firm than vice versa. The most the trading firms can do is to negotiate a more 
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acceptable claim, by referring to the importance of a good buyer-trading relationship 
and the norms bf faimess. 
However, the local trading firms would pass such pressures down to the 
suppliers. Even if such problems are resulted from the trading firm's negligence of 
quality control, it still has the ability to demand the factory to shoulder the claim. It is 
not difficult to fmd faults in the products and to press the suppliers to shoulder the 
burden. The quality control exercised by the local trading firms is very discretionary, 
as David argues, 
There must be room for maneuver. When the problem is a small one, we may 
possibly “let the products go" {zouhuo). But i f the problem is a large one, of course 
we would not .…If it is a new factory, or the relationship is not good, even if it is a 
f small problem, we would not let the products go. For example, I had a new factory as 
， my supplier. It was very tough in the negotiation of payment and quantity, and it did 
not provide me lunch and transportation as others would do. There were problems in 
their products, we must reject them and let the supplier know you do not like it. We 
reserve the right to reject the products if there are problems, no matter small or large. 
There's a little bit abuse of power indeed. 
Even the fact that the supplier has practised capacity or specialization 
subcontracting can be utilized to justify the buyer's claim. In this way, when a buyer 
wants to lay a claim, the trading firm would not suffer any money losses. What it 
loses in this case is just the strength of its relationship with the particular buyer. The 
trading firm would still force the factory to compensate for the claim. A first-tier 
supplier, which have already maintained a long-term relationship with a local trading 
fmn，cannot stay immune from such pressures, because to keep that relationship alive 
requires it to sacrifice a bit. In this case, the trading firm would request a more 
‘‘reasonable” compensation. For the less endowed ones, the trading firm would press 
unfailingly on its suppliers to shoulder all responsibility, through the “abuse of 
power,, as David in the quotation above admits. Since contracts are incomplete, there 
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are no objective benchmarks to settle these disputes. Power plays a prominent role 
here, as fierce market competition and the value of a stable output outlet would force 
the lower-tier producers to accept unequal terms. Peter states it bitterly, 
When the buyer forgets to check her stock, and when the trading firm forgets to 
source the product, they would request us to deliver the goods at an early date. We 
have to rush. .. I f w e have been in partnership for a long time, we would try to help. 
We bet the trading firm would buy from us when it needs a product. ... We bet that 
after we have helped it this time, in the future when it needs a new product, it would 
>; 




To maintain an on-going relationship with a powerful partner, the junior one 
has to sacrifice, even though the problem, in the first instance, is totally unrelated with 
a 
|-, its own faults. Because this relationship is a scarce good, and because the investments 
；: in the construction of such a good relationship requires a long period of amortization, -*, 1 ._•‘ I 
JI the producers would try as far as they can to "please" the trading firm. 
t . . 
I 
;' In Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, I have analyzed why trust is important in 
fS'" 
！ governing the relationships among domestic producers. But the operation of trust 
I - - - -
I should be put into its context. Power in the domestic commodity chain is unevenly 
I distributed, as I have demonstrated in this section. A recognition of this power 
asymmetry is indispensable to our analysis of the governance ofthe domestic node. 
；：}. • 、 
, , - ^ 
••? 
I Power can first substitute trust, in the sense that the control of market outlets 
1^  
|f： enables an upper-tier producer to solicit the expected action from a lower-tier one, 
fe even though such a course of action would not be the one preferred by the latter. For £ 
'S instance, the first-tier producers' dependence on the local trading firm would create 
1 the incentives to cooperate with them or “submit” to their demands. The supplier 
‘ cannot resist seemingly unequal terms, because what is fair is defined within the 
jm 
丄 f 
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power relations. David has described the situation when burdens are to be shifted 
•— . 
down, 
When the buyer wants to lay a claim, we have to bully the factory first. No matter 
what the factory is, no matter whether it is a familiar one, we have to bully it fu*st. 
Let'em know you're dissatisfied. Perhaps the buyer wants 20%, we would say 30% 
to the factory. We let the factory bargain on its own. "We offer a sky-high price and 
accept a ground-low sum" {kaitian shajia, luodi huanqian). 
Only because the local trading firms have the control on the producers' market 
outlets are they able to pressure them to accept these unequal terms. Trust, 
nevertheless, still plays a role here. An on-going relationship with a supplier is a value 
to the trading firm^i; and to keep such a relationship alive would require that the 
supplier should place trust on it. To demonstrate its own trustworthiness, the trading 
firm in tum has to (pretend to) protect its house factories. For example, it has to take 
the latter's fmancial conditions into account when negotiating with the buyer, to see 
whether the supplier is able to shoulder such a claim. Only when the factory believes 
that the trading firm has taken care of its own well-being would it bestow trust on the 
trading frnn. Cooperation is granted and an on-going relationship maintained only 
when both parties behave properly, according to the norms of informal obligations. 
Thus David continues the story in this way, 
1 
We have also to think for the factory. Whether their pleas are reasonable. We have to 
think for the factory, about its fmancial conditions. ... For example, the supplier 
� cannot accept 20%; we have to negotiate with the buyer. Then we bargain and talk to 
the supplier. We tell the buyer, saying that 20% is Joo high for the supplier. How 
about 15%? Normally the buyer would not stand very tough, because she has marked 
up a little bit in advance. ... i f the factory cannot exchange the sub-standard products 
with money, we may tell it to supply new products instead. Or the claim can be 
f 
.^  2lFrom the opposite angle, the supplier would value such a relationship too. However, the two 
i "values" are not equivalent, because it is easier for a trading firm to fmd a new supplier than the other 
i w a y round. This can be seen as the reason why the supplier would accept these objectively more 
unequal terms. 
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partially compensated in future businesses, by marking up a smaller margin. Possibly 
we would help the supplier in these ways. 
• — 
In other words, the use of power has its own limits. If power is used 
excessively or too arbitrarily, the trading firm cannot demonstrate its trustworthiness 
to the factory; the relationship would certainly be ruptured and its own reputation 
damaged. If it is really the case, many future business opportunities would be closed, 
and the advantages of a close relationship would also be forfeited. The norm of 
faimess still applies. 
Power is also a basis oftmst. The trading firm would only bestow trust on its 
suppliers only if their performance can live up to the standard (as required by the 
foreign buyer). The power to have its principal sources shifted can strengthen the 
incentives of the suppliers to keep its product quality and the like, by introducing 
traces of market competition into the relationship. The local trading firms can 
minimize the risks associated with their suppliers, opportunism by threatening (with 
reasons) to drop them out from the list, or by slowly promoting the less frequent 
suppliers to a more preferred status. To place trust on the first-tier producers is thus 
hinged on the possibility of the trading firms to protect themselves (by shifting its 
frequent sources and by asking credits from the suppliers), if trust is betrayed. When 
the trading frnn can ultimately utilize its power to have its supplies shifted (that is, a 
credible threat), it can safely bestow trust on its suppliers. That the trading firm is 
willing (and able) to accept an incomplete contract (that is，contractual trust), and not 
to inspect the finished products (competence trust) is hinged on such possibilities to 
recruit new suppliers into its production network. The trading firm can also anticipate 
goodwill from the suppliers, because the latter values an on-going relationship with a 
trading firm very much (as a good relationship with a trading frnn is a scarce good). 
When asked how he could know whether a new supplier is trustworthy or not, John 
had slipped his tongue, 
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We should know the origins of the person and his background. ... More importantly, 
it is only after the factory has delivered the products that we pay it money. That is the 
factory advances to us. In other words, the factory has to place trust on us than the 
other way round. Ha! ... Actually, we have to place trust on each other. 
Trust is somewhat twisted here, in that the goodwill of the supplier is a result 
of exigencies, and that the goodwill of the trading firm more discretionary. 
The last qualification in the above quotation is extremely interesting, as power 
cannot be stretched too much, as I have argued above. The trading firm has to strike a 
delicate balance, so as to reproduce the precarious symbiosis between the two parties. 
Consequently, the relationship is not as one-sided nor as overtly exploitative as it first 
appears. The trading firm has to behave properly, so as to demonstrate its 
trustworthiness, because collectively the first-tier producers can sanction a deviant 
trading firm. Though the local trading firms have that power to press the producers to 
accept unequal terms, to push the producers to the limits (say to bankruptcy) is 
defined as unacceptable. The reputation of a trading fmn would be damaged if it over-
stretches its power. Having the ability to propagate the_wrong-doings of an overly 
opportunistic trading frnn (through gossip or informal discussion) to their colleagues, 
the producers can collectively boycott it and thus sanction against deviant action. Of 
course, that many producers are competing in the market would render such strategies 
rather costly and inefficacuous (Cf. Olson 1971). Structurally speaking, the collective 
power is doomed to be weak. However, the increasing number of, and tightened 
competition among, local trading firms has shifted the balance and make these threats 
more credible. In other words, competition (among local trading firms) can be 
increasingly capitalized to solicit cooperation of the local trading firms for the first-
tier producers. The collective power of domestic producers is thus one of the bases on 
which they can place trust on the local trading firms. 
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The collective power of the producers, furthermore, is enhanced, when the 
number of trading firms has increased. As the power of the trading firms has 
gradually decreased, the scope of discretion is reduced. That is, the trading firms are 
obliged to place genuine trust on the producers, because the ability to have suppliers 
shifted is weakened. In other words, more trust is placed by the trading firm on the 
producers now. Alternatively, the producers can place less trust on the trading firms. 
The trading firms have to behave "more" properly, as the producers would tolerate 
lesser volume of contrary evidence. In sum, a more egalitarian relationship is now in 
place. 
To conclude, the governance of the domestic node in Hong Kong is mainly 
based on trust. Power is also an important mechanism; but power has its own limits. It 
cannot totally substitute trust. Power, however, still matters, because it is a basis of 
trust. Power is the basis on which credible threats are made; and such credible threats 
are indispensable when trust is to be placed. We would further elaborate the processes 
of construction of trust in the following section. 
6.2. The Social Construction ofTrust — 
As I have mentioned at the very beginning, to place trust on another actor puts 
the trustor at larger risks than otherwise: when the trustor lives with an incomplete 
contract for instance (because it has placed contractual trust), it is squarely exposed to 
opportunism ofthe trustee. Put it into the context here, when the trading firm requests 
a quicker delivery or downward revision of price after the commencement of 
production on such an incomplete contract, the first-tier producers would fmd it hard 
to resist these requests. It would suffer a great loss if they do not, or damage the 
relationship if they do. There is no specification of what good or proper performance 
is. Furthermore, they do not have that ability to check the validity of such claims, 
because of information asymmetry. It follows that trust has to be placed, and that the 
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trustor has to place it carefully. That the cultivation of trust requires investment would 
make a cautious approach advisable too, because, as we will see later, trust can only 
be built over time, and that a trustor would be indebted to its existing trustee when a 
new trust with another is to be built. 
To minimize the risks in trust-placing, the would-be trustor thus has to gather 
as much information as possible, because it would enable the trustor to gain a more 
informed understanding on the likelihood whether the trustee would, behave 
opportunistically. The would-be trustor would principally collect two "kinds" of 
information: that on past specific performance, as well as that on the general 
"personal integrity" of the would-be trustee. The would-be trustor can collect such 
information either through direct contacts or through informal circulation, with the 
. former more preferred by the would-be trustor. Furthermore, a trusting relationship 
can only be built gradually, since by proceeding step by step，the risks sprang from a 
misplaced trust can be minimized. The trustor has also to maintain a repertoire of 
sanctioning devices in its own hands, because this would strengthen the incentives of 
the trustee to behave properly (see also Lau 1994). In other words, the threat of exit is 
important in creating loyalty (Cf. Hirschman 1970). Since _we have already talked 
about the utilization of power as a credible threat (that is，a sanctioning device) in the 
cultivation (and strengthening) of trust, our discussion would just revolve around the 
first two themes. 
Several "kinds" of information can be gathered in the construction process. 
Firstly, the would-be trustor can gather information on the characteristics of the 
would-be trustee (Zucker 1986). The gist is that some persons are more trustworthy 
than others because they possess the necessary attributes. It is commonly argued that 
relatives, family and ethnic members are more trustworthy, because of the more 
intense personal and emotional bonds in between (Granovetter 1985; Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993). With the assumption that these persons live in the same 
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community with the would-be trustor, and that the sense of “we-ness” would create a 
' , - • 
greater disposition to trust, the would-be trustor can feel more secure in the processes 
of placing of trust. Consequently, trust can be more easily be built. This disposition to 
trust (and trust in itself) are enhanced when the community is systematically 
discriminated in a host society. It is not surprising then that a tight business network is 
commonly found in immigrant populations and in demographically stable 
communities (Granovetter 1992; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Zucker 1986). 
However, such a basis of common characteristics is not a sufficient pre-
condition for trust to be placed (for a contrary view, see Wong 1991). Economic 
action, as I have argued in Chapter Two, contains simultaneously rational and a-
rational elements. To place trust is aimed at the solicitation of future actions, those 
which are more favorable from the trustor's point of view. The future, by definition, is 
full ofuncertainties. The minimization of risks and the attempt to solicit the expected 
action cannot but be a rationalistic motive. One of the principal ways to minimize the 
risks in trust-placing is to extrapolate or overdraw the existing information to the 
future, so that the trustor can feel more secure in the present (Luhmann 1979). 
Information on past (specific) performance is the most important piece here, because 
the trustor can assume (with more, though not total, confidence) that a good performer 
in the past is more likely to remain so in the future. Peter has made this logic very 
clear; he would like to trace the past performance of a would-be production partner 
when trust is to be placed, 
Sometimes, new trading frnns want to do business with you. They want to buy your 
products. Often we know the origins of these new trading firms. For example, HS 
Trading Company. Its owner was employed in SW Trading Company before. We 
have business contacts with SW. We know whether this person is a diligent one or 
not. If he is, we may help him. Before that, he was employed in SS Trading 
Company. And so on. You have ways to trace the origins of this person. 
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Likewise, a trading firm would also trace the origins of the owner of a new 
supplier, 
We have been in this trade for a long time. We have experience. We know the 
origins of a new factory. That is, we know the person who establishes this factory; 
we know who he is. For example, if there is a new factory "coming out" from an 
existing one, from our colleagues in our trade or other factories, we know which 
factories this person has been in the past. We have the record to trace, whether he is 
"honest" {laoshi) or not (John). 
To gather information on past performance is thus complementary to, if not 
more important than, that on common characteristics. But how can this kind of 
information be gathered? John has hinted, correctly in my view, that personal 
networks are extremely crucial in this regard. The resort to personal networks as an 
information channel can clarify the functions of a community of common 
characteristics. As I mentioned just before, trust is more likely to be built between 
persons with common characteristics. While it is possible to argue that it is related 
with the sense of community, that is, a strengthened (pre-given) disposition to trust, 
such a phenomenon can be interpreted in another angle. It is because to rely merely on 
characteristics (as a reflection of greater disposition to trust) when trust is to be placed 
is very risky. Firstly, there are matrices of common characteristics, intersecting across 
actors. It is difficult to disentangle which characteristics are more reliable. To attribute 
the cultivation of trust to the operation of a specific common characteristics (say, 
being Chinese) among many others may just posit a spurious relationship. Secondly, 
not all persons with the same characteristics would behave properly, simply because 
there is a free-rider problem. The deviant would gain at the expense of other 
community members who behave properly. It follows that a trustor would 
discriminate among community members (Cf. Silin 1972). 
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However, common characteristics still matter, because, in a community, 
information flows are facilitated. More accurate information, of course, can be 
obtained when a would-be trustor has direct personal contacts with the would-be 
trustee. "Hands-on" experience or information is believed to be more reliable. The 
would-be trustor can also leam the past performance of the would-be trustee through 
peer advice and informal discussion. A community, by definition, is a diffuse entity; 
many information in addition to those about business conducts can be gathered. This 
is important, since trustworthiness has a moral and diffuse nature. If a person behaves 
improperly, say in family affairs, the other community members would believe that 
this person is less likely to behave properly in economic transactions. Whether a 
person would be honest (laoshi) in business affairs is believed to be related with its 
"daily" honesty. If the would-be trustor knows that the would-be trustee is an 
excessive gambler, the former would overdraw such information to place distrust 
(instead oftrust) on the latter. Of course, such processes of overdrawal may be faulty. 
But since the would-be trustor, by definition, does not have that direct personal 
information about the specific past performance of the would-be trustee, such 
information about other spheres of action is indispensable. 
Furthermore, a community is constituted by dense networks of ties. One can 
utilize the existing ties to get more information (Granovetter 1973, 1983)，because the 
informants themselves have their own networks. One can conceptualize a community 
as a honeycomb of networks. Peter has described how he knows the past performance 
of a new local trading firm, and how he would place distrust on the basis of such 
information, 
We would discuss the matter [whether a new trading firm is a trustworthy one] with a 
number of familiar colleagues. They may not necessarily be the ones in our industry. 
But they are the familiar ones; we know them. We would ask them whether this 
trading firm is troublesome, say in payment. Or whether it would claim the factories 
even when the buyer doesn't. Whether it has dirty records. We have to know the 
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"foundation" {di) of this new trading firm. If our colleagues have done businesses 
with this troublesome firm, we have to take more precautions. ... So we may ask it to 
issue a local L.C. At most we pay the fees. We have to protect ourselves. ... We may 
also ask it to place a deposit, say 30%. We have to protect ourselves. 
More accurate information can only be gathered from familiar production 
partners, because the factory has ab:eady placed trust on these colleagues. The two 
parties are bound by emotional and friendship ties. The informant may fell obliged to 
lead a helping hand, because of the existence of obligation in a friendship.- From a 
more rationalistic perspective, the factory has the expectation and confidence that the 
information offered is genuine. Such an expectation is grounded (though not totally), 
because an on-going relationship already in place would deter the informant from 
giving false information, since to give false information would bring bad 
consequences to the informed and rupture the relationship afterwards. It is also 
advantageous for an existing trustee to offer a piece of valuable information to the 
trustor, because this would strengthen the norms of reciprocity existent already. By 
offering a “gift” to a trading frnn for instance, the latter would be indebted to the gift-
giver, a situation more conducive to the maintenance of an on-going relationship, 
which is valuable for the informant. I have mentioned in Chapter Four that a trading 
frnn can create a larger production network with the help of existing suppliers in 
equivalent terms. In other words, a producer would utilize the existing trust to build 
another new trusting relationship. 
It follows that producers would try their best to maintain their business 
reputation {xinyong). Since information on wrong-doings and improper behavior can 
be easily circulated in a community, the trustee would possess an incentive not to 
behave opportunistically. The fear of subjecting to ostracism is a deterrent in other 
words. Gossip is an important channel to propagate such information, 
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Formally, we would not [exchange information with our colleagues]. All in all we 
are competitors. On the surface, we would not talk about this. But when we are with 
a number of familiar persons, when we eat or drink together, we would mention this 
kind of affairs. What topics do you have except this?…Topics，well, in some time, 
we taUc about the products of a particular factory. Is it reasonable or is it not? And 
many others. We absorb "information from the roadside" {lobian xiaoxi) (John). 
We would not taUc about this in formal occasions. We would ask for advice by 
phone. We ask one or two familiar ones for advice. For example, if we come to a 
new trading ftrm, with which we have no partnership before. It offers you a huge 
order. When we meet this situation, we have to, as we, the trading business, 
commonly call, "help yourself to survive" {zhisheng). We ask, have you done 
business with this new firm? Or we can, "partially intentionally" (youyi wuyi), ask 
this new fmn, where it comes from, where you are employed before. We can then 
ask the parent firm, whether this person is trustworthy or not. We have to check. 
(Peter) 
Informality is a defining feature here. It is inappropriate to talk explicitly 
about the wrong-doings of other trading firms or factories, since the informant itself 
obtained such a piece of information either through another occasion of gossip or 
through past interaction with that wrong-doer. The informant knows that that piece of 
infonnation may be outdated or erroneous afterall. With this caution in mind, the 
informant would prefer informal channels, since this means "a reference-only" to the 
informed. If it tums out that the information is indeed inaccurate, the informant would 
be less indebted to the informed, who may now suffer a great loss on the basis of such 
a piece ofinaccurate information. A step further, the informant may fear retaliation by 
the wrong-doer. If the latter knows that the information is propagated by a particular 
person, it would in tum propagate information about that informant, that he is making 
troubles. For the informant, such propagation about trouble-making would affect 
business reputation and consequently further business opportunities. Thus, personal 
networks and the associated trust are important, since the informant can be assured 
that the sources of information would not be disclosed by the informed. 
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That such information is circulated through informal channels, and that trust is 
cultivated through personal networks, are also related with the lack offormal trust- (or 
distrust-) producing institutions in Hong Kong. Some institutions can facilitate the 
construction of trust, for example, by specifying codes of practice and by adopting 
certification procedures or internal auditing. That Hong Kong lacks such a trust-
producing mechanism is in stark contrast with the Japanese practice (and those in 
other institutionally-regulated production system), in which a formal -business 
association (often monopolistic, sponsored by the state) is established to circulate the 
performance and general business ethics of various members (Smitka 1991; Storper 
and Scott 1989: 31). Of course, there are manufacturers' and trade associations in 
Hong Kong; but these institutions cannot serve as a (dis-)trust-producing mechanism, 
because no tight entry requirements are stipulated and no elaborate information 
dissemination system is established (Cf. Zucker 1986). 
It follows that a cognitive leap is necessary when a would-be trustor is about 
to bestow trust, the risks ofthe leap of course are related with accumulated experience 
and intellectual capability. Thus the trustor would try to "inspect" the reality by its 
own senses, so as to complement the fragmented information, 
When we have to source a product from a new factory, we have to go to the plant 
directly. We would taUc to the factory boss. When we have made a longer chat, we 
can possibly know whether this factory can make it or not. We would ask him, 
whether he has done businesses with buyers coming from Europe before. We check 
— whether he has "exaggerated" {zuodd). We ask him which company he had done 
businesses with before, and where the products go. We check whether he can answer 
you at once. I fhe hesitates, we know that this factory may possibly exaggerate. This 
point is very important. ... We have to go to its showroom, and we have to check its 
catalog. Some factories are very weird indeed; they may use catalogs of other 
factories as their own. (David) 
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We come to a particular trading firm. We see whether it's poorly organized or not. 
Whether it is like a normal business firm. (Peter) 
But such direct queries cannot be used too far. The "inspector" can only 
"partially intentionally" ask the would-be trustee indirect questions, since a formal 
and over-cautious attitude would signal to the would-be trustee that the would-be 
trustor is questioning its trustworthiness. Of course, it is only when the inspector 
doubts the trustworthiness of the would-be trustee does it try to ask these indirect 
questions. But the possibility that the would-be trustee is indeed a trustworthy one 
cannot be ruled out. That possibility would force the would-be trustor not to behave 
improperly (that is，questioning too far), because it may forego valuable business 
opportunities. John argues for the same point in this way, 
New factories give us samples and we have to do business. If the products are 
suitable to us, we would market the products. We keep our doors open and we do 
business. If we are over-cautious, we cannot do business anyway. In normal 
operations, we taUc about the word of trust. This is very important. 
In sum, the actors have to utilize whatever available means in the process of 
construction of trust; the most easily accessible (and most reliable) ones are personal 
and social relationships. While it is possible to argue that personal relationships are 
culturally preferred by the Chinese people (Cf. Redding 1990)，that trust-placing, by 
its nature, involves risk would cast doubts on such a kind of simplistic argument. 
Personal relationships matter, not because of a mere cultural preference, but that these 
are information channels with higher fidelity. Consequently, to rely on such networks 
in the process of construction of trust is a less risky and more preferred tactic. As 
Granovetter (1985, 1992) has argued forcefully, economic action is neither 
undersocialized nor oversocialized. Trust, in the end, serves to minimize or cope with 
risks and uncertainties; but the process of placing of trust is a risky one. Information 
from familiar persons and further verification through direct inspection are 
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indispensable in figuring out the risks when trust is to be placed. These two means 
increase rationality, the ability to estimate the magnitude of risks. However, cognitive 
and emotion leaps must still be involved: only when rationality ends does tmst begin. 
An embedding of the construction of trust into personal relationships and 
direct inspection are not enough (though they are the only available means). Since to 
place trust would incur risks, and since actors would like to minimize risks, it follows 
that the construction of tmst should be a gradual process. The gist is that there is a 
time lag between the time when trust is placed and the time when the benefits of a 
trusting relationship can be appropriated. Of course, as I have explained just before, a 
would-be trustor would gather as much existing (but indirect) information as possible 
when it is to place trust on the would-be trustee. Such overdrawal of limited and 
indirect information would still leave a definite amount of risks untouched. To 
proceed step by step, that is, more trust is only placed over time, is thus a less risky 
approach, because even if such a trust is misplaced as time unfolds, the trustor would 
suffer a smaller loss than otherwise. Peter has described how this gradualism 
manifests itself, 
When a new electro-plating firm asks us for business, we would first see whether it is 
trustworthy enough. ... We would focus on the quality of its products. [Q: How can 
you know that ifyou have not done business with it before?] We would give it one or 
two baskets, and we try. [Q: You certainly know the quality of these test baskets. 
How about that when you are in real business with this electro-plater?] If we are 
satisfied with these baskets, if they are good enough, then we would give the electro-
plater one or two smaller orders, to see whether it can make it or not. If it can, we 
would place more and larger orders. 
Similarly, a merchandiser would only recruit a new supplier into his 
production network in a gradual fashion, 
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When we do business with a new factory, we have to take precautions. ... We would 
taUc to the boss. When we have made a longer chat, we can possibly know whether 
this factory is capable or not. ... [If it is,] we would place trial orders on that supplier. 
The size of order would not be too large. We'd rather place a repeat-order to this 
factory when there's no problem after delivery. ... We can only develop a long-term 
relationship with a supplier only after we have done a good deal of business. ... It's 
not just a matter of time; it is a matter of how many orders you can place to a 
particular supplier (David). 
Trust by one party is not enough; the other party must bestow trast on its 
partner to make trust really deliver the goods. By proceeding step by step，both 
transacting parties can thus gain a more informed understanding on the actual 
business conducts of the other. Normally, then, a trusting relationship can only be 
built over a long period of time. But sometimes trust could be enhanced in a rapid 
fashion. This would happen when one party voluntarily exposes itself to great risks. 
By signaling to the other party that it has a genuine intention to build a long-term 
relationship, or by making a visible commitment, the other party is more likely to 
bestow trust on the signal-giver. By bearing a high risk without being assured of 
returns, the party taking such a great leap forward can demonstrate to the other that it 
is a trustworthy ones. It is easier for the trustor to place tmst on the trustee and to 
adopt a cooperative strategy afterwards. I have mentioned in Chapter Four that a 
factory which is willing to further develop and strengthen the existing relationship 
with a trading firm would attempt new product development without asking for 
"development fees". This is an important signal of its "potential" to the trading firm, 
because the trading firm can feel more secure in the process of placing of tmst, if it 
knows (and believes) that the signal-giver is a cooperative supplier; it is an "easy-
going" factory. Likewise, the trading firm has to give signals too, so as to boost the 
relationship, 
If we want to develop a long-term relationship with a new supplier, we must start 
from ourselves. We have to see what its needs are; we try to help it at our best. For 
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example, it may require a specific payment date, or shipment date. We have to help it 
when we can. When it has some inquiries, we urge the buyer to confirm faster. We 
want to show it that we do business in a fair manner, that we are efficient and 
cooperative. We try to make it believe that it is good to place trust on us (David). 
However, such signals cannot be too strong. Paradoxically, too strong a signal 
would lead the receiver to query the giver's trustworthiness. The kemel is that the 
receiver would query its intention when it behaves too cooperatively, and would raise 
doubts on its ability to fulfill its promises. In other words, the receiver would believe 
that the promise are false ones, or that the signal-giver deliberately makes a trap. Thus 
John would take a cautious attitude when a supplier offers an extremely low price. 
Because we have been in this trade for a long time, and because we have 
accumulated a lot of experience,... we know the difference between the price offered 
and the market price.…From ourjudgment, ifthe factory offers a price that is lower 
than production cost, there must be problems. ... If the factory does not encounter 
any economic problems, it is impossible to offer a price that is lower than the market 
level. ... Intuitively, the factory must have not enough orders. To keep business 
going, the factory would offer an unbelievable price. ... The factory may also want 
some cash. Or there must be something weird. For example, if a cartoon box contains 
twelve pieces, the factory would just put ten into it. Minus 20%. So when we meet a 
very low price, we have to take precautions. 
In sum, the construction of trust is a highly delicate process. You have to 
demonstrate your trustworthiness by making visible commitments and by signaling 
that you are eager to be trusted; but you cannot do that too visibly. Otherwise, the 
would-be trustor would question your intention and your trustworthiness at the 
bottom. Each party has to behave properly, in other words. 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
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In this Chapter, I argue that the domestic node in Hong Kong is governed by 
trust. While the production system is constituted by a large number of small-sized 
producers, and that external linkages are very extensive, I argue that such networks of 
interdependence can be regulated without taking a form of vertical integration. Trust 
can solve the problems of opportunism. Such a network form of governance can also 
generate advantages which would not be available in a spot market, because it is “able 
to optimize the conflicting requirements of flexibility and long-term orientation" 
(Traxler and Unger 1994: 15). Flexibility, or the ability to respond promptly to the 
foreign buyers' demands, is indispensable in a buyer-driven commodity chain. In 
other words, "governance by trust" is more efficient than either markets or 
hierarchies. However, to explain the existence of such a governance form by its 
efficiency is not enough. I have argued that trust can only be built gradually, and the 
trustor would like to embed the relationships into personal ones in the processes of 
construction. Without employing these tactics, we can safely argue that the 
transacting parties cannot successfully build the necessary trust. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 7 Conclusion 
In previous chapters, I have analyzed the mode of insertion of the domestic 
production system into the world-economy. I have also described the configuration of 
the input-output system as well as the mode of governance of this production system. 
A careful reader may remember that such an exercise is aimed at answering a 
development question, that is, we can better explain the dynamism of the Hong 
Kong's industrial economy by adopting a social organizational point of view. In this 
fmal chapter, I would first recapitulate my previous discussion, and then see how the 
GCC framework is helpful in this regard. As a fmal concluding remark, I would also 
attempt a small theoretical reflection, which, I believe, would indicate some future 
research agenda. 
7.1 A Recapitulation 
In Chapter Two, I have reviewed three prevalent explanations ofHong Kong's 
industrial development. I argue that they have neglected, firstly, how the production 
system is connected with the world-economy, and secondly, how it is organized. 
Based on this review, I have adopted a social organizational perspective in this thesis. 
Two assumptions have been made here. Firstly, the organizational setup matters, 
because it is through the various transactional arrangements that commodity 
production is accomplished, various “factors of production" combined, and factors 
extemal to the domestic economy are mediated. The organization setup would affect 
the developmental outcome as well as the structural adjustment potential of the 
production system. Put it in the GCC framework, whether a nation-state is able to 
occupy a specific position in the global division of labor, or whether it can develop 
(via the accumulation of surplus), is related with the way the domestic production 
system is organized. From an opposite angle, the local organization of production is 
~~ Page 206 
Chapter Seven 
affected by the global organization of production. This is the basic starting point of 
my whole analysis. 
In Chapter Three, I have further elaborated the GCC framework. Its basic 
argument is that when we want to explain the (under-)development of a particular 
nation-state or economy, we have to know, firstly, the nature of global commodity 
chains in which it is involved; secondly, the position of the nation-state or economy in 
those chains; thirdly, why and how the nation-state or economy is able to occupy that 
position; and finally, how surplus is relatively distributed within those chains. The 
purpose of this thesis is to answer the third question, which is，to me, the least 
theorized one in the whole GCC framework. In this chapter, I have also introduced 
two studies utilizing such a framework, in which their emphasis on the local 
organization of production is quite insightful for my purpose here. I have argued that 
since domestic producers are engaged in "buyer-driven commodity production", the 
production system they constitute has to be highly responsive to foreign buyers' 
demands. The gist is that these foreign capitals are foot-loose and that the production 
process proper is organized by domestic producers themselves. Only when foreign 
buyers find the production system a responsive one (or when they can find 
"appropriate" producers and products) do they continuously place their orders on 
domestic producers here. I thus contend that, because the domestic production system 
of Hong Kong is intimately connected with foreign buyers, and because it is 
organized in a responsive fashion, Hong Kong is able to occupy a place in the global 
division of labor^. To be successful in this regard, two requirements have to be met: 
the connection and responsiveness. ‘ 
In Chapter Four, I have described how the connection with the world-economy 
or foreign buyers is being made. Local trading firms play a crucial role here. These 
1 My aim is to explain why Hong Kong is successful in cuntinously occupying a place in the global 
division of labor. How much surplus is accumulated in such an export role is not my principal concem. 
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specialized agents are more effective than other domestic producers in monitoring 
foreign market changes. They enjoy economies of scale, and they possess the requisite 
resources in searching for market niches and in facilitating information flows. By this 
token, they can contribute to the matching between foreign buyers' demands and 
domestic production capability. 
However, such a close monitoring of foreign buyers' demands is just a 
necessary (but not sufficient) factor in this process of matching, because it is domestic 
producers themselves who produce the required commodities. Whether there are 
appropriate producers in Hong Kong which can produce the required commodity is 
perhaps a more fundamental factor. This leads us to local organization of production. 
The production system ofHong Kong, as I have detailed in Chapter Five, is populated 
by a large number of small-sized industrial establishments. The input-output system, 
then, is constituted by elaborate production networks among domestic producers. 
These networks of interdependence serve to complement the limited scope and scale 
of the average producers, and also to tackle the fluctuations associated with buyer-
driven commodity production. Domestic producers are given the chance to "produce" 
only when they can receive an order from foreign buyers. Hence domestic producers 
in buyer-driven commodity chains are passive agents; they do not have that control on 
marketing and product design. The only way for them to gain access to a continuous 
flow of buyers' orders is to enhance their own production responsiveness. That 
domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in buyer-driven commodity 
production would place a specific "functional imperative" on the way how the 
domestic production system is constituted and governed. I have shown in this chapter 
that domestic producers would resort to capacity and specialized subcontracting to 
fulfill this imperative. Though external transactions should be seen as a necessity 
(because of limited scope and scale), domestic producers (the first-tier ones) can tum 
this into a virtue, by creatively adjusting production schedule and by tapping 
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independent initiatives from lower-tier production partners. Thus responsiveness to 
foreign buyers' demands is enhanced. _ 
That commodity production is accomplished across organizational boundaries 
would make the problem of coordination or integration very interesting. The second 
assumption of a social organizational perspective is made here, viz., economic action 
is socially embedded. In other words, we should focus on the social aspects of the 
organization ofproduction. Both the input-output system and the mode of governance 
are not purely economic phenomena. In Chapter Five, I have shown how a tight labor 
market, the perennial tendency of spinning-off, and the lack of active state support 
would limit the size of industrial establishments in Hong Kong. Domestic producers 
are situated in a social (and political) world which reduces their possibility of size 
growth. That domestic producers are small in size would, in tum，affect how the 
input-output system is constituted, that is, they must resort to externalized 
transactions to finish a commodity or marketable output. 
On the issue of governance, I have shown in Chapter Six that power and trust 
are two important means to integrate or govem the decentralized production system. 
Upper-tier producers could utilize their power, according to their structural position in 
the layered industrial structure, to ensure expected actions from lower-tier ones. The 
configuration of the input-output system re-enters the picture here. The structure is 
stratified by different-sized industrial establishments, each layer with its specific 
"amounts" as well as kinds of resources and power. Upper4ier producers are often 
larger in size than lower-tier ones; they have more resources and power too. For ‘ 
instance, the market power local trading firms possess would force first-tier producers 
to submit to the former's demands, like a post-contractual revision of delivery date. 
These post-contractual revisions are frequent, partly because there is no written (not to 
say complete) contract between domestic producers, and partly because buyer-driven 
commodity production is highly fluctuating. How these post-contractual revisions are 
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resolved is obviously related with the power relations among producers. The power of 
the upper-tier producers is further enhanced, since they are situated in a less 
competitive market (relative to their lower-tier counterparts). The reason is that 
exactly because to occupy an upper position in the industrial structure requires more 
resources and capabilities, the entry barriers for such position would be higher. 
Consequently, the layered structure is also a pyramidal one, something that is similar 
with the structure of the world-economy (Cf. Arrighi 1990). 
Though upper-tier producers can utilize their power to ensure expected action 
from lower-tier ones, power in itself is not enough in governing decentralized 
commodity production. The gist is that power has its own limits: its over-exertion 
would make integration of commodity production impossible. Producers have to place 
trust on each other, and to solicit genuine cooperation. Trust is important in governing 
the networks ofinterdependence, because contracts in transactions are incomplete and 
frequent adjustments as well as independent initiatives from the less powered are 
required. Cooperation from lower-tier producers have to be ensured, because an 
isolated producer is unable to survive. For instance, local trading firms could not do 
any business ifall first-tier producers they have are not cooperative enough. Likewise, 
when first-tier producers want to accept a rush order or an order at a lower-than-
market price, they have to solicit cooperation from lower-tier ones. It is because 
small-sized domestic producers have to resort to extemal transactions; and hence they 
have to ensure cooperation across organizational boundaries. Upper-tier producers 
have to ask for quicker delivery or a slightly reduced price from their lower-tier 
production partners. Without the necessary trust and the resultant cooperation in 
place, then, production would be paralyzed and the decentralized production system 
would disintegrate. Thus a minimal amount of trust has to be placed, even by the 
powerful. 
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Such a mode of governance should be seen as efficient in organizing buyer-
driven commodity production, because it can enhance responsiveness to foreign 
buyers' demands. However, we cannot explain the emergence of this mode of 
governance merely by attributing to its efficiency. A production system governed by 
distrust is also an equilibrium. When domestic producers do not place enough trust on 
each other, they would attempt to draft a contract as complete as possible, and they 
would not attempt production adjustment nor offer independent initiatives without a 
guarantee ofretums. Ifit is really the case, the production system as a whole is rather 
weak in attracting foreign buyers' orders. What we want in the explanation of this 
mode of governance is thus the causal processes of social construction. How and 
whether trust can be constructed is，I have argued, conditional on the social structure 
in which actors are embedded. To focus on the social construction of trust is a good 
entry point, when we want to redress an economic bias. 
Trust has two interesting properties, which can fully demonstrate why the 
construction process is very delicate and socially embedded. Firstly, to place trust 
requires the trustor taking a cognitive (and emotional) leap. If the trustor can predict, 
with full confidence, that the trustee would behave as expected, trust is not required. 
Trust begins after rationality ends. However, rationality still plays the role in the 
minimization of risks when trust is to be placed; otherwise it is a blind faith. How a 
trustor can gain a more informed understanding of the probable trustworthiness of a 
would-be trustee, and hence can take a less risky leap as well as a more secured move, 
depends principally on the volume and fidelity of information gathered. I have argued 
in Chapter Six that a would-be trustor would utilize its own existing personal network ， 
as well as direct "inspection" to gather the diffiise information of the would-be 
trustee, so as to determine the trustworthiness of the latter. Information gathered 
through this channel is believed to be more accurate and reliable. Such juxtaposition 
of economic onto personal relationships, then, may not be necessarily the mere result 
of cultural preference. It also clearly shows us that trust among domestic producers 
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are not as "automatic" as some economists would like to see. Furthermore, each 
producer has to behave properly according to the norms of faimess; otherwise, a 
stable relationship among them would disintegrate. It follows that trust has to be 
actively maintained or reproduced. 
While a would-be trustor would feel more secure and informed with these 
kinds of information at hand, the actual trustworthiness of the trustee can only be 
revealed over time, at the time when the fruits of such a trusting relationship are ripe. 
This is the second property of trust, that there is a time lap between the time when 
trust is placed and cooperation (or the lack of it) is really granted. It thus follows that 
the process of trust-placing would be a gradual process, because of the inherent 
incompleteness ofexisting information, and because of the larger risks involved after 
trust has been placed. To proceed in a gradual fashion and to superimpose the 
transactions onto social relations will minimize the risks or losses even if trust is 
misplaced. 
Although an actor who has placed trust on the other would act as z/there is a 
very low probability ofopportunism, the risks of which still remain. But the tendency 
of such opportunism is curtailed, firstly because of the value of the relationship in 
itself, and secondly because of the possibilities of social sanctions against such 
"wrong-doings". For instance, local trading firms would not push too far on first-tier 
producers, because a stable pool of first-tier producers is valuable to them, and 
because first-tier producers can collectively boycott a "deviant" or overly 
opportunistic local trading firm. That domestic producers are in one common 
community can strengthen these threats of ostracism. Domestic producers thus can 
feel more secured when trust is to be placed, because the risks of opportunism on the 
trustee is indeed minimized. 
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These two aspects of the production system, namely, the input-output system 
and the mode of governance, have been neglected by the prevalent explanations ofthe 
industrial development of Hong Kong. I believe my attempt here can prepare a good 
foundation to further explain why Hong Kong is able to strike a good track record of 
development. 
7.2. On Developmental Outcome 
The aim ofthis thesis is indeed a modest one. My objective is to describe how 
commodity production is organized in Hong Kong. However, with an understanding 
ofthe constituting elements and operations of the production system, we are now able 
to say a few words on its developmental outcome. My focus is on the social processes 
by which responsiveness of the production system is enhanced^. 
7.2.1 Creative Combination of Cooperation and Competition 
To succeed in a buyer-driven commodity chain, by definition, the demands of 
the foreign buyers must be fulfilled. Price, quality, speed, and flexibility are principal 
components of"responsiveness". I argue that these qualities are encouraged in such a 
production system, firstly because there are checked competitive pressures within the 
networks of interdependence. For instance, local trading firms have to select a price-
competitive first-tier supplier, because their own buyers have that option to resort to 
other trading firais (that is, their own competitors), and because other first-tier 
producers are exerting pressures on local trading fmns to do business in a “fair” > 
manner. While local trading firms would certainly prefer a stable production 
partnership to a market-like trading relationship (because a stable partner is more 
2 I have assumed that when responsiveness to foreign buyers' demands is enhanced, the production 
system of Hong Kong can occupy a place in the global division of labor. Such a position would yield a 
significant amount ofsurplus, the accumulation of which would signify "development". 
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"helpful"), they have to introduce competition into the market of first-tier producers. 
It is because local trading firms themselves are subjected to competitive pressure too. -
Thus to gain access to foreign buyers' orders and to reproduce a “good 
relationship" with a local trading firm, first-tier producers would have the incentive to 
offer a good price, service and "cooperation". Otherwise, they would be easily 
displaced by their fellow competitors. However, whether a first-tier producer is able 
to enhance these qualities is not under its own domain of control, because the whole 
production process is accomplished jointly with a number oflower-tier producers. For 
instance, if a first-tier producer wants to increase its price-competitiveness, it has to 
ensure that its lower-tier production partners are able to produce price-competitive 
commodities or components. Ifit wants to receive a rush order, it has to ensure that its 
lower-tier partners can deliver the goods as quickly as possible. 
Lower-tier producers are thus facing competitive pressures too, because first-
tier producers would recruit new members into their production networks if the 
original ones are out-performed by their competitors. First-tier producers would have 
their partnership shifted if a good price, service, or quality has not been offered by 
their original partners. Although first-tier producers again would prefer a stable 
trading relation to a market-like one, they have no choice but to change their 
production partners, because they are facing fierce competition in the market of 
buyers' orders. In GCC terminology, an existing local commodity chain will be re-
constituted if one of the occupants is unable to remain competitive enough to satisfy 
foreign buyers' demands. When seen in this light, competitive pressures in the final 
consumer markets would pass along the global (and local) commodity chain. 
Competition is the catchword here. 
However, the threat of "exit" cannot be over-stretched. Because commodity 
production in Hong Kong is accomplished in a network of interdependence, domestic 
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producers have to solicit cooperation from other production partners. They have to 
place trust on each other, firstly because contracts are inherently incomplete, and 
secondly because independent initiatives fromjunior production partners are required. 
An over-use of exit cannot demonstrate to others that one is trustworthy enough. A 
stable relationship, which is buttressed by trust, is important when producers have to 
satisfy a rush order and to "develop" a new product. Cooperation, or "mutual 
adjustment", is an important factor in augmenting responsiveness to foreign buyers' 
demands. Thus domestic producers have to creatively combine both competition and 
cooperation in fulfilling the demands ofbuyer-driven commodity production. 
7.2.2. A Precarious Symbiosis 
As the title of this thesis suggests, domestic producers are in a precarious 
symbiosis. They are symbiotic in the sense that the survival of each domestic producer 
is a collective matter. Commodity production is accomplished across organizational 
boundaries; an isolated small-sized domestic producer is but unable to finish a single 
commodity. They have to cooperate with each other. The precariousness of the 
relationship means the delicate balancing of competition and cooperation by the 
various producers. Firstly, there is a certain degree of interdependence among 
domestic producers. Local trading firms are in need of the cooperation of first-tier 
producers, in the fulfillment of rush order and the attempt of new product 
development, for instance. First-tier producers are, simultaneously, dependent on the 
local trading firms to organize their outputs. Shifting down a level, first-tier producers 
likewise are dependent on their lower-tier counterparts: since the scope and scale of 
one particular producer are limited, external linkages must be resorted to, and 
cooperation of the production partners must be ensured. By the same token, being 
deficient in the necessary resources to occupy upper position, these lower-tier 
producers have to "please" their upper-tier counterparts, so that a stable and adequate 
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flow of business can be maintained. Inter-dependence, in sum, implies a certain 
degree of cooperation. 
However, a mere reliance on the cooperation from other production partners is 
not enough, simply because the relationship would rigidify in due course. Production 
is highly decentralized and consequently intemal authority to ensure expected actions 
is absent. Competitive pressures have to be introduced, so that each producer must try 
its best to prove its worth to the other. Only when introducing competitive pressures 
into their downward vertical linkages can domestic producers withstand competitive 
pressures in their upward linkages. Market power, of course, is an important means to 
introduce competitive pressures into an existing relationship. However, as I have 
mentioned just above, its use has its inherent limits, and so does competition. 
Cooperation cannot be guaranteed by the use of power only. Cooperation is only 
granted only if one party has placed enough trust on the other, that the latter would 
behave "properly", and would try its best to maintain the relationship. Such a 
cooperative relationship, in tum, is favorable to both parties alike. Power and trust, 
then, are intertwined, so that such a balance between cooperation and competition is 
struck. A symbiotic relationship has to be actively maintained. In sum, by creatively 
combining cooperation and competition, domestic producers can jointly, or 
symbiotically, survive the fluctuations of buyer-driven commodity production. By 
this way, the production system of Hong Kong excels in the satisfaction of foreign 
buyers' demands, or succeeds in a buyer-driven commodity chain. 
7.2.3. The Future Destiny of the Production System and Development 
In previous chapters, I have also noted some temporal changes in various 
aspects of the production system. For example, we have talked about the growing 
"roundaboutness" of the production network, the slow erosion of the power of local 
trading firms, as well as the intensifying process of industrial restructuring or 
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relocation. These changes are important factors to be considered when we want to 
understand the “destiny，，of the production system, and the possibility of further 
development of the industrial economy. While it is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis to tackle them in great detail, I believe that a social organizational perspective 
is quite helpful to answer these questions. 
We may begin from the structural changes in the world-economy. This focus 
on the level ofworld-economy is imperative, as the input-output system as well as the 
mode of governance of the production system in Hong Kong are intimately related 
with its mode of linkage with the world-economy. Buyer-driven commodity 
production is inherently unstable; whether buyers' capital will continue to source in 
Hong Kong is related with the competitive pressures exerted by other NICs. While we 
can argue that the production system is so developed that no other NICs can easily 
match, and that a rush or complicated production order can only be fulfilled by this 
production system, rising wage rates in Hong Kong cannot but be an unfavorable 
factor with respect to the global sourcing program of buyers' capital. Of course, the 
loss of price-competitiveness can be compensated by quicker delivery and flexibility 
in fulfilling buyers' demands. There are indeed different "export roles" in buyer-
driven commodity production, which requires different kinds of production 
capabilities on the part of domestic producers (Gereffi 1993, 1994b). A buyer-driven 
commodity production can be upgraded from OEM production to ODM ones, if the 
production capability (for example, design functions) is well developed. These are 
also the crucial competitive advantages of the Hong Kong's industrial economy. 
However, particularly after the production systems of NICs grow in elaboratedness, 
these competitive advantages may be eroded relatively. 
As the GCC framework has argued, development as surplus accumulation 
can be enhanced when a particular country or economy moves up along the global 
commodity chain. One can thus say that Hong Kong can continue its good track 
_ - Page217 
Chapter Seven 
record of development by incorporating the marketing functions of a buyer-driven 
commodity chain. This is exactly the strategy adopted by the most established 
garment-making industrial establishments in Hong Kong (see Gereffi 1994b; 
Glasmeier, Thompson and Kays 1993). These establishments have developed their 
own brand name and have gained direct access to advanced markets. They have also 
developed specialized design fmctions, which are crucial in exploring highly 
competitive markets. However, the feasibility of this mobility strategy for the less 
capital-endowed industrial establishments in Hong Kong is quite dim/ As the 
experience of the metal ware factory has shown us, such direct marketing strategy, 
though basically out ofgood intention, is not a viable one, because ofthe lack oflarge 
amount of capital and of the large cultural distance with the markets. 
However, a move upstream does not necessarily mean a wholesale 
incorporation of all functions in a buyer-driven commodity chain. As many industrial 
establishments have their production capacity relocated to other lower-tier NICs (most 
notably to South China), these industrial establishments can be seen as having moved 
just one node upwards in the global commodity chain. These establishments are still 
producing according to the orders and specifications placed by foreign buyers, but 
they are now taking up the coordinating role in organizing the regionally scattered 
industrial activities in East Asia. These establishments take advantages of the growing 
industrial capability and lower wage rates of the lower-tier NICs, and act as the 
regional production headquarters (Cf. Henderson 1989). The first-tier production 
partners of the Nike production network that I have talked about in Chapter Three 
have also adopted this self-limiting strategy. Thus we may argue that a relatively 
larger amount of surplus can be appropriated in this way. That producers in Hong 
Kong are more socially and physically proximate to these lower-tier NICs is perhaps 
another piece of competitive advantage. However, whether this denotes “real 
development" is uncertain, as this process of industrial relocation may mean to some 
as deindustrialization and loss ofjob opportunities. 
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Another development option is now open for the relocated establishments. 
Originally, these establishments treat production sites in China as labor-only 
workships. Having built up the necessary connections with various Chinese producers 
and state agencies, these establishments may now shift their target markets to China. 
In other words, they can now transform into “real” transnational production capital, 
capturing the growth of home markets as well as cheap labor power. This 
incorporation of marketing spheres is more feasible for the relocated Hong Kong 
establishments, because of a shorter social and physical distance with the target 
markets. Furthermore, the Chinese markets, because of its virgin nature, demand less 
sophisticate product and less advanced production capability than the highly 
developed ones in advanced countries. This strategy may perhaps be a very favorable 
option for the producers based in Hong Kong. 
7.3 A Theoretical Reflection 
I have employed the GCC framework in understanding industrial development 
ofHong Kong. As I have introduced in Chapter Three as well as the beginning ofthis 
chapter, when one wants to explain the development (or mobility) of a particular 
nation-state or economy in the world-econonmy, one has to answer four questions. 
Firstly, what is the nature of commodity chains the nation-state is engaged in? 
Secondly, what is the position of this nation-state in those chains, or what is its 
position in the global division of labor? Thirdly, why and how can the nation-state 
occupy such a position? And finally, how much surplus is (relatively) appropriated in 
such a position? My thesis is aimed at answering the third question, which is, in my 
view, the least theorized one in the whole GCC framework. 
Of course, to answer the third question requries one to answer the remaining 
ones simultaneously, and a handful of GCC researches has already done a good job 
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here. My starting point is that domestic producers in Hong Kong are engaged in 
buyer-driven commodity production, as OEM exporters in the world-economy 
(Gereffi 1993). I have specified the nature of the commodity chain and the position in 
which Hong Kong is engaged and occupied. In this kind of production chains, I 
hypthesize that foreign buyers would place their orders only on responsive domestic 
producers (or on their constituent production system). The specific nature ofthis kind 
of commodity chains, in other words, would place specific "fmctional imperatives" 
on the local organization of production. While I believe my discussion has already 
validated this point, the analysis of the nature of different GCCs can nonetheless be 
strengthened by a systematic comparison between various kinds of commodity chains. 
The distinction between producer- and buyer-driven commodity chains is a first step 
toward this goal; however, I believe more attention should be given to the reason why 
a particular commodity would branch out from the core to specific semiperipheral or 
peripheral countries. 
To anwser this question, one has to first specify the “needs” ofthe core capital 
concerned. Korzeniewicz (1992) is a good case here, when he tries to connect the 
global geography of industrial production to the secular changes in core markets. His 
notion of consumption in the “postmodem” world is instructive in the sense that the 
core capitals would want responsive and flexible producers so as to gain a firmer hold 
in turbulent product markets. The search of a cheap labor supply is obviously not the 
only motive in global outsourcing (Cf. Schoenberger 1988b). This directs us to the 
domestic organization of production of the recipient nodes, or equivalently, the 
"attractiveness" ofthis domestic node. How a specific nation-state can attract foreign 
capital cannot but be related with its domestic characteristics, among them cheap 
labor provision is just one. 
To say this would perhaps lay an unreasonable burden on the GCC 
framework, since the focus of a GCC theorist (as a world-systemist) may not be on 
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the individual mobility of a particular nation-state. Nonetheless, if we want to 
• _ 
decipher the secular trends of the whole world-economy (I see this as the principal 
explanadum in world-systems analysis), we cannot lose sight of the possibility of 
reshuffling of individual states in the world-economy. The GCC framework is indeed 
faithful to the basic tenets of world-systems analysis, since it emphasizes that the 
specific nature of commodity chains (and the dynamics of the world-economy) would 
affect the posibility of mobility of an individual nation-state as well as the 
morphology of the global organization of production. Cheng and GerefE's (1994) 
notion of the "developmental-organizational contexts" of informal economy in East 
Asia is particularly relevant here. They have skilflilly analyzed the impact of the 
developmental context on the organizational arrangements of a domestic production 
node, and relate the different facets of the informal economies to the "requirements" 
ofthe commodity chains the East Asian NICs are engaged in. However, their analysis 
sounds a little one-sided, in that the domestic organization of production (here the 
input-output system) is determined by the needs of foreign captials or markets. 
Furthermore, they have not specified how the specificities of the domestic 
organizational characteristics would enable the various East Asian NICs to occupy 
different positions in different types of GCCs. While my analysis has also singled out 
the requirement of buyer-driven commodity production as an important determining 
force on the inter-organizational relationships among domestic producers in Hong 
Kong, I have gone a step further by arguing that the developmental context in which a 
domestic node is situated is affected by its (domestic) organizational arrangements. 
That domestic producers in Hong Kong are smaU in size and that the principal 
competitiveness of the production system they constitute is quick response would 
“lock” them in the OEM role in buyer-driven commodity production in the world-
economy. I thus believe such a recognition of the mutual interaction between the 
developmental and (domestic) organizational contexts and a broadening of our 
conception of the role of peripheral nations in relation to the core would help redress 
the one-sided emphasis on the structuring forces of "the global". The articulation 
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between the local and the global is perhaps the major item of the fliture research 
agenda (Cf. Dicken 1994; Raynolds 1994). 
The other major item in the future agenda is about the distribution of surplus 
in the world-economy. The concept of surplus is, first of all, a dubious one (Cf. 
Arrighi 1990). A GCC theorist would face immense difficulties in deciphering the 
structure of world-economy and its operations if the definition of surplus is not clear 
enough. The definitions of core and peripheral actitivities are likewise very fuzzy, 
particularly when industrial activities are now "de-corified". Whatsoever the 
definition is, however, the most acute problem is about the mechanisms involved in 
its uneven distribution. In this thesis, I assume that foreign buyers are core capitals 
and possess associated dominating power, because they have control or monopolies in 
the marketing and distribution spheres. By this token, they can appropriate a 
disproportion of surplus even though the production system ofHong Kong has gained 
a firm place in these buyer-driven GCCs. Here I have adopted Arrighi's (1990) 
notions of"expropriation" and "exculsion" in deciphering the nature of core activities 
(and, for that matter, semiperipheral as well as peripheral activities). However, as the 
"roundaboutness" ofthe domestic production system in Hong Kong increases and it is 
made so flexible and responsive that other would-be NICs cannot easily match (Cf. 
Morawetz 1977), we can say that Hong Kong is now enjoying a certain amount of 
monopoly. Whether this signifies mobility into semiperipheral (or maybe core) status, 
I am afraid to say, cannot be satisfactorily anwsered in present GCC researches. I 
hope my exercise here can contribute a little toward this goal. 
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Appendix 1: Glossary 
bijiao bangshou 比較幫手 
chulai 出來 
chumian dejia 出面的價 
chunshe 唇舌 





guanzhao 關 照 . 
huxiang qianjiu 互相遷就 
kaitian shajia, luodi huanqian 開天殺價，落地還錢 
laoshi 老實 
lobian xiaoxi 路邊消息 
mingong 民工 
Moluocha hongs 摩囉差行 










tuo ren shouzhou 托人手月： 
wancan 玩殘 
xiaohuo zherang $^^折讓 
xinyong 倍用 
youyi wuyi 有思無思 
zhisheng 執生 








Appendix 2: List ofInterviewees 
Alvin Male, Mid-Twenties Merchandiser of an Independent Trading 
Firm 
David Male, Mid-Twenties Merchandiser of a Resident Buying Office 
of a Swiss Department Store 
John Male, Mid-Fifthies Owner of an Independent Trading Firm 
Mary Female, Early-Twenties Merchandiser of a Resident Buying Office 
ofa Swiss Department Store 
Peter Male, Mid-Fifthies Owner of a Metalware Factory 
Sam Male, Late Thirties Owner of an Independent Trading Firm 
Simon Male, Mid-Twenties Merchandiser of an Independent Trading 
Firm 
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